[Col. F. W. Lander, Letter from Col. Lander, Sacramento Union, July 12, 1860]

 

LETTER FROM COL. LANDER.

__________

BUFFALO SPRINGS, EDGE OF GREAT DESERT, )

July 5th, 1860. )

            Editors Sacramento Union : In an article of the Weekly Union, of June 9th, under the head of "Indian Fighting," my name is quoted and reference made to our conversation prior to the battle between the forces under Col. Hayes and the Indians near Pyramid Lake. The article states that my opinion, given to you in casual conversation, led you to express yourself in favor of a division of the force about to be led against the Indians at that point. I think you will remember that I said the real object to be held in view in engaging the Indians was by a sharp, decisive action to close the war, relieving the settlements and preventing the necessity of keeping large forces in the field to protect the incoming overland emigration. While it was inexpedient to despise the enemy or risk defeat, the blow — to be effective — should be so guided that avenues of retreat would be cut off and the Indians especially prevented from breaking up into small marauding parties. I also stated that a force of two hundred and fifty men under so competent an Indian fighter as Col. Jack Hayes would be small enough to draw these Indians into a protracted engagement, while the remainder of the Volunteers could cut off their retreat or pursue them to advantage.

            I have just returned from a reconnoissance of two weeks in the Indian country, during which I have ascertained that at least three hundred Indians of the force engaged at Pyramid Lake retreated for over forty miles across the level open country of the Mud Lakes to their mountain fastnesses. No troops occupied the pass through which they retired, nor did the cavalry strike them while thus moving in disorder across the open plains. My own party met the enemy in force, and from the necessity of not being able to divide the small number of men I carried into the field, the Indians again retired without severe loss. Out of a force of sixty-eight men, having quite a pack train to protect, I could only lead into action, in that peculiar cañon country, about fifty individuals. Could I have had hundred and fifty at my command, the Indians must have been compelled to a desperate and decided action. This you will perceive would have occurred from a division of the force, which I offer in support of my first proposition.

            I do not maintain these views apply in civilized warfare, where the detached parties would be struck in detail and annihilated by the superior forces of a disciplined enemy ; but Indians will not stand a sharp assault unless they believe they have a small party at great disadvantage, or are able to create a panic in the ranks of a large one. Perhaps the time is now past when a divided force of gallant men, by taking extreme risks and at some loss could close this Indian war in a short campaign and relieve the Government and frontier settlements from the costs and trials of a long one.

            Driven from their position at Pyramid Lake with the loss of a few men, the hostiles are now broken into marauding bands, prepared to strike the isolated settlements and annoy the great overland travel. It will probably be many months before they can again be drawn into a battle where their position, or spirit to engage, will admit of their sustaining so decided a defeat as to cause them to sue for peace.

            The force led against them was a large and effective one ; the commander stands in the first rank of frontier officers. The whole question, so far as my opinion was given, has been tested. I hope this communication will not be regarded as a reflection upon any of the brave men engaged in the campaign, among whom I number many personal friends. It is only made in my own justification, and I assure you that I will not again venture an expression upon a matter so purely local, even at solicitation.

            Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. W. LANDER.