CHAPTER XVIII

          MEXICO and the United States experienced a change of administration about the same time. On February 24, Madero, the unsuccessful progressive, went to his grave, and on March 4, Taft, the unsuccessful conservative, departed toward a college professorship and a round of lecturing upon pleasant commonplaces, expounded to the taste of the educated simple, and designed to reestablish popularity along safe and sane lines.

          Two strong and resourceful men had taken the highest seats in the two countries — strong in different ways, contrasted rather than similar in their acumen, widely unlike in experience, and as far apart as possible in their morality. They have been the conspicuous actors in the drama, dwarfing all others in the popular view, except perhaps the comedian, Pancho Villa. The action of the piece has centered on the duel between Huerta and Wilson, a contest much more real than that of a military aspect in which the formidable Indian had recently been engaged — the bombardment in Mexico City — yet not quite what it seemed, as will hereafter be made plain.

          The minor characters — Mondragon, Diaz, Calero, Vera Estañol, the survivors of the Madero party, etc.— had little set down for them but exits, which they made when their cues came. De la Barra had a quiet scene or two, and Henry Lane Wilson had the center of the stage for a moment. A new personage, Venustiano Carranza, " first chief of the constitutionalists," appeared conspicuously, then got word from Washington and retired for a time. Upon the

338

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 339

whole the performance, as I have already said, had very much the aspect of a duel between the two presidents.

          The world has been asked to believe that events in Mexico since the 4th of March, 1913, may be accounted for by two causes ; the unsettling effect of Madero's attempt to establish democracy in a country unprepared for it, and President Wilson's refusal to recognize the Huerta Government as de jure.

          The preceding chapters have been devoted to disclosing the influences which nullified Madero's honest efforts —the influences, not of twelve or thirteen million peaceful, unlettered Indians, but of educated and powerful men in Mexico and elsewhere. These had consented to the wrecking of the Government; as they might have consented to the wrecking of a corporation in the hope of bettering their own position through a reorganization.

          Most Americans and Europeans held this view, or at least had been greatly affected by the constant assertions that the Madero rule was not good for business — a kind of panic talk, that had been a weapon of the late President's enemies. The foreigners did not lament Madero's fall ; most of them looked upon him as a disturber, and had accepted the ten days' battle in Mexico City as a full demonstration of his inefficiency. They were shocked by the murders, but hardly a man of them saw what must follow. Nearly all believed that the prospects for an enduring peace had been materially bettered by Madero's death, though the manner of it had been unfortunate. The new government, they supposed, represented all the most powerful cliques. There would be trouble for some time with the Maderistas and the bandits, said the resident foreigners, but they had considerable hope in Huerta as a man capable of reestablishing a Diaz rule — not under Felix, of course — and they were greatly influenced in the new dictator's

340 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

favor by the attitude of the American Ambassador toward him.

          Severe losses already had been sustained by the foreigners, the largest, without doubt, falling upon Americans and American corporations. Of the 40,000 Americans, which my special canvass in 1910 had disclosed as permanent residents, possibly 20,000 were in Mexico at the beginning of March, 1913. The number had been smaller directly after the great stampede of March, 1912, but the alarm had been false and many had returned. Practically all who had remained away were heavy losers, and so were many who came back, but the great majority of the English speakers who were in Central Mexico at the time the Huerta Government was set up preferred it to its predecessor, and hoped for better business conditions in the near future.

          In Mexico City the Americans saw their Ambassador as diligent for the new government as was any man connected with it, from Huerta down. All knew what his attitude had been toward Madero, and some of them understood the inwards of the matter fairly well, and were very glad of the change. A Mexican President pulling one way and an American Ambassador pulling the other make a bad, in fact an impossible, combination as regards governmental stability, and commercial advantages: Some of these men were well satisfied with Ambassador Wilson, personally, others were not. But in one thing they were thoroughly agreed : they did not wish to see another situation like that which they had just passed through, where the dean of the diplomatic corps was hostile to the government.

          They therefore hoped devoutly, for business reasons which were the only potent ones with them, that President Wilson would retain his namesake, the Ambassador, that nothing would mar the latter's cordial relations with Huerta,

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 341

and that the new administration in Washington would promptly recognize the man who had seized the helm in Mexico.

          Estimates of American investments in Mexico printed in newspapers of the United States were current about that time and were visibly incorrect in detail although not far from fair in total. Railway investments were overestimated by fully $200,000,000, as a large portion of the railway securities originally floated by American bankers had been sold to Europe. Moreover Mexican Government notes and bonds were named among American holdings, but nearly all of these had been disposed of in Canada and England and the European continent. On the other hand American investments in mining properties, rubber properties, oil lands and haciendas were greatly understated, and when the small individual holdings of resident Americans are fairly figured, I consider the total estimate of a billion dollars, most of which represented actual cash, as not far from correct. These investments now had undergone a great shrinkage, which it would be futile to attempt to estimate.

          But the element which seems to have made little impression upon the men who were inside of the game in Mexico City or the observers in Europe and the United States, was the release from active employment of peaceably disposed peons who presently became recruits for the bands which as " constitutionalists," or without attempt to dignify their occupation, preyed upon property. It is estimated that in 1910 fully 1,800,000 Mexicans were employed by American companies and individuals and that by March, 1913, not less than 500,000 of them were entirely idle, while as many more were without regular work. In addition to this the decreased patronage of Americans was seriously felt by a host of Mexican Indians who made a living from produce

342 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

which they carried into the towns on their backs and sold to American families.

          Reduced to the starvation point the unemployed and the little traders made up a constantly increasing menace to the peace. Let no one permit himself to be impressed with the statement that all Mexicans would rather fight than eat, or would choose murder in preference to legitimate employment as a means by which subsistence may be gained. Of the great body of Mexicans, totalling fifteen millions, no larger percentage were viciously inclined than of peoples in lands more advanced in culture. Let us be just to the ignorant peons ; what precept of morality or righteousness would be likely to induce a million starving men in any country to die of hunger and permit their families to suffer the same fate rather than steal from those who have plenty ?

          Without entering deeply into all the elements of the situation, the Americans in Mexico addressed themselves with vigor to their home government in support of the new order of things which, viewed through the glasses of expediency, seemed to them roseate with promise. In every way by which influence could be exerted at Washington it was promptly applied. Petitions were made up and mailed, delegations were dispatched, individuals of wealth and standing, and corporation men of financial power visited the American capital on this business, all pressing upon the Wilson administration the two vital decisions, recognition of Huerta and retention of Ambassador Wilson.

          A political campaign was instituted in Mexico City in the interest of Ambassador Wilson, with the Embassy as headquarters. Americans, Englishmen and Europeans in general were gathered in to join the endeavor. The endorsement of resident Americans was to be made unanimous and the sentiments of other foreigners who appreciated the Ambassa- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 343

dor's efforts during the bombardment, were desirable as a testimonial of high personal regard.

          The work was overdone and the design which lay behind it could not remain hidden. It was known not only in Mexico City but in the United States, where versions of the story appeared in the newspapers. Doubt was then thrown upon the spontaneity of the movement. But these considerations merely emphasized the opinion which very early began to be voiced in the press of the United States, that the American Ambassador had meddled deeply in Mexican affairs, and had then endeavored to commit his home government without authority. If these acts of an ambassador were to be sanctioned, unlimited discretion amounting to usurpation of executive power would in effect be conceded to Washington diplomatic agents in general. The result might have been foreseen from the beginning, but it was so long in coming that its effect for good was lost.

          The problem which the Mexican tangle presented to the Wilson administration at the very outset was a severe test of its qualities if solution were to be found on a moral and entirely peaceful basis. Later on in these pages the subject will receive further treatment. What impressed the American public, as indicated by the experience of interested individuals and the occasional escape of steam in Congress and the press, was the resisting power of the new administration. For four months no man from Mexico could get a hearing.

          On March 6 a slip in routine at the Washington State Department resulted in cabling a note of commendation bearing the signature of the Secretary of State to Ambassador Wilson at Mexico City. Promptly given to the press by its recipient, it was cabled back to the United States and across to Europe. Three days later the Secretary cabled again withdrawing his generous words.

344 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          On March 11 President Wilson issued a statement of intent to cooperate with the people of Latin America, and to use the moral force of his Administration in the interest of electoral reform in those countries, to the end that their governments should be based on the consent of the governed. He announced his lack of sympathy with revolutions that served personal ambitions.

          The statement was regarded in Europe as too vague to commit the Washington Government to non-recognition of Huerta while an Ambassador was held in Mexico City who was exerting all his power through the American consular service and the diplomatic corps at Mexico's capital to support the Huerta rule. In the months of April and May, 1913, England, France, and Germany accorded recognition to the new Mexican government. This was the logical procedure from the European standpoint. Bankers and other interested persons could see no hope of settled conditions in Mexico, should any other course be pursued. If the advice of Señor Limantour and Lord Cowdray was asked for, it was doubtless supplied — and heeded.

          Although Lord Cowdray's name and his much misunderstood oil concession in Mexico have figured prominently in news reports since the setting up of the Huerta government, he has said that he refrained from meddling; and Señor Limantour, in July, 1913, specifically denied having made " intriguing representations to the Powers." It is essential, nevertheless, to consider carefully the positions and the influence of these two men.

          They had long been regarded by European financiers and statesmen as the chief authorities on Mexican matters. They had been consulted in preference to all others. Limantour's opinion as to Mexican credits, and as to politics also, was weighty beyond comparison. Lord Cowdray's knowledge of practical business development in

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 345

Mexico had been obtained from the closest contact, and from the control of large investments. Each of these men had gained in grasp of the situation by his relations with the other during fifteen years of intimate acquaintance resulting in mutual sentiments of profound respect.

          It may be confidently stated that neither would have chosen Victoriano Huerta to rule over the country in which both were so deeply interested. " What a spectacle before the world! " said Limantour in referring to him. Yet Limantour could not view with any degree of tolerance whatever the armed revolt in the North, nor favor by his advice to bankers such action as would precipitate Huerta's fall and put the so-called Constitutionalists into power.

          The thing to be supported was Mexico ; the thing to be averted was a sweeping financial disaster which would pile up the National Railways merger and the Mexican government obligations in a tangled mass of wreckage under which would lie the ruins of every considerable investment that had been made by private individuals. Whatever degree of reticence may have seemed proper to Limantour in his desire to avoid the appearance of participation in Mexican politics, he could not have avoided giving to those who consulted him some disclosure of his conviction as to this matter which was uppermost in his mind.

          In default of any evidence of a constructive policy formed by the United States in recognition of its responsibilities toward Mexico, Limantour was compelled to regard a measure of support for the de facto government of his country as offering the only hope of staving off disaster.

          Lord Cowdray must have arrived at a similar conclusion through considering his own interests in the petroleum fields in the Mexican states along the Gulf of Mexico. The boring concession which he had secured in 1907, while not productive of direct results on government land, had

346 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

led him to undertake extensive operations on areas secured from private owners by purchase and lease. These operations had produced magnificent results, in sharp contrast to the slow progress he was making in the sale at retail of the refined product in Mexican markets. Production of crude petroleum for export and for fuel therefore declared itself as the wise business policy, and preparation was made by him to secure immense tracts in the most promising sections of the oil belt.

          For several years the plans to acquire proprietary or leasehold rights in the oil states were followed with vigor, and the actual area thus brought under Lord Cowdray's control reached, in 1913, the vast total of 1,600,000 acres, about half of which is owned in fee by him or his companies, and the remainder held under thirty-year leases. Two hundred and eighty thousand acres of land held in fee had been acquired by Lord Cowdray in 1902 as part of his Tehuantepec railway deal with the Mexican government. A tract of 418,000 acres adjoining this he bought from private owners subsequent to 1907. He bought 100,000 acres more in northern Vera Cruz.

          The 800,000 acres acquired on leasehold necessitated nearly a thousand separate leases, some of them requiring the signatures of more than forty persons. This illustrates the complications of land ownership in those sections. The proprietors were of all classes, hacendados, planters, ranchmen, and even the unmodified aborigines whose ancestors had held the land from the days of Moctezuma. The enormous labor which this process entailed throws light upon the difficulties that will confront the framer of any equitable plan for redistribution of Mexican lands.

          While Lord Cowdray had been laying this foundation for producing oil in quantities beyond the previous record

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 347

of any individual, others had not been idle. The rights to bore on government land were possessed by him alone, but of purchase and lease of private properties in the oil belt he held no monopoly, and a host of strong competitors had arisen to demand a share of the wealth which flowed in the strata 1,800 to 2,000 feet below the earth's surface. Lord Cowdray's great unmeasured well, Dos Bocas (two mouths) which in 1909 had exploded and become unmanageable, had startled the oil world. When it caught fire and burned for weeks, laying waste many square miles of property, the truth about Mexico's oil was a trade secret no longer. A year or so later Lord Cowdray's borers " brought in " the gusher Portrero del Llano, which held the world's record till November, 1913, its production for every twenty-four hours that it was permitted to flow amounting to about 700 carloads — by actual measurement 103,000 barrels of forty-two gallons each.

          In the spring of 1913 the general development of Mexico's fields had advanced so far that the output of Lord Cowdray's locally organized company, the Mexican Eagle (La Aguila) was barely a half of the total. The heaviest oil concerns in the world were now in the field. The Standard Oil Company, the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, the Southern Pacific Railway Company were large holders. The Rothschilds were said to be interested in the reorganization of the Waters-Pierce Company. Such individuals and firms as William R. Hearst, John Hays Hammond and J. G. White and Co. were prominent. E. L. Doheny, of Los Angeles, California, had made a sensation with his Mexican Petroleum Company and the Huestica Petroleum Company. Maximilian Whittier, Calvin Hunter and other Californians had formed corporations. Richard Mestres, a former employee of Lord Cowdray, had made lucky purchases of Indian lands at twelve

348 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

cents to fifty cents an acre, and in association with Hammond and others had organized strong companies. No pumps were needed ; every well was a gusher.

          Other substantial men had pushed their way in, and many owned producing properties. London promoters were exploiting Mexico oil lands heavily. There were prospects of a boom in oil, approaching that in rubber which had swept through England in 1909. The Mexican Yearbook records the names of 165 corporations operating in the Mexican fields in 1913. Probably as many more had been formed but were awaiting settled conditions before actually beginning work.

          The presence of these other interests, however, did not affect Lord Cowdray, so he says, in any injurious way ; they were in fact helpful during the development stage. The possibilities of the region could not be less than 1,000,000 barrels a day, a volume of output nearly equal to that of the entire world outside. Lord Cowdray's domination of the crude-oil trade depended upon his facilities for handling his own product and that of others in the belt. In 1913 he made a contract with the British government to supply its navy with 7,200,000 barrels of fuel oil a year. With increase of equipment — pipe-lines, tanks, and tank-steamers — his way was open for rapid enlargement of this business to huge proportions, provided always that Mexico's internal disorders could be kept from spreading to the Tampico and the Tehuantepec regions.

          Here were grounds sufficient for desiring that the visible government of Mexico — without regard to its origin or moral qualifications — should receive support, so long as it should be useful as a protective agency.

          The financial situation of the Huerta government was so serious in the spring of 1913 that all parties interested were compelled to give it their close attention. Luis de la

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 349

Barra, brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations, was sent to Paris via New York to give information to those in the French capital whose aid and advice would be most helpful. Following this a representative of the international banking syndicate which had taken the loan of 1910 and had considered favorably a further undertaking to be secured by the unpledged thirty-eight per cent. of the customs, was sent to Mexico to confer with members of the government and report upon the situation.

          The one-year notes of the Mexican treasury for $10,000,000 were maturing on June 10. The one-year notes of the Monetary Commission, endorsed by the Banco Nacional and the Banco Central (both now under French control) and amounting to $10,000,000 were due on August 31. In addition there were obligations of the National Railways of Mexico totaling $23,000,000, to be provided for. Of these obligations $10,000,000 fell due on June 1 and $13,000,000 on November l0.

          The natural recourse at such a moment would have been to ask the bankers to renew, but a syndicate headed by Speyer & Company held twenty millions of the forty-three millions maturing, and they declined to carry the obligations further unless they should be amply secured. The other twenty-three millions were due to bankers who were members of the new syndicate then negotiating.

          The crucial nature of this financial undertaking is emphasized by the fact that if the National Railways should default on its obligations, the corporation would fall into bankruptcy and $105,000,000 of its outstanding bonds which bore the guarantee of the Mexican Government would become a demand obligation upon the treasury of the guarantor. The time may arrive when this default will come, but June or November, 1913, was premature. Before this important financial event occurs affairs must so shape them- 

350 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

selves that prompt reorganization may be safely and profitably effected.

          The negotiations were conducted with the international syndicate of bankers whose principal members are Morgan, Grenfel & Co., and Henry Schroeder & Co. of London ; Banque de Paris et Pays Bas, Credit Lyonnaise, Societe General, and Banque Francaise of Paris ; Bleischroeder of Berlin ; J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., National City Bank, First National Bank, and Guaranty Trust Company of New York.

          Arrangements for a National Railways loan and a Mexican Government loan were rapidly consummated with the international syndicate. The Railways loan consisted of $27,000,000 in two-year notes. The Mexican Government loan was a ten-year obligation of 20,000,000 pounds sterling, of which 6,000,000 pounds sterling was a firm underwriting by the bankers at 90, and the balance optional. Speyer & Company were compelled to subscribe to the loan in a sum equal to the maturing notes which they then held. Thus the control of Mexico's customs by the international syndicate was made complete, and Speyer & Company exchanged the maturing obligations for ten-year bonds secured, as stated, by the customs. They had, however, surrendered their position as fiscal agents of Mexico.

          Out of the 6,000,000 pounds which the bankers positively accepted in the closing days of May, 1913, less than $7,000,000 reached the Mexican treasury for general uses, the greater part having been devoted as described. No difficulty was experienced with the Mexican Congress in securing authorization of the loan, although the pledge of 38 per cent. of the customs receipts was a feature of it.

          The effect of the flotation of this loan on any terms was a distinct gain for the Huerta government at home, and as a

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 351

triumph over the United States was greatly relished at the Palacio Nacional. It was a correspondingly distinct shock to the press of the United States, which had sturdily declared that Mexico could borrow no money until Washington accorded recognition. When the administration was interrogated about it no reply could be elicited. Rumors of Lord Cowdray's deals in oil in association with the loan were stamped by him as falsehoods. Rumors of Limantour influence brought equally emphatic denials. No one could be found, excepting routine Mexican Government officials, who had assisted in any way in the transaction; the loans had been effected in the ordinary course of business, no deals had been made, no influence used. Where and by whom the most effective persuasion was exerted may be gathered from the fact that, of the loan so far as floated, Paris took one-half and the remainder was parceled out to bankers in Germany, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and New York.

          While financial arrangement for Mexico had been going forward, Mexico itself had steadily retrograded in stability. Practically all the North, including the states of Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Sonora were lost to the Huerta Government. The capitals of all these states except Sonora were still held, and certain posts of entry on the border, but the states were overrun with bands and armies calling themselves Constitutionalists. Murder, pillage, torture, outrage, all the crimes that barbarous warfare stimulates, were committed daily in these states and in sections of other states both adjoining and remote.

          The general head of the Northern and Northwestern revolt against Huerta was Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, to whom most of the bands acknowledged allegiance as " first chief," but the quality of the men who admitted his leadership was such that little faith was placed by most ob- 

352 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

servers in any real cohesion when the test should come, and still less in the legitimacy of any enterprise in which they were engaged.

          Many pitched battles were fought with Federal troops and it must have puzzled the devil to know which side to favor, their ethics being undistinguishable. Wounded men were killed. Prisoners were executed by a firing squad unless they changed allegiance, and many were shot who were willing to fight against their comrades.

          In the South the Zapata bands overran the state of Morelos and made frequent excursions into Puebla and Mexico. Frequently their operations were carried do within twenty miles of the capital itself. The general adroitness of these bands was now established and Madero was cleared of charges of lukewarmness in their pursuit. Victoriano Huerta could not be accused of hesitation for sentimental reasons, and he was the best strategist in Mexico besides.

          In Sonora the war was prosecuted with bitterness. The state troops were joined by the Yaqui Indians to repel federal invasion and they nearly always won.  The state forces in Sonora were better armed than were the Constitutionalists further east. Border smuggling of munitions of war from Arizona in the United States seemed a far easier matter than from Texas into the Mexican states immediately south; from Arizona the "gun running" was carried on with little or no regard to Washington prohibition. The patrol at this part of the border was too thinly spread out to be effective. Hermosillo, in Sonora, was repeatedly threatened but never taken by Federal forces, a distinction which dignifies it among insurgent capitals.

          All this was destructive to legitimate business operations in agriculture, cattle raising, mining and all industries in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo Leon and the northern part of Tamaulipas. In Sonora there was

THE POLITICAL SHAME- OF MEXICO 353

much interference with mining interests except those under the control of the Phelps-Dodge Corporation at Nacozari and Canannea which, except for slight troubles at the beginning, were not molested. The Southern Pacific Railway of Mexico, upon which nearly $70,000,000 had been spent and which was nearly completed to Guadalajara to connect with the National Railways, suspended all but tunnel work upon its line and left nearly 1000 miles of completed track to the mercy of events. This railway skirts the Pacific coast through Sonora, Sinaloa and a part of Tepic to a point where it swings abruptly into the state of Jalisco of which Guadalajara is the capital city. The 6000 Mexican laborers and operatives whom the company employed were discharged.

          The system of the National Railways of Mexico was disorganized in all the northern states, being used chiefly by Constitutionalists or Federals for the moving of troops. The damage to its lines and its rolling stock by July 1 totaled an enormous sum in addition to loss of income from traffic. No railway line was in operation from Mexico City to the United States border. The only exit from Mexico's capital was by way of the Mexican Railway to Vera Cruz, and thence by steamer.

          Damage to property belonging to American and European companies and individuals was of discouraging dimensions. Injury to Americans was constantly being reported in despatches ; now and then an American was killed, not apparently because he was an American, but because he happened to be blocking the course of events.

          The Wilson administration was doubtless greatly perturbed, but it made no sign. The Secretary of State was absent from Washington the major part of the time lecturing, the State Department and the Executive Mansion established a quarantine against information on the Mexican sub- 

354 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

ject and held their peace. As the middle of July approached conditions grew worse steadily. There were signs of insubordination in Congress which, for the most part, had heeded with meekness the President's request for a free hand. Newspapers in the states along the Mexican border broke out in violent expressions, and newspapers further east were finding it difficult to construct editorial matter which would bear intelligently upon the news despatches in their columns, and yet be sufficiently inoffensive to Washington to avoid displeasing the President.

          The signal for action came from Europe. Various nations were mentioned as taking the initiative, but the reports were surmises. The nation from which the inquiry came as to the course which Washington intended to pursue is a secret of the State Department as yet unrevealed. But it stirred President Wilson ; and many Americans at home and abroad congratulated the unknown chancellery for its achievement. It was on July 15, that this mysterious stimulus became effective at Washington, and on the following day the step which seemed to be four months and twelve days overdue was taken — Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, was recalled.

CHAPTER XIX

          SO great had been the decline of his importance in the Mexican problem that the removal of Henry Lane Wilson from one side of the primary equation did not change the answer. The apparent policy of the United States was still found to be equal to zero.

          There was a plentiful lack of haste in the elimination of the Ambassador. He was summoned to Washington on July 16; he arrived there on the 26th. Nine days afterward, the resignation which he had tendered according to the diplomatic custom, at the change of administration on March 4, was accepted to take effect October 14, an extension of the usual sixty days to ninety.

          His public criticisms of the policy of the United States produced no result. If my estimate of that policy is correct, the Ambassador did not know what it was. His attacks were fervid, and perhaps injudicious ; his view of the recent chapter of history in which he had figured, seems to me erroneous and his argument unconvincing. These things matter very little. Though he had spoken with the tongues of men and of angels, he would have been just as unsuccessful in affecting the President and the Secretary of State.

          It is probable that dissatisfaction with his performance as Ambassador to Mexico was not the determining cause of his deletion from the diplomatic service. He was of no use to the administration; the influence behind him had ceased to have political value. With reference to the problem as it stood, Henry Lane Wilson had nothing to offer

355

356 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

which was acceptable. He expressed his opinions with becoming moderation before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and made a favorable impression upon some of the members, but there is no evidence that the President or Mr. Bryan was brought to see any way in which the Ambassador could be of the least service to them in what they wished to accomplish. From that time forth Henry Lane Wilson was hardly more influential than Cassius M. Gillette.

          What the world saw at this period was the struggle between Woodrow Wilson, in the White House, and Victoriano Huerta in the National Palace. It seemed to progress slowly, but some of the moves were very unusual and very interesting even to those who did not comprehend the strategy. Mexico was bleeding to death, in the meantime, and shrill cries often drew away the attention of spectators, yet the contest went on.

          Huerta was at first embarrassed by some of his own official family, and he proceeded to dispense with them in order to secure more freedom of action. His ideas as to the importance of certain men, and of the political factions which they represented, and of the influences behind them, had greatly changed since the days of the terror, when he was reckoning up the elements of strength which must be combined in support of his rule. No bestowal of political patronage, no possible assembling of individuals in governmental positions under him, could now secure the solid backing of the largest interests. He could not bargain satisfactorily with those interests because he could not give the necessary guarantees. The failure to secure recognition from the United States had greatly weakened him. He was in a position somewhat analogous to that of a business man who is in straits and heavily indebted to his bank from which he cannot now get the accommodation that he needs,

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 357

lacking the requisite security, yet the bank will lend him a few dollars from time to time, not quite daring to let him fail.

          In these circumstances it was natural that Huerta should see the best chance for himself in the concentration of power in his own hands ; and it is quite possible that some of the better men around him either estimated this situation with their own brains and found it hopeless, or were enlightened by the superior personages whom they served. Be this as it may, the exodus began and those who were comparatively strong went out with some that were weak and useless yet not wholly tractable. What Huerta now desired was a government all Huerta.

          In June Garcia Granados resigned as Minister of Gobernacion and Aureliano Urrutia, a full-blooded Xochimilco Indian, was appointed in his place. Urrutia was a surgeon, able and well instructed, a wholly self-made man who had risen to eminence and wealth from the lowest of levels ; but he knew nothing of statecraft or politics, and was looked upon by the Cientifico influences which Garcia Granados represented, as a potentially dangerous ally of Huerta's. As Urrutia came in, Vera Estañol resigned from the Department of Education, and with him went the active representation of the great American corporations for which he was counsel.

          On June 23 Manuel Mondragon was disposed of after a manner quite Huerta's own. A banquet of army officers was held, at which War Minister Mondragon and President Huerta were guests of honor. At its conclusion General Huerta informed Mondragon that his presence in the United States was required at once and that a train with his luggage aboard was in waiting to carry him to Vera Cruz. To Mondragon's expostulations Huerta gave humorous answers, and calling half a dozen officers from among the

358 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

banqueters, he joined them in escorting Mondragon to the station where he embraced him cordially in farewell and assured him that it was " all for the good of the Fatherland." General Blanquet was immediately made Minister of War, vice Mondragon resigned.

          In July, Felix Diaz was sent away, ostensibly en route to Japan on the famous mission of thanks which Gustavo Madero had arranged to undertake, and at the close of the month de la Barra was accredited to Paris as Minister. Ambassador Wilson had already been recalled to Washington. Rodolfo Reyes, though shorn of power, held to his seat in the Cabinet until September in the vain hope that Felix Diaz would rise again to a conspicuous place in Mexican affairs. Thus were the ties severed which had seemed to bind certain influences to Huerta. His cabinet was made up of men whose own wills counted for little; he could look into a hand-mirror and behold the sardonic visage of the whole Mexican Government. And the same view was more and more clear to observers in other parts of the world, notably in Washington where the obstinate Indian's chief adversary played the odd, dilatory game against him, to the perplexity of all nations.

          President Wilson's first conspicuous move was made on August 4 when he despatched to the Mexican capital as his personal representative ex-Governor Lind of Minnesota. It was announced that Mr. Lind had gone on a peaceful errand for Mexico's good. August 9 he sailed into Vera Cruz harbor on a warship, with the eyes of the world upon him and the big journals of the United States very anxious about their news facilities, lest these should not operate fast enough to cover the brisk performances of the envoy.

          On the following day, despite rumors that danger lurked in the tunnels and bridges along the ascent to Mexico City, Mr. Lind made the journey without mishap. His message

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 359

to Huerta was delivered by Mr. O'Shaughnessy, the American chargé d'affaires, and was politely received. Its substance was presently cabled back to the United States where it created more perplexity than in Mexico. Neither the partisans of President Wilson nor his adversaries knew what to make of it. Not that the language was in the least degree obscure; on the contrary it was as clear as a mirror, and as difficult to see through. In the minds of thoughtful editors it begot the question, why should Mr. Lind be sent to Mexico upon a mission that had no chance of success?

          The communication which he transmitted to Huerta was a summons to surrender, its demands being covered in four items :

          First. Complete cessation of hostilities (that is, an immediate peace, or at least a truce, in Mexico).

          Second. That President Huerta resign in favor of a President ad interim.

          Third. The fixing of an early date for the Presidential elections.

          Fourth. That General Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency.

          The task of replying seriously on behalf of Huerta to these suggestions that he expunge himself, fell to Federico Gamboa, who was the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations at that moment. He had been Minister to Belgium for several years, but had been called home by Huerta when de la Barra was accredited to France. Señor Gamboa was personally unacquainted with Huerta who had sent for him, relying upon his reputation as a successful lawyer in Mexico City and as sub-secretary of the Foreign Office under Mariscal, who for many years held that portfolio in the Diaz regime.

          The status of John Lind as confidential agent of President Wilson operating under indirect credentials might have

360 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

been challenged, but Señor Gamboa made no difficulty over trifles. He possessed the gift of language and the theme invited his muse. Under date of August 16 he responded in a document of seven thousand words.

          The paper was summarized for quick transmission of its tenor to Washington. The full text was then translated and forwarded in sections during the three succeeding days. Close study of the English version disclosed obvious and unassailable reasons why none of the four proposals could be acceded to, one of them, the cessation of hostilities, being manifestly impossible. It also revealed a suggestion which was not far from a demand that Huerta be recognized and his Ambassador received at Washington. But the most striking feature of this document was its calm expression of belief that the people of the United States were not of the same mind as His Excellency, their President.

          Meanwhile Mr. Lind had gone to Vera Cruz to await instructions. These he received on August 24, and the following day he submitted a new set of proposals, substantially modified as to their terms, but holding firm to the demand that Huerta should not be a candidate for the Presidency. Twenty-four hours were allowed for consideration and answer.

          By request the time limit was extended one day further, but before the reply was received, President Wilson, on August 27, read a message to Congress on the Mexican situation. As it was the first time in a hundred years that an American President had personally addressed Congress on an international subject, the occasion was a decided event, emphasizing the seriousness of the questions at issue.

          Naturally it was supposed that the President would declare a more vigorous and definite policy in the Mexican dispute. There was nothing in the United States that might be called general information on the subject, nothing that

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 361

resembled a common sentiment, but probably a majority of those who formed an opinion were inclined toward the belief that coercive measures were contemplated and that intervention would follow. This was the easiest inference from the fact that the proposals which had been made to Huerta were obviously such as he would never willingly accede to. Some of the newspapers printed estimates of military strength, and pictures of battleships and generals ; but this display meant little because what the President would say was already known in editorial rooms.

          His address to Congress was an argument for patience, very impressively delivered. " The steady pressure of moral force," he said, " will before many days break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we could triumph as her enemies — and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfactions of conscience and of honor."

          But by way of assurance that the retarded fulfilment of his prophecy of peace should not endanger American lives he added that " all Americans will be urged to leave Mexico at once, and will be assisted to get away by the United States Government through all the means at its disposal."

          Something notable was omitted from the address, a few words which might have supplemented President Wilson's description of the moral force whose steady pressure was to be relied upon. The omission consisted of a sentence in the amended proposal to which Mr. Lind was that day receiving his answer.

          " If Mexico acts immediately and favorably upon the foregoing suggestions," the sentence read, " President Wilson will express to American bankers assurances that the Government of the United States will look with favor upon an immediate loan to Mexico."

          The answer returned by Señor Gamboa was not so long

362 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

as his former paper. It declined the proposals as to the Presidency and the elections, and withdrew the request for recognition. It then disposed of the loan suggestion in these words :

          " Permit me, Mr. Confidential Agent, not to reply for the time being to the significant offer in which the Government of the United States of America insinuates that it will recommend to American bankers the immediate extension of a loan which will permit us, among other things, to cover the innumerable urgent expenses required by the progressive pacification of the country; for in the terms in which it is couched, it appears more to be an attractive antecedent proposal to the end that, moved by petty interests we should renounce a right which incontrovertibly upholds us at a period when the dignity of the nation is at stake.

          " I believe that there are not loans enough to induce those charged by the law to maintain that dignity, to permit it to be lessened."

          Señor Gamboa's reply had the effect of strengthening considerably the position of Huerta. Influential men who had been displeased with the dismissal of their representatives from the cabinet were reconciled, more or less ; some of them spoke out in favor of the new regime. Evidences of popular enthusiasm were not lacking; the number of voluntary enlistments in the army was increased, and in many ways the general apathy was broken by sentimental outbursts. Señor Gamboa was loudly praised, and Huerta also. The ill will towards Americans was deepened ; the reviling and ridiculing of President Wilson began to give promise of the monstrous lengths to which it went a little later.

          Mr. Lind returned to Vera Cruz to await further orders. His movements from the day of his departure from New York were a subject of keen interest to American newspapers. The episode was the strangest journey in diplomacy

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 363

with which editorial writers of the United States had been called upon to deal, surpassing the Hawaiian expedition of Paramount Blount.

          It is improbable that after the publication of the first demand made by Mr. Lind any extravagant hopes for the success of his mission were entertained by citizens of the United States whose knowledge of Mexican affairs fitted them to form an opinion. But the attention of editors and the public had been drawn to him, negotiations were seen to be in progress between the two countries, and the talk of intervention naturally subsided. By the 28th of August the unpleasant topic had been almost dropped.

          There was much praise of President Wilson as a guardian of the peace of nations. Certainly he himself showed no irritation as a result of General Huerta's refusal to abdicate. The stubborn Indian might stick to his capital and the cares of office, but that was no reason why Mr. Wilson should do the like. On the contrary he departed from Washington

on the 29th for his vacation in Cornish, New Hampshire ; and at the same time Secretary Bryan resumed his lecture tour on the Chautauqua Circuit. The Mexican matter was shelved.

          But the Americans in Mexico — those outside of Mexico City where little attention was paid to Washington's warning — were in sad straits. Urged by President Wilson's speech and spurred by Secretary Bryan's announcement, supported by the activity of American consuls, the Americans began a new exodus from all points of departure on Mexico's coasts and borders. Their personal belongings that could not be carried in a hand bag they registered at the nearest consulate and abandoned.

          Those who had no money made their way in one fashion or another to ports on the Gulf or on the Pacific, and looked about for the transportation which had been promised. In

364 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

due time they discovered it. On the Gulf Coast it consisted of steerage passage on merchant vessels to the southernmost ports of the United States ; on the Pacific a transport traveled along the coast to gather in straggling refugees. These unfortunates were carried a few miles beyond Mexico's Pacific coast line and were set ashore at San Diego, California.

          President Huerta was distressed at the poverty of the arrangements which President Wilson had referred to as " all the means at the disposal of the Government of the United States." The men who had contributed to Mexico's prosperity, the grim old Indian humorist said, should not travel in the steerage ; Mexico would provide first-class accommodations for all who wished to return to their native land. And many Americans, be it said in passing, accepted his offer. On September 7 the Department of State at Washington reversed itself ; consuls throughout Mexico were ordered to stop the exodus.

          On the night of October 10, President Huerta emulated the example of Napeoleon Bonaparte by a coup at the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber had angered him by insurgent resolutions following the disappearance of Senator Belisario Dominguez, who had delivered a speech violently denouncing Huerta and charging him with responsibility for Madero's death. The Mexican Congress seems to have lost its temper in the matter of Dominguez, and when Huerta perceived this, he lost his own. While Congress was in session on the evening of the l0th, the building was surrounded by a large force of troops. A detachment then invaded the Chamber and one hundred and ten deputies were arrested, leaving only members of the Catholic Party exempt.

          For two hours the uproar within the building continued, after which the one hundred and ten men were taken through crowded streets to the penitentiary and placed in

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 365

cells. The populace sided with the deputies, and attempted to cheer them but were driven into cross streets and hustled out of the way, many persons being injured and a few killed.

          As soon as the deputies were arrested the Senate which was in sympathy with the Chamber adjourned sine die. Before midnight Huerta dissolved both houses by decree and assumed their function in his own person. By the same convenient method he took to himself the supreme judicial power, and completed his dictatorship by absorbing the powers conferred upon the Departments of Finance, War and Gobernacion. The following morning, while Mexico City held its breath not knowing what arbitrary act might follow, Sir Lionel Carden, the newly arrived Minister of Great Britain, presented his credentials to the dictator and assumed the duties of his post.

          The selection of that moment to complete England's recognition of Huerta by the formal presentation of documents was decidedly unfortunate. The incident indicated a new attitude of British representation in Mexico, and it seemed to suggest a forward move at England's Foreign Office. This impression was strengthened ten days later when Sir Lionel was quoted at length in despatches. Much that he said was void of offense, but in one sentence he intimated that Washington was dealing with the Mexican situation superficially, without full knowledge of the real causes of the trouble, and in consequence was complicating affairs rather than contributing to their solution.

          The fact that many Americans at home, not directly interested in Mexico, recognized in these remarks a just criticism of President Wilson's endeavors in the Mexican field, did not soften the Minister's offense. But it presently developed that London believed there was an error in the report, an opinion which Sir Lionel sustained a little later by

366 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

denying that he had uttered the words which caused the flutter. The episode passed by with no alarming signs of damage, yet a shock had been felt. The statement that Sir Lionel was a close friend of Lord Cowdray's was declared to be without significance, but it was noted by the discerning few.

          The Mexican Constitution of 1857 is a remarkable document. It provides more safeguards for those who abide under the shadow of its wing than any other Government charter in the modern world. But somewhere in its tortuous and carefully amended course is successfully concealed the fact that a Mexican ruler, guarded by a careful student, can issue a decree depriving persons of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and still keep within constitutional bounds. Deputies are constitutionally exempt from arrest, yet here were one hundred and ten jailed at one stroke; and no power short of overwhelming armed force could release them but the Dictator alone who put them in prison. No law could operate because the Dictator had decreed to himself the supreme judicial power of the State. The student who had guided the Dictator's acts in this affair was no other than Querido Moheno who had been made Secretary of Foreign Affairs when Federico Gamboa resigned to become a candidate for the presidency, and an object of Huerta's distrust.

          It grieved General Huerta to inconvenience these gentlemen among whom were such old friends as Rodolfo Reyes, who had resigned from the Cabinet on September 12, and Jorge Vera Estañol, once a valued member of the same circle. The dissolution of Congress, Huerta said, was the greatest sacrifice he had been called upon to make, but he could not hesitate because it was for the good of the Fatherland. He earnestly hoped, he said, for the support of the people, and he called upon them to elect worthier representa- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 367

tives. To provide them with an opportunity for this, he proclaimed a new election of Senators and Deputies to be held on October 26, the date that had already been set for the presidential election.

          On the day following the publishing of these expressions of policy (October 12), forty of the deputies were released ; later the doors were unlocked at different times for others, among them Rodolfo Reyes and Vera Estañol who with all convenient speed proceeded to New York. At the time these pages were prepared for the press about thirty of the deputies were still in prison.

          On October 14 President Wilson invalidated the Mexican elections in advance by informal pronouncement at Washington. In no sense could the elections now to be held be regarded as " free " and " in accordance with the Mexican Constitution," which had been the condition President Wilson had insisted upon as pre-requisite to his recognition of the results. President Huerta was not greatly disturbed and his simple election program was not altered in the smallest item.

          In what may be called the advance puffery, that election of October 26, 1913, was monstrous in volume. The multiplying of descriptive phrases appropriate to a legitimate contest, passed the limits of common sense and went into absurdity. The Madero election was the only one ever held in Mexico which could be called " free," and even that was without effective safeguards. The election carried on by Huerta was of the old Diaz order and consisted of an elaborate system of appointments.

          In certain places a vote was manufactured by signatures of soldiers and of peons gathered in to make up a minimum. In most instances these men made their crosses for few could write; none of them knew what they signed. Voting, in short, was a negligible quantity in an election where the

368 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

result was made up in advance. A certificate bearing the correct signature was election, whether it was preceded by voting or not. When this certificate had been issued in accordance with the will of the chief, the constitution was supposed to have been suitably respected.

          The Huerta officials in recognition of the broad interest in this election determined that no slip in consistency should mar so solemn an event. " Returns " were reported as coming in slowly, and much uncertainty was expressed as to the result. While the calculations were being made Felix Diaz, who had ventured into Vera Cruz in order to be constitutionally entitled to receive votes, found it advisable to depart. Helped by the American consul at the port, he was hustled, in the night of October 27, aboard the American gunboat Wheeling lying between the Vera Cruz wharves and the island prison of San Juan d' Ullua. The next day he was placed on board the battleship Louisiana. Some days later he made his way to Havana.

          An election report was given out early in November at Mexico City and Generals Huerta and Blanquet were said to have been elected President and Vice President. When the new Congress, chosen at the same time, assembled on November 20 it declared its own election valid, but nullified that of Huerta and Blanquet " as a rebuke to the overenthusiastic people " who in defiance of the constitution had insisted upon voting for these men. The constitutional prohibition of a provisional president's being a candidate to succeed himself applied only to Huerta, but Blanquet was included in the nullification act to simplify matters. By this maneuver Huerta had " tagged " a Congress into office and renewed his lease of the dictatorship until July, 1914.

          Meanwhile President Wilson in a speech at Mobile, Alabama, on October 27 had made the important declaration that the United States would " never again seek one foot

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 369

of additional territory by conquest." In the same address he dealt at length (and quite incorrectly) with concessions in Latin America. Mexico was not named, but as it had been conspicuous for months, and just then was most prominently in the public eye, it doubtless stood for the Latin America to which his remarks were addressed. He congratulated Latin America on its coming emancipation from the concession evil, a trammel upon true progress from which the United States had long been free.

          President Wilson did not distinguish between concession and monopoly which, in Mexico, are terms by no means synonymous, and his lack of clearness on this point must have obscured the meaning of his remarks for Mexicans familiar with affairs in their country. They supposed that the President meant to warn them particularly against granting oil concessions to Englishmen, and to advise them to seek prosperity by heeding the counsels of the United States. But it is a common argument in Mexico that the Latin American countries furthest removed from the influence of the United States are the most prosperous and best governed, and that Mexico should hesitate before she turns a deaf ear to all other counsellors, and heeds only the voice of her great neighbor on the north.

          On the next day after President Wilson spoke at Mobile, Secretary Bryan made announcement that England, France, and Germany had agreed, at the request of the United States, to take no further action with regard to Mexico until the Washington Government should declare its future policy. When the statements of the President and the Secretary of State were pieced together they seemed charged with full assumption of responsibility for Mexico and for all Latin America, on a basis of altruism broader than any hitherto conceived. Also they seemed to prepare the way for armed intervention at any moment.

370 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          There was no sign, however, of any but a verbal aggressiveness in Mexican affairs. Week after week went by without announcement of a Washington policy. Europe held to its bargain and permitted the United States full enjoyment of the Monroe Doctrine without official protest. On December 2, President Wilson, in his first annual message to the regular session of Congress, definitely relegated Mexican matters to the doldrums.

          " Little by little," he said, " Huerta has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling, and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting."

          It was officially out at last : watchful waiting in the Mexican affair was the policy of the United States. Enthusiasm was hardly to be expected ; the American people were not keen for watchful waiting or for any alternative ; they had no common opinion on this subject. The press was inclined to ridicule the Wilson policy, but there was no determined attack of such a nature as seriously to disquiet the President. The secret of his procedure in the Mexican affair from the outset of his Administration, though it lay open to every eye, was never seen by friend or foe, if I may judge from my own reading of editorial comment published in the United States and Europe.

          The London Times in its issue of December 3 contained expressions worth quoting. Under the heading " Mexico in Chaos " the Times dealt editorially with the message in these words :

          " There is no need, said President Wilson, to alter his policy of watchful waiting. It is just that policy to which opinion in Mexico City ascribes the recent aggravation of the situation and the rapid spread of anarchy accompanied by every sort of horror. If, says

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 371

the despatch from our correspondent in Mexico City, the present tactics continue there are no words too strong to paint the disastrous results which will ensue.

          " We are convinced that these dangers are realized as fully in Washington as in Mexico City and we shall be surprised if, when Huerta is gotten rid of and the moment for reconstruction has arrived, President Wilson is not found to have thought out and to be ready to apply a plan for restoring order and decent government in the neighboring republic. Presidents, like other heads of States, are not given to betraying their policy in public utterances."

          It was not possible for all to be so patient and so confident. There were many interested persons not so near Mexico that they could hear the bullets whistle, who found watchful waiting for Huerta to crumble and collapse a joyless experience. The United States had shut up Huerta in a supposedly air-tight closet, but he was receiving a little oxygen by the help of local bankers with European connections, and foreign corporations which dreaded chaos to follow his extinction. Besides there was more air inside than had been noted in President Wilson's original estimate. To be explicit, the resources of that part of Mexico over which the Dictator exercised a species of control were very large.

          In a broad zone across the middle of the country business continued to be done, and the inhabitants could not look to any one but Huerta for protection. They were compelled to pay for it in various ways. For example, the general commanding Federal forces in a district would call together the representatives of important business interests, and announce that the central government was unhappily a little short of funds, wherefore it devolved upon the general to announce with regret that he must withdraw the troops on the following Tuesday unless $250,000, or some other

372 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

amount appropriate to the particular place and occasion, should be provided by those who were to benefit by their retention. In most instances the money was forthcoming.

          It must be remembered that though the revolt in the North overran a vast territory, the percentage of inhabitants thus brought under the Constitutionalist banner was comparatively small. If Mexico in the winter of 1914 be thought of as two nations, the one over which Huerta ruled was enormously richer and more populous than that of which Carranza was the reigning prince and " Pancho " Villa the military genius. Conceiving of the two parts as at war, under fair conditions, there would seem to be no doubt as to which would win, or which in peace would be the more affluent.

          This is not to say that in the circumstances as they really existed, there was any hope for Huerta, unless he could get support from outside his borders. His situation was worse than precarious. The financial system, that solid structure of the Limantour days, began to totter early in the Huerta regime. The Mexican peso which contains forty-seven American cents of intrinsic value as silver metal in any broad market, declined from its parity of 49% that had been fixed by decree and sustained by deposits in New York and London. Steadily down the grade the exchange and purchasing value slipped.

          In June, 1913, the peso could be exchanged for gold at a valuation of forty-five. In August it had fallen to forty. In November it dropped to thirty-six. In January, 1914, it was down to thirty-four, and early in March it reached twenty-nine cents. The history of the exchange market during this decline is one long tragedy for merchants and others compelled to convert their silver into gold. The banks of issue which had made use of their circulation privileges, and had put out bank bills to something like the

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 373

limit allowed by the Limantour law, were unable to redeem in coin on demand. The result was a violent shock to credit.

          In December, 1913, Huerta came to the rescue of the big banks and decreed holidays ; three days first, then ten, then a month. Between Christmas, 1913, and the first of the March, 1914, no bank in Mexico was compelled to meet its obligations on demand. The banks, as a matter of fact, met all the obligations that were actual items of legitimate routine, but checked every attempt to deplete their reserves. No man could present a demand for one thousand or five hundred or even two hundred pesos and receive peso coins for it unless he could prove that the sum was asked for to supply a legitimate need of his business. The half-peso coins, carrying much less proportionate value than the pesos, could be more readily secured, but the days of abnormal financial insecurity were upon the nation, and the result was demoralizing to all honest effort.

          The every-day-a-holiday-system caused monstrous derangement of ordinary business relations. Rents in Mexico City were almost impossible to collect ; interest on mortgages and similar obligations went unpaid, and creditors found it virtually useless in most cases to take legal action. It is folly to displace a tenant who does not pay and substitute another who has no money nor means of getting any. Pecuniary distress absurd and cruel afflicted thousands of men and women who were not rightfully poor.

          Graft and commissions in government supplies were the only healthy and going industries. The commissions and profits of the traders were scaled to bottom levels, but the graft never lessened. War is very favorable to dishonesty in the best ordered nations, and Mexico under such a rule as I have described, was in the throes of civil war. A big army requires arms and uniforms. In Mexico, except about the capital, they are not so particular about shoes, and food

374 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

is left for the women to gather as they can. But forage for horses, and essentials for military service furnished business for dealers who knew the methods.

          Two of Huerta's sons were supposed to have controlling influence in these matters. If any man had arms or ammunition for sale he must see Don Jorge ; if it was uniforms, he made his proposition to Don Victoriano, chico. These young men were said to drive hard bargains and to leave a narrow margin of profit for the dealers, after all commissions were paid, but the money was sure. According to current reports the General and his sons went over the figures of these transactions every morning.

          Early in the year 1913, a gambling house was opened which was known in Mexico City as " The President's House," and was said to be conducted upon capital furnished by Huerta himself who each day called for the winnings. Later on there was a chain of houses, and the sons took charge of the business. There were establishments for all classes of trade distinguished by the minimum wager permitted — the centavo houses for the peons and the peso and five-peso resorts for the opulent. Soldiers lacked their pay sometimes, but the graft and the gambling went merrily on.

          The bull ring at the capital seats thirty thousand persons. Half of the seats are in the shade. The charge for these is three pesos. The other half are in the sun and the price is one peso. Each Sunday the ring was filled ; where the money came from is a mystery which has been observed before but never adequately solved in cities similarly cursed with idleness and empty stomachs.

          For another aspect of the widespread Mexican disaster we must look to the northward. What may be called the Constitutionalist capital was Hermosillo, chief city of Sonora. Here Carranza maintained his headquarters for sev- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 375

eral months, providing himself with a cabinet and other features of an actual government. Hermosillo was a wise selection because the northwest state, Sonora, was the solidest part of the Constitutionalist territory, and the least likely to be attacked. There was a federal army holding the Pacific port of Guaymas, less than a hundred miles away, but a much larger force hemmed it in.

          The selection was wise also because Sonora possesses certain revenues which have been available for the Constitutionalist cause. The State made an issue of fiat currency in July which was followed by a larger issue of Constitutionalist currency whose recognized trading value in Constitutionalist territory on the first of March, 1914, was 33 1/3 cents on the dollar. Three such dollars were regarded as a fair trade for an American coin of the same name. Another argument in favor of Sonora as the headquarters of Carranza was the ease and convenience with which arms were run across the border from Arizona before the embargo was lifted.

          The border is but an imaginary line and for several months the American patrol was lamentably insufficient along the stretch from El Paso westward to the Pacific. The " gun running " industry in that section thrived mightily and it was not conducted under a bushel, or by the storybook variety of smugglers. The deliveries were made in automobiles and the most important concerns in that section were engaged in it. The Phelps-Dodge Corporation and the Dodge Mercantile Company were among those accused. There is no evidence that they were carrying on this business for profit; rather it was thought that they were doing it to assist the Carranzistas, and in the interests of the preservation of order by the only means available.

          Despite some facts which will be presently set forth, it is not possible to say that the alleged " gun running " for Car- 

376 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

ranza by Mr. Dodge's companies was winked at by the United States. In September they, along with others, were indicted for the offense in the United States Courts in Arizona, and although the first indictments were declared faulty, new ones were found. The defendants were discharged without fine or imprisonment, but the proceedings seem to have been regular.

          Much of the help which Carranza received from Americans came in the course of plain business. He was a good customer for munitions of war, and there was a combination of dealers engaged in supplying the demand. The combination did what it could and all that it dared to increase the sales and reduce the difficulties of transportation and delivery. Persons profiting in this way will exert influence in fomenting and maintaining disorder in northern Mexico, as long as the possible market seems to justify the effort. There is no sentiment here, no conscience.

          I do not think it is proved that Carranza is much of a fighting man himself, but he is not a bad manager. Comfortably settled in Hermosillo, with an active junta in Washington, he could await the reduction of Chihuahua by Pancho Villa and be prepared with solemn explanations of any departure from modern standards in Villa's military ethics. It is not credible that Carranza evolved this policy unassisted.

          After Villa captured Juarez and the City of Chihuahua and drove the remnants of the federal army across the Rio Grande at Ojinago, thus making himself master of the largest state in Mexico, the question frequently arose as to whether a man of Villa's successful fighting record and disposition to be nervous under restraint, would long consent to be second to Carranza. If there had been only Carranza in the problem, it is likely that Villa would have thrown off the yoke, light as it doubtless actually was. But

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 377

Carranza plus Washington was a different matter, and Villa was restrained by the obvious advantages that lay in keeping within the charmed circle which the light of Washington's countenance threw around the First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement.

          The understanding between Washington and Carranza was maintained partly by means of United States Consuls, notably George C. Carrothers. Another route of communication between the State Department and Carranza led through the Maderista headquarters at No. 115 Broadway, New York. Francisco Madero, whose office was at No. 32, had fallen out of favor with Mr. Bryan. The recognized spokesman of the Maderos was Rafael Hernandez, the murdered President's cousin, a negotiator of remarkable gifts, courteous, cool, and very hard to read. I am speaking now of February and March, 1914, when a coalition of monied interests was formed for the purpose of restoring peace in Mexico. Enormous capital was represented, and the plan proposed was apparently the best of fifty that had been laid before Mr. Bryan. I say " fifty " because that was his own hasty estimate on an occasion when there was no need to be accurate. He preferred this plan to the others, and seriously inclined his ear to its advocates.

          Congress had been controlled during all these months by a maximum of skilfully exercised authority combined with an irreducible minimum of real information ; upon the whole a miracle of management made possible only by a lack of coherent opinion in the legislative body. There had been ebullitions of jingo sentiment, but no appearance of anything solid in the shape of a Mexican policy in either house.

          On July 22, 1913, the Senate talked Mexican matters in the open, but that night the leaders were counselled, and there was no immediate repetition of the offense. On

378 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

July 31, the House developed symptoms of acute distress over Mexico, but the trouble soon quieted under palliative treatment. On August 8 Senator Bacon declared that the Mexican situation was one of the gravest problems which the United States had ever been called upon to face. After that statement Mr. Bacon subsided and did not again offend. On August 15 Senator Penrose, stirred by the first hand reports of injury to Americans, used strong terms in the Senate Chamber. He promised to resume the following day but was dissuaded.

          On August 19 the Senate endeavored to press a resolution demanding a full account of Mexican matters from the President, but Senators Lodge, Bacon and Stone caused it to be postponed. On November 16, an attempted revolt in the House against the censorship was fought down by Administration men, and on January 27, the Senate, though greatly alarmed over Mexican affairs, was brought into line, and the subject was dropped.

          Viewed as a political performance it is entitled to rank high, that holding back for months of the floods of oratory on a subject so inviting, so full of opportunity to stir America with authentic stories of wrong done to its citizens, of vast pecuniary loss, of insult, dire hardship, and atrocious murder; so full, too, of potential European complications which always tempt a certain class of orators. The Senators and Representatives who held their peace under such provocation were untrammeled men ; many were of the opposition. Never before had a Congress at Washington been so well controlled; never had a Congress bowed to such a master.

          The foregoing summary is not to be taken as a table of reference; it is designed merely to give an impression. The tale of horrors in Mexico was not told as it would have been if a superior power had not prevented the sub- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 379

ject from being thoroughly opened up. In fact nobody in Congress knew the truth. Certain Senators and Representatives were equipped with lists of outrages, but the lists were not accurate. The State Department may have had better information but it was not available; the records of 1913 on this subject were closed to all. When by chance a resolution calling for the data was passed, the Department met it with a refusal.

          Close following of Mexican events through private channels, supplemented by a not too credulous reading of press despatches, led me, early in March, 1914, to set the number of Americans who have lost their lives by violence in Mexico since January, 1913, at one hundred and fifty. Of these not more than thirty were killed because they were Americans; the others fell victims to a condition which the American Government might have prevented.

          There have been exaggerations in accounts of Mexican troubles, but much has been missed altogether. What can the comfortably situated readers at a distance comprehend of the suffering and insult barely hinted at in vague reports of isolated cases or described so crudely that the exaggeration destroys all feeling of reality? What estimate can he form of the twenty-four days' reign of terror in Durango, of the looting and the re-looting of Torreon, of the flight of American refugees on foot two hundred miles in mud and rain to Saltillo, of the evacuation of Chihuahua, and the entry of Pancho Villa, the bandit conqueror of the north? Who can sit in security and grasp the horrors of the Cumbre Tunnel?

          Washington was moved by the well authenticated cases of distress; it issued demands on Huerta and on Carranza and on Villa that the perpetrators of crimes against Americans must be punished. The State Department made a long record of those whom it would hold personally re-

380 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

sponsible for acts of violence. Ever since the awakening which caused the despatch of John Lind, a well supported and clearly meritorious story of mortal injury in Mexico could command a hearing. But with the demand started on its endless journey, the record made, and the hearing over, the incident was closed.

          The Americans are a patient people. Many thousands of despoiled refugees from Mexico who could get no redress have found that out. These refugees and their relatives and friends wondered what dimensions this record of disastrous wrong to Americans must reach before a stir would be caused which resembled purposeful action.

          On February 17, 1914, they supposed that their question had been answered. The death of one man seemed for a few days to have strained the resistance of the Washington Government to the breaking point. The individual in question was William S. Benton, an Englishman. He was killed by the order, if not by the hand, of Pancho Villa, whose immediate chief was Carranza, over whom was no superior but the Government at Washington.

          The early accounts of this crime which made it out to have been an execution following a court martial, were hardly more credible than the Huerta government's account of the killing of Madero. There had been no one to punish Madero's murderers ; it was obvious that Carranza would not and could not punish Benton's. But the formidable reputation of the British Government for protecting its citizens seemed to make some action necessary on the part of the United States, which was the guardian of Mexico, and in a very special sense the guardian of the Constitutionalists whose nominal chief was Carranza — now for good cause as truly an impossible as Huerta, unless Villa

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 381

should be brought to book, an outcome not included in any sane man's forecast.

          It seemed, then, that the United States was cut off from any peaceful contact with Mexico, and was hopelessly involved in trouble inside its borders. What alternative remained but intervention ? Yet it did not come. Inquiry as to Benton's death brought fiction after fiction, and a tangle of falsehood and mockery, absurd and offensive. Yet the weeks dragged away, and England waited with unexampled patience, while the United States did nothing that the eye of man could discern, " and did it very well," to quote appropriately from a familiar lyric of W. S. Gilbert's.

          Five weeks after the murder of Benton, Villa was still at the head of his army, about to lead it in what promised to be a critical engagement of the civil war in Mexico. And aside from the forthcoming battle at Torreon the chief news from Mexico was that John Lind had resumed negotiations with Huerta, in the hope that the usurper would consent to efface himself in favor of a new provisional President.

          Surely this is a remarkable page of history, requiring for its explanation some very careful reading between the lines.

CHAPTER XX

          TORREON fell to Pancho Villa on April 2. From that day the Washington authorities declined to listen to plans for the elimination of Huerta on a cash basis. They pinned their faith to Villa as the man whose destiny it was to drive out the usurper. Much more than had been generally understood they had encouraged the fighting Constitutionalist leader who had been permitted to gain such ascendency that he had become the alternative to intervention. To depose him from command of his army — if that were possible — or even to permit him to be defeated would eventually force an invasion of Mexico, not only from the Gulf ports but from the North. His victory at Torreon was essential.

          I do not suppose that the Wilson Administration knew what were Villa's plans for subsequent campaigning or how he expected to pay his troops. I prefer to think that the President and his advisers were imperfectly informed as to the character and motives of the leader, and as to the incentives of the great majority of his officers and men. A kind of patriotism, easily exaggerated and misunderstood, animated a few, and all seemed to be fighting for a cause not unworthy. Ample evidence has been furnished that Washington did not believe Villa to be so black as he was painted ; that he was thought to be amenable to control. I firmly believe that President Wilson would have been shocked to learn that the rebel leader would rather fight his way across Mexico to the National Palace in the capital

382

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 383

than to have full possession of the government delivered to him without a struggle.

          There was a deal of mystery about the Torreon fight which was carried on mostly in the districts north and west of the city itself. At first the attacking force suffered reverses, but after several days of battle they turned the tables and the Federal General Velasco evacuated the city. Losses were very heavy on both sides. Villa's army numbered about 12,000 and Velasco's 9,000. Estimates which are not to be relied upon place Villa's loss from all causes at 5,000, and that of the Federals at 3,000. It would seem that Velasco should have held the city, but he failed, whether from bad tactics, poor troops, deficient ammunition, or the superior skill of his opponent. The victory was Villa's and his conquest of Mexico was fairly under way.

          Torreon is seven hundred miles from the capital, and the richest section of Mexico lies between. Four armies were required to make a lasting success of the southward movement, and three of them were already in the field. To the east, in the Gulf of Mexico state of Tamaulipas, one large force had been operating for several weeks. It had taken Victoria, capital of the state, and had seriously menaced the port of Tampico which Villa now needed more than ever, for reasons which will presently appear.

          In the West a Constitutionalist force was active in the Pacific Coast state of Sinaloa, and the territory of Tepic. In the center, under Villa himself, was the remainder of the army which had captured and was now occupying Torreon.

          Another army must speedily be raised to act in concert with Villa's own forces in their campaign for possession of the cities on the two trunk lines of railway in Central Mexico. Recruiting seemed surprisingly easy for Villa. Immediately after Torreon he was able to send a force toward

384 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

Monterrey in pursuit of the Federals, and start another southeastward in the direction of Saltillo.

          In addition to these forces pressing east and south there were smaller armies and garrisons in all the border states of the North and in the northwest state of Sonora. I think it fair to estimate that on April 5 the Constitutionalists had 40,000 men in the field, well armed and many of them fairly well equipped. The only visible means of support for this very considerable military establishment was the country in which the various detachments operated. The only discoverable brain directing the widely separated bodies of men and keeping them supplied with arms was under the hat of First Chief Carranza. I can but think this a remarkable showing, not wholly devoid of mystery.

          Fiat Constitutional currency, well backed by force, accounted for such of the equipment as could be drawn from local sources. Force alone took care of wages and food for men, and forage for horses. But rifles, sabers, revolvers, automatics, machine guns, cannon and ammunition, to say nothing of cartridge belts and other such necessities for 40,000 men, must come from a source which demands real money. Let us not attempt to answer this riddle otherwise than by crediting Carranza and Villa with financial ability of a high order.

          Doubtless it would be better to say plainly that I believe Carranza and Villa received advice and assistance in matters of finance. The propriety of this depends, perhaps, upon the method employed, in regard to which I have no trustworthy information. Certainly Carranza was advised in the matter of withdrawal from active participation in conspicuous military operations, and this resulted in raising Villa to such an eminence that some outward alteration in the man became a necessity. After the Benton affair he was constantly under tutelage, by which he was clever

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 385

enough to profit. In the Torreon campaign he also benefited by advice in military matters. The allegation that American troops fought with him is wholly unsupported, and should require no denial ; but there were a few American soldiers of fortune under his banner, and three of them were artillerists.

          Villa had learned something about publicity too, perhaps from his experience with the moving-picture men for whom he had posed at Juarez. A good press agent had been added to his staff, and the official reports to Washington were made by George C. Carothers, confidential agent of the State Department. Thus there were various presentations of Villa before the eyes of the world, and various external sources now contributed to the sum of his apparent qualities. Like other famous men he had become several persons in one. He was no longer a mere individual, he was a syndicate.

          But in spite of all surface amelioration Villa and his soldiers remained much the same as they had been at Durango and at Juarez. A recital of their crimes would have no end. I do not think the newspaper reports of their cruelties were materially exaggerated; more probably, taking into account the limitations of language, they were less than the truth. From what I have seen and heard I believe that a more accurate mental picture would be gained by magnifying the printed reports some four or five diameters. But it should be remembered that Villa and his men were not created by the government of the United States ; they were found upon the scene, and whatever has been done to influence their behavior toward the proprieties of civilized warfare may count as meritorious.

          It remains to be said that on April 5 Villa was acquitted of all blame in the Benton affair, by Carranza's court of inquiry whose verdict was in accord with Secretary Bryan's

386 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

frequently expressed belief. Though this decision carried little weight, it helped somewhat to make Villa a more possible figure in the design of the Washington government for the expulsion of Huerta.

          As has been intimated the cover of Villa's military code had been cleansed, and he had been taught to keep the volume closed in public, whenever he could remember to do so. This saved some lives after the fall of Torreon, but there are other punishments than death. In the captured city there were good and bad persons, in Villa's estimation, and he drew the line between them with quick decision. The good were inconvenienced but not despoiled. The bad, consisting of Spaniards and every variety of Huertista, were subjected to a forfeiture of goods without delay.

          More than six hundred Spaniards were driven at the bayonet point into box cars and shipped five hundred miles to El Paso. Their property, both real and personal, was seized. Several thousand bales of cotton valued at about $4,000,000 were among the items which Villa appropriated as spoils of war.

          The deported Spaniards endured great suffering on the journey to El Paso. Scantily clothed and stripped of everything negotiable they had been crowded like sheep into the cars, and during the forty-eight hours in transit they had little water and less food. Their condition at the end of their journey was pitiable. The Spanish government asked the United States to look after the interests of its subjects, and accordingly a protest was addressed to Carranza who solemnly replied that the Spaniards had been dealt with very leniently considering their offenses.

          The spoil from this proceeding must have been large for some of the deported men were rich. Efforts were immediately made to sell the cotton which had fallen into Villa's hands, but negotiations for its sale in the United

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 387

States failed. Two agents were sent to Europe to find a purchaser, but there was a serious obstacle in the way of closing a bargain. This was the difficulty of transportation. About four hundred cars were required, and so much of the rolling stock of the railways had been destroyed that no such supply was available.

          Even should the cars be got, and the cotton be carried to El Paso, there would be many chances yet to be taken. The United States government might fear complications with Spain, if it should allow the goods to pass through its territory to the Gulf Coast for shipment abroad. And the railway which should haul the cotton under the known circumstances would be in an unenviable position, if the rightful owners should present claims. There was but one alternative; the purchasers of the goods must take delivery at a point in Mexico and that point must be the port of Tampico. The distance from Torreon was only five hundred and fifty miles but the port itself was in the hands of the Federals, and the railway route to it led through Monterrey, a city of eighty thousand people, which had resisted rebel attacks. If the cotton were to be carried to tidewater both Monterrey and Tampico must be captured.

          The movement against Monterrey was promptly begun. Federal General Velasco with about 2,500 of his men had retreated in the direction of that city after evacuating Torreon on April 2, the remainder of his forces having fled toward Saltillo. Two days later he was overtaken at San Pedro by General Rosalio Hernandez of Villa's army, and many of Velasco's command were killed. Hernandez, cooperating with other generals of the Constitutionalists; then pushed on for Monterrey.

          The force threatening Tampico was spurred forward, and the city destined to be the greatest oil center in the world was more closely invested. The Federal garrison which

388 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

had held its ground for weeks, was cut off by rail from its base of supplies at San Luis Potosi and had been supported from Vera Cruz, two hundred miles south, by means of vessels plying between the two ports. Great anxiety was felt by the oil interests in the neighborhood. A miracle had saved the Lord Cowdray and Waters-Pierce refineries at Tampico from destruction during the days when the rebels were actively attacking. The same army, substantially reinforced, was preparing for assault, and any day a great disaster might befall the stores of inflammable wealth together with the equipment for industrial operation.

          Threats were made by the rebels against Lord Cowdray's properties because he was suspected of having aided Huerta in negotiations for loans. None of the companies doing business in the oil fields took sides however. If the Waters-Pierce interests hoped for Constitutionalist supremacy they made no sign, and the Huerta forces did not single them out for attack. The Dutch-Schell managers were also painstakingly neutral. Their great well, La Carona, had flowed more than 150,000 barrels in a single day when it sprang into life in November, 1913, distancing Lord Cowdray's famous Portrero del Llano and succeeding to the world's producing record for a single well. If the course of war should lead over their property the loss would be incalculable.

          Active business in the oil fields could not continue with skirmishing between the rebels and the defenders going on, but no outside government cared to take the step of landing troops to protect its nationals or the property they owned. The Federal garrison awaited the attack and the besiegers threatened continually. Foreign residents understood that the next vigorous move of the Constitutionalist forces would place them in great peril and they prepared to take to the ships at short notice. Affairs at

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 389

Tampico were in this state when the incident occurred which brought the United States into armed clash with Huerta to the material benefit of the Constitutionalists' plans.

          On April 9 a whaleboat from the United States gunboat Dolphin lying in the Panuco River before Tampico, was sent ashore for gasoline, and put in at the Iturbide Bridge. The boat was manned by a crew of nine sailors in charge of an assistant paymaster of the United States navy, and displayed American colors at bow and stern. The men were unarmed. While part of the crew were still in the launch Colonel Hinoza, commanding a detachment of Mexican Federals placed the American officer and the whaleboat's crew under arrest. Immediately afterward he paraded them through the streets to jail amid the jeers of bystanders and cries of " Death to the Gringos."

          The American Admiral Mayo, being promptly informed of the occurrence, demanded instant release of his men, an apology in due form by General Zaragoza, the Federal commander at Tampico, and a formal salute to the American flag, consisting of the firing of twenty-one guns in its honor before six o'clock the following evening, April 10. The men were at once released and the apology offered, but the matter of the salute was referred by wire to Mexico City, Admiral Mayo at the same time forwarding an account of the affair to Washington.

          It seems quite clear that the right procedure would have been instant direction from Washington to Admiral Mayo to enforce his demand to the letter, as this would have tended to restrict the affair. But Washington temporized; directed the Admiral to extend the time one day for the salute to be fired, and took up negotiations with Huerta through the American Charge at Mexico City with the result of aggravating the incident.

390 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          The history of Washington's previous demands upon Huerta repeated itself. Temporizing argument was the only response which could be elicited, and day after day the time for firing the salute was extended. What seemed like a division of sentiment among high government officials at Washington was indicated by the statements given to the press. Hesitation there certainly was for three days at least. Suddenly on the 14th, the Atlantic war fleet of seventeen battleships was ordered to proceed with haste to Vera Cruz and Tampico.

          On the 16th formal notice to salute was served on Huerta, and this was followed on the 18th by an ultimatum demanding that the twenty-one guns be fired by 6:00 P. M. on the 20th. On the 19th Huerta made flat refusal to comply, unless the salute should be answered gun for gun which would have condoned the offense and have been construed as a recognition of his government. That day more ships were despatched for Mexican waters.

          On the 20th President Wilson laid the case before both houses of Congress in a personal address, reciting the Tampico incident and supplying the additional information that a uniformed orderly from the U. S. S. Minnesota had been detained in the city of Vera Cruz while ashore on mail service for his ship, and also stating that government despatches from Washington to the embassy in Mexico City had been withheld from delivery until the American Charge d'Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, had gone in person to demand resumption of the service.

          President Wilson, in view of these offensive acts   the two latter being in natural sequence to that at Tampico —asked for quick joint action of Congress in support of his demands upon Huerta.

          " I therefore come," said he, " to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 391

ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amid the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico."

          The House, after a stormy session of four hours, passed the following resolution by a vote of 337 to 37:

          " Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives, in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States of America is justified in the employment of armed forces of the United States to enforce the demands made upon Victoriano Huerta for unequivocal amends to the government of the United States for affronts and indignities committed against this government by General Huerta and his representatives."

          The Senate in a session that same night objected to the naming of one man as an enemy against whom the Army and Navy were to be used. The Tampico affair was called a pretext, in the course of the debate. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed a resolution which recited the wrongs suffered by American individuals, in person and property. Debate was heated. The Senate adjourned over midnight ; then reassembled and passed a substitute resolution. The House concurred. This is the text of the resolution as passed by both bodies:

          " Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that the President is justified in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States; be it further

          " Resolved, That the United States disclaims any

392 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

hostility to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico."

          In one respect the President's address was similar to that which he had made to Congress in August, 1913: it was notable for an omission. On the former occasion he had refrained from mentioning the financial offer which he had authorized John Lind to make to Mexico as a reason why Huerta should resign. The second address contained no reference to the true cause of haste in the despatching of the warships to the Mexican gulf ports. The urgency was due to information that a large shipment of munitions of war was on its way from a German port to Vera Cruz. The cargo included some thousands of rifles, a number of machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition ; and the receipt of these supplies by Huerta would greatly strengthen him against the Constitutionalists, and perhaps against the United States, should war result from the increasing complications. At the moment, however, this was a move against Huerta and in favor of the Constitutionalists who had been receiving all the arms for which they could pay.

          On April 21, when the Senate and House agreed upon the resolution, the German ship Ypiranga, carrying the munitions of war, arrived at Vera Cruz. To prevent the cargo from reaching its intended destination a large body of American marines was landed at that port and the custom house was seized. The landing party was under orders not to fire unless fired upon, and to occupy only a small portion of the city in the immediate neighborhood of the custom house which is on the water front.

          The marines met resistance of a scattering and irregular sort. The opposition gathered strength as the movement swept up the broad, open pier, and it presently became necessary for one of the smaller warships lying within easy

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 393

range to shell some of the positions of the enemy, including the naval academy building. Before actual possession of the custom house was secured, four American marines were killed and twenty wounded. The number of Mexicans killed was about two hundred.

          " Sniping " or isolated fire from concealment picked off Americans for the next two days. The entire city was occupied by the American forces on the 22nd, the Federal troops having retreated several miles to a point on the Mexican railway, a mile of which they tore up. In all, seventeen Americans were killed and sixty-two wounded. " Sniping " being punishable by death according to usages of war, it was reported that forty Mexicans were summarily executed for this offense.

          Meanwhile the republic of Mexico was becoming an unfit place of residence for Americans, and in Monterrey violent demonstrations were being made. On April 21 a Huerta captain commanding a detachment of Federal troops, acting no doubt under orders, tore down and stamped upon every American flag in the city including that over the United States general consulate in which many Americans had taken refuge. That night the consulate was surrounded by Federal troops and the lives of its inmates were threatened.

          On the following day, the United States Consul General, Philip C. Hanna, was taken before a military tribunal, charged with aiding Constitutionalist generals, and thrust into prison where he remained incommunicado until April 24, when the Constitutionalist army under Generals Villareal and Castro entered the city in triumph, the Federal forces evacuating the place. The conduct of the Constitutionalists after this victory, as reported by the grateful consul general, was a decided improvement over that which they had exhibited elsewhere.

394 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          On April 22, Charge O'Shaughnessy of the embassy at Mexico City received his passports, and the same service was rendered in Washington to the Mexican charge, Señor Algara, who notified the State Department of his intention to leave the territory of the United States. O'Shaughnessy and his family, with the attaches of the embassy excepting interpreter d'Antin, arrived in Vera Cruz on the evening of the 24th, accompanied by Consul General Shanklin and the attaches of the Mexico City consulate. No other Americans were permitted to leave the capital, it having been reported that Mexicans were being detained in Vera Cruz against their

          Two days later, however, Huerta learned that he had been misinformed, and all Americans who desired to do so were allowed to depart. Some were conveyed to Tejera, the Mexican camp near Vera Cruz, whence they were escorted on foot to the American lines under flags of truce. Others were sent to Puerto Mexico, the eastern terminus of the Tehuantepec railway.

          Excitement throughout Mexico was intense. Americans were everywhere insulted. As fast as possible those in the interior made their way out, the majority going to the capital and thence to Puerto Mexico or Vera Cruz. The United States Government chartered the Ward line steamers to carry refugees to Galveston and New Orleans, and expectation of immediate war was general.

          Huerta prepared to destroy the railways from Mexico City to Vera Cruz. The United States sent an army brigade of 5000 men under General Funston to Vera Cruz, and the control of the city passed from the navy to the army, the sailors and marines returning to the ships. Fifty-two American war vessels of all classes were now in Mexican waters. Washington denied that war existed, but prepared to supply large bodies of troops at short notice.

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 395

          In Tampico the demonstrations against Americans were violent, and the American warships in the river and harbor were said to be a menace rather than a safeguard to their nationals in the city. There is some dispute about this, but none at all about the withdrawal of the ships, leaving the Americans to be protected by the German and English vessels. More than five hundred Americans were taken aboard these warships, and transferred to a merchantman which conveyed them to New Orleans, without their previous knowledge or consent, as some of them have alleged. The refugees declared further that the American warships had brought down the trouble upon them and had then deserted them while they were in great danger. It was a peculiar incident, not the first of that class experienced by Americans who have lost everything they possessed in Mexico and have found themselves without a country.

          While these events savoring of tragedy were in progress, Washington's relations with Carranza were disturbed by complications in the vein of comedy. On Wednesday, April 22, the day after the marines landed at Vera Cruz, Mr. Carothers, the State Department's representative with the Constitutionalists, transmitted to Carranza at Juarez, by request of Secretary Bryan, a note of explanation of the Vera Cruz incident. The note stated that the landing of troops and the seizure of the custom house " was made necessary by Huerta's refusal to make proper amends for the arrest of unarmed American sailors." The secretary suggested that the " proper attitude " for the Constitutionalists was to " stand aloof," and concluded with the hope that they would " not misunderstand President Wilson's position or misconstrue his acts."

          This communication I take to be one of the most unusual productions of the State Department, even in the incumbency of Mr. Bryan; but the true comedy resides in the

396 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

unexpected results to both parties. At that time the United States was on the very point of recognizing the belligerency of the Constitutionalists ; the documents, so to speak, were already drawn up; and the communication which has been mentioned was in a sense the forerunner of the recognition.

          But Carranza had not been advised of the good things in store, and Secretary Bryan's conciliatory despatch took him unawares. In less than three hours after receipt of the message the First Chief of the Constitutionalists sent a communication to President Wilson through Mr. Carothers which amounted to a threat that if the United States did not retire at once from Vera Cruz the Constitutionalists would join in an effort to expel them. He also suggested that after withdrawal of its forces, the United States should recognize the Constitutionalists as the actual and permanent Mexican government, which courtesy would be requited with as much saluting as might be desired.

          Pancho Villa was then at Torreon pushing forward his plans for campaigning against Saltillo and San Luis Potosi. Advised of Carranza's action by telegrams from that gentleman and from Mr. Carothers, Villa hurried to Juarez, and at dinner with the State Department's agent quite pointedly reversed the First Chief. Talk of strained relations between Carranza and the military genius of the Constitutionalists was revived. An open break was declared to be imminent, if it did not already exist.

          This was a situation which Washington viewed with alarm as indicating a lack of cohesion in the Constitutionalist enterprise. But the tactful Carothers restored harmony between the two leaders ; and Carranza slowly shifted his position until it became evident that he and Villa, on the surface at least, were in accord.

          In the United States there was a disposition to look upon Carranza's reply as prearranged with Washington, but this

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 397

seems to be an error. The truth is that the State Department had put the First Chief into a place where he was compelled to be haughty, in order to preserve his hold upon the Mexicans. He had already gone as far as he dared in obedience to Mr. Bryan's instructions, and his reputation in Mexico was in danger. Thus he was compelled to reply to Mr. Bryan's note in some manner which should comport with his professions of independence. This was perceived in Washington, after patient study, and the anxiety was relieved. It was not thought necessary to restore the embargo on arms at the Mexican border, though in regard to this traffic certain precautionary measures were taken, as will hereafter be noted.

          The actual gain to the Constitutionalists by the Vera Cruz operations was too clear to be ignored. The revenues of Mexico's principal seaport had been cut from Huerta's visible means of existence, and the cargo of war munitions had been turned back to the high seas. Villa certainly perceived all this, and he was satisfied with the assurances of Carothers that the United States did not desire to advance inland from Vera Cruz. There can hardly be a doubt that Carranza's irritation, if he had really felt any, yielded to the same arguments.

          But Carranza's vigorous pronouncements had excited the Texans, the Arizonians and the New Mexicans, and preparations for a state of war along the 1800 miles of Mexico's frontier were speedily under way. The War Department at Washington urged upon President Wilson the necessity for immediate restoration of the embargo on traffic in arms across the border, and adduced evidence to show that in the eight days which had elapsed since April 14, when the war fleet was ordered to Mexican waters, 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 10,000 rifles had gone into Mexico from the United States. But the President de- 

398 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

clined to replace the embargo in full force. There were several thousand rifles, ten machine guns, and 500,000 pounds weight of ammunition in El Paso ready for delivery across the river. These the War Department was permitted to order withheld. The conversation between Carranza and Villa which resulted from this would, I fancy, throw a bright light on many matters at present wofully obscure. And on the top of it all they had lost, for the time, their recognition as belligerents.

          On April 25 the Ambassador of Brazil and the Ministers of Chile and the Argentine Republic at Washington tendered their good offices to the Wilson Administration to bring about a peaceful solution of the Mexican troubles. After consultation with Secretary Bryan, their proposal was formally tendered as follows :

(Translation)

LEGATION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC,

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 25, 1914.

Mr. Secretary of State:

          With the purpose of subserving the interests of peace and civilization in our continent, and with the earnest desire to prevent any further bloodshed, to the prejudice of the cordiality and union which has always surrounded the relations of the governments and peoples of America, we, the plenipotentiaries of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, duly authorized thereto, have the honor to tender to your Excellency's government our good offices for the peaceful and friendly settlement of the conflict between the United States and Mexico.

          This offer puts in due form the suggestions which we had occasion to offer heretofore on the subject to the Secretary, to whom we renew the assurances of our highest and most distinguished considerations.

D. DA GAMA,

R. S. NAON,

EDUARDO SUAREZ MUJICA.

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 399

          The offer was accepted by the Washington State Department in a response whose most significant paragraph ran thus :

          " This government feels bound in candor to say that its diplomatic relations with Mexico being for the present severed, it is not possible for it to make sure of an uninterrupted opportunity to carry out the plan of intermediation which you propose. It is, of course, possible that some act of aggression on the part of those who control the military forces of Mexico might oblige the United States to act, to the upsetting of hopes of immediate peace; but this does not justify us in hesitating to accept your generous suggestion."

          On Monday, April 27, the Spanish ambassador at Washington, who had acted for Mexico since the breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, announced to the State Department General Huerta's acceptance of the mediation proposals of the " A. B. C." powers of South America. In the interval before the gathering of the delegates at Niagara Falls to open the conference on May 20 specific charges were made by Huerta that the government of the United States had violated the armistice which had been agreed upon. There seemed to be no tangible foundation for the charges, but they were annoying.

          The Huerta delegates, Señores Elguero, Rabassa and Rodriguez, arrived at Washington, May 16, accompanied by their families and immense quantities of luggage. All of the gentlemen were important lawyers of Mexico, of the group which once flourished under the name Cientifico. The United States government provided for their use two private cars from the Florida coast and elaborate suites at hotels. The delegates utilized the cars and the hotel suites,

400 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

but insisted upon paying the charges. One of the delegates, Señor Luis Elguero, was a director of the National Railways of Mexico and also of Lord Cowdray's Aguila Oil Company, prominent in the Mexican fields.

          Mediation as a means of settling the differences between the United States and General Huerta need not be considered seriously. It was accepted for the sake of advantages which each party perceived. The United States welcomed the chance to strengthen its position by dividing the general Latin-American sentiment, so that subsequent action with regard to Mexico, if anything forcible should be necessary, might not antagonize all the southern nations of the hemisphere. The move tended to satisfy the numerous advocates of peace, and gave the Constitutionalists more time to overrun Mexico and drive Huerta out, while the United States forces sat quiet at Vera Cruz. Carranza was invited to suspend hostilities and send representatives to Niagara Falls, but it was not within reason that he should accept at that juncture. If he had done so, it might have been a distinct disappointment to the United States.

          Huerta saw his own importance increased, and the price of his abdication raised. A truce with the United States was valuable; it eventually enabled him to get the shipment of munitions of war ashore from the Ypiranga while Washington looked on ridiculously helpless. Moreover there was strong pressure upon him to send delegates to Niagara Falls, for mediation inspired the survivors of the old Diaz circle with hope. A prominent Mexican exile described the mediation congress to me as " the last stand of the Cientificos "— with which body he himself had been affiliated.

          The mediators were all favorable to property rights, and it was unthinkable that any plan of government which they

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 401

might devise would satisfy the desire of the radical Constitutionalists and the feeling of the masses behind them that the rich ruling class of Mexico should be killed or driven out, and the Catholics oppressed and despoiled. The Huerta delegates, very keen negotiators, went to the congress for the purpose of tying the United States up in a hard knot. The whole proceeding was manifestly absurd as long as the Constitutionalists were not represented. Without their concurrence no result could be reached which a few more victories by Pancho Villa would not upset. Meanwhile the United States might easily be committed to the plans of the mediation congress so far as to be in honor bound to back them, even to the extent of armed invasion. And it is conceivable that this was the true goal toward which the Cientificos and the other business interests represented by the participants in the congress were striving.

          On May 13 Tampico fell to the Constitutionalist forces, the garrison withdrawing to Tuxpan after suffering serious losses. Comparatively little damage was done to foreign interests. The Dutch warship had landed a guard to protect the great La Carona well ; but from no other vessel of the foreign fleet were troops sent ashore.

          The fall of Tampico still further weakened Huerta's position, and the gain of this port completed the Constitutionalists' line of communication from the interior to the Gulf.

          The great properties controlled by Lord Cowdray escaped serious damage when Tampico passed into the hands of the Constitutionalists, but that change introduced new complications for the Englishman. From the advent of Huerta, in February, 1913, to May in the following year, Lord Cowdray's investments in the Tampico oil fields steadily increased at the rate of £50,000 a month — a total

402 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

of about £750,000 added to the great capital already engaged there. His continued enlargements of operations in the oil field had been regarded as evidence of his confidence in the stability of the Huerta government, and as corroboration of the reports that he had aided its financial negotiations. He was not in good odor with the Constitutionalists, and if they were to have anything like a free hand in setting up a new government, its attitude would certainly be hostile to him.

          Another important item of Lord Cowdray's relationship to the Mexican government was his interest in the Tehuantepec Railway of which mention has already been made. Unknown to the Mexican people and the Mexican Congress his negotiations with the Madero government for the sale of this railway interest had been concluded, and the agreement covering the transaction was to have been signed on February 10, 1913. The outbreak of February 9 with its fatal consequences to Madero prevented the signing of the papers. This left the Tehuantepec proposals to be presented to the government of the usurper. Efforts were constantly made during the early months of Huerta's rule to effect a bargain, but a plan was formed by Lord Cowdray, looking toward an alternative, if negotiations should fail, as they actually did.

          This plan was intended to enable the Tehuantepec Railway to do a profitable business despite the competition soon to be introduced by the Panama Canal. The disadvantages of the Tehuantepec route for Hawaiian sugar lay in the necessity of transhipping from vessel to train at Salina Cruz, and from train to vessel at Puerto Mexico on the eastern coast. Lord Cowdray's idea was to do away with one of these handlings by the use of seagoing barges upon each of which sixteen of the cars could be run, at Puerto Mexico, to be delivered at Galveston or New Orleans.

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 403

Orders for eight of these barges were placed, and four were nearly ready for delivery on April 1, 1914.

          But the partnership of the Mexican government in this railway makes it indispensable to Lord Cowdray that he shall be on fair terms with its officials who, on their part, must be affected by similar considerations. The Constitutionalists, looking forward with confidence to the control of Mexico, might well hesitate to make an enemy of Lord Cowdray, whose favorable influence would be of so great help to them in operations of finance, and whose antagonism would work powerfully against them in the money markets of the world. For this reason too serious oppression of Lord Cowdray in the oil fields by the rebels who at this hour control that region, will be a grave tactical error.

          The United States on May 18 added two nations to its highest diplomatic grade, thus increasing its embassies to thirteen — which is said to be the President's lucky number. The nations were Chile and Argentina. Ministers to the capitals of those countries were promoted to Ambassadorships. The inevitable result of this would be reciprocal action by Chile and Argentina in favor of their Ministers at Washington. Previously Brazil was the only one of the " A. B. C." nations enjoying this distinction in the Washington scheme of statecraft and it was agreed that it would be well if all the mediators were of equal rank.

          Argentina, with its eight millions of people, and Chile with four and a half are prosperous nations. There is no doubt that the United States would welcome a larger portion of their trade, and all the usual benefits which recognition of one nation's worth brings to another. But selection of that particular moment to confer these honors carrying personal benefits to two of the mediators called forth unfavorable criticism.

404 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          The sustained successes of the Constitutionalist arms in April and May did violence to the hopes of two aspirants for Mexico's presidency both of whom had secured backing in New York, including the advice and guidance of eminent counsel. One of these ambitious men was Felix Diaz, well known to fame and misfortune. The other was General Fernando Gonzales, the son of that president of Mexico who held the office from 1880 to 1884 by the permission of Porfirio Diaz.

          The Felix Diaz enterprise need not be considered at length, although $l00,000 was wasted upon it by men who should have known better. But the scheme of General Gonzales, formerly governor of the State of Mexico, was more formidable. Early in April Gonzales left New York for Mexico city with a proposal to lay before Huerta which involved the payment of three million dollars to the dictator and certain of his generals in consideration of the appointment of Gonzales to a place in the cabinet from which he would succeed to the presidency. Huerta's resignation was to be handed in before the money in the form of drafts on Paris should be paid. Seated as provisional president, Gonzales was to announce an open election in which Carranza, Felix Diaz, and all and sundry aspiring to the position, should have a fair chance to win on their merits.

          Gonzales reached Mexico's capital, laid his proposal before Huerta, and was not shot ; at least he had escaped that fate as late as May 9, when a cablegram in code was received from him by his counsel in New York. The cablegram conveyed the intelligence that matters seemed to be progressing favorably and might be concluded without violence, but that if violence proved to be necessary, the arrangements for its successful application had been made. If the transaction should be consummated on a peaceful basis, General Huerta was to leave the country unostenta- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 405

tiously via Puerto Mexico, taking passage in a vessel carrying the French flag.

          Some thirty millions was to be supplied by loan to Mexico's treasury to start the Gonzales government. The three millions of cash had been provided for by negotiations of a large block of an old issue of bonds similar in appearance to those which Gustavo Madero had endeavored unsuccessfully to negotiate on a five-for-one basis in 1910, but of a better quality. These bonds to the amount of $15,000,000, face value, were to be passed over in return for the three millions in money, and were to be acknowledged by Gonzales when he should have achieved the presidency. The thirty millions to be loaned to Mexico was to be provided by men of large interests in that country in association with men of New York who hoped by this plan to stave off intervention by the United States with its shock to the security market. The market already was staggering under the heavy strain of the tariff and currency measures, and intervention in Mexico might break it down.

          This story, fantastic as it seems, is sober fact, and demonstrates the lack of information and judgment among men, otherwise sane, regarding the actual trouble in Mexico and how to remedy it. Pancho Villa's victories and those of other Constitutionalist leaders which have been recorded made the Gonzales scheme impracticable from every point of view, especially the financial. Carranza loomed larger and larger as a presidential possibility, even taking into account the lack of adequate provision for Villa in any new government which might be set up.

          Carranza's platform has been a rather startling one, but I do not find that it has seriously interfered with Washington's attitude toward him. Carranza is a Constitutionalist to the backbone and this is the foundation of his creed : every man who has voluntarily aided Huerta must be shot.

406 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

          To some minds this may seem objectionable, but if relegated to the realms of purely academic discussion, by the operation of sufficient restraints, it might not matter.

          Be Carranza's merits what they may, he was fortunate in having a good lawyer which is often better than a good cause. The Constitutionalists were ably served in this respect at Washington, having a lawyer more successful than Mr. S. G. Hopkins, who had acted for the Maderos. The new attorney, Mr. C. A. Douglas, smoothed the way of the latterday revolutionalists of Mexico over many difficult places.

          But the elevation of Carranza or any other man of the Constitutionalist party to the presidential chair will be no more than a beginning of the Mexican task. The pressing and vital problem is the finances of the government and of the railways. Few realize the harm that Huerta has done in nullifying the solemn pledge of Mexico's customs receipts to bankers as security for loans. It is hard to see how the great sums needed can be borrowed in Europe or America unless arrangements are made to place such pledges beyond the possibility of violation. This will demand a collector at every port to act as trustee for the bankers. The trustee must be powerful enough to enforce the rules. The United States can permit no other nation to undertake this business.

CHAPTER XXI

            FOR many months the Mexican policy of President Wilson had been the theme of jests, or of serious discussion which was even more amusing. It had been treated by the world as a peculiarly difficult and entertaining riddle ; it had been supposed to hide mysterious and menacing international relations ; it had been scoffed at as the mask put on to hide mere indecision. There is a sense, however, in which editorial comment in the United States, with few exceptions, had been constantly favorable. The dread of war, of trouble and expense, of injurious effect on business was constantly in evidence, and as Mr. Wilson's policy seemed to be safe, it may be said to have been praised in all these utterances.

          Before he took his seat —in the days of the overthrow and murder of Madero — leading articles in thousands of papers began with statements of the Mexican situation which read like the most earnest arguments for intervention, but almost invariably there was a paragraph or two at the end which deprecated any action on the part of the United States tending toward invasion of Mexico or costly interference with her lamentable condition.

          When the developments recorded in the preceding chapter had disclosed the relations of the Washington administration with the Constitutionalists, and had caused the President to use the armed forces of the United States against Huerta, the tone of criticism speedily became adverse and the President was censured for too much energy and haste by the same pens that had mildly ridiculed him for endur-

407

408 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

ance of the antics of an intolerably bad neighbor. It seemed that the true inwardness of Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy was not understood, even so late ; that it was not seen to have been a perfectly simple device to meet a very obvious requirement of his situation.

          There is no doubt that in the latter part of February, 1913, the Mexican question presented itself to the President-elect in the form of a riddle which, as a public man and as an earnest, intelligent and humane individual, he would have been very glad to answer. But the situation in which he conceived himself to stand with reference to his interests and his highest duty seemed to demand that he should ask not, " How shall I solve that problem? " but rather, "How long will it wait unsolved?"

          The public which he had been chosen to serve was excited by the ten days' bombardment in the Mexican capital (a performance not detected as a farce) and by the subsequent murders, and the peril to American lives and property; but as to what should be done, the public had no conviction. The tone of the press was decidedly against warlike measures. There was no clearness anywhere as to their justification, as to the cost and difficulties that would have to be met, or as to the essential truth that intervention in some form was inevitable, the only real question being, shall the thing be done now or later? Above all there was no sentiment against delay as a policy in itself, harsh and bloody.

          The absurdity of private comment in high places at that time is beyond belief to-day. It was almost openly said in Washington by influential men that the overthrow of Madero was fortunate for Mexico, that his death though regrettable would make for peace, and that Huerta was the strong man needed to bring back the days of Diaz. These views are of no importance except as indicating the prev- 

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 409

alent mental confusion. There was no unified public opinion tending to influence Mr. Wilson in his choice of a policy, except such as was expressed by the general deprecation of war at a time when the business situation was so unsatisfactory.

          When President Wilson took office he encountered organized pressure exerted for the recognition of Huerta. Ambassador Wilson advocated that course, and went beyond the bounds of propriety in his efforts favorable to the usurper's interest ; but the President was unalterably opposed to recognition. He saw Huerta for what he was, vicious, unreliable, treacherous, bespattered with the blood of his predecessor. Personal distaste for such a man was mingled with considerations of another sort, and there was never a chance that Huerta would receive the least support from the government at Washington while Woodrow Wilson was at the head of it.

          Among the other considerations was the desire to safeguard American interests in northern and northwestern Mexico. Revolt against Huerta was under way in Sonora, Chihuahua and other states. Already some of the more important industrial corporations controlled by Americans were preparing to make terms with the rebels in order to save valuable property from destruction, and avoid the great loss which would result from enforced suspension of operations. Whatever would enable Huerta to carry war into those states would threaten irreparable damage or even confiscation ; but so long as the areas should be securely held by one party to the struggle, business might go on, at the cost of moderate tribute paid to the Constitutionalist leaders.

          The best way to keep Huerta's armies out of the northern states was to cut down his pecuniary resources. This was the immediate necessity in President Wilson's view,

410 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

and it could be met without taking the active measures which he desired to avoid as long as possible. To withhold recognition from Huerta, to prevent foreign nations from giving him aid, to damage his credit in every way that seemed proper under the circumstances — these expedients would suffice to prevent such injury to American interests in northern Mexico as would compel the United States to interfere.

          The President hoped and expected to solve the Mexican problem, but his first desire was to postpone it. The policy of watchful waiting looked forward rather vaguely to the defeat of Huerta by the Mexican rebels and to the setting up of recognizable government by the Constitutionalists ; but its transcendent merit in the President's mind was that it would enable him to baffle the uncertain and divided advocates of quick action in Mexico, and would give him time to force through Congress those measures of economic reform to which he was pledged. Revision of the tariff, banking and currency legislation, and the antitrust bills were the matters upon which he was determined to focus his own energy, the services of his party in Congress, and the attention of the country. He believed that these enactments were essential to the nation's welfare, and that the time was ripe. His political future and his place in history seemed to depend upon his success along the lines that have been mentioned. It would have been extremely bad strategy to permit the Mexican question to push in ahead of those domestic issues which were, in his opinion, more momentous and more urgent.

          Any immediate action, even a definite declaration in the Mexican matter would have excited antagonism in Congress, would have jeopardized the President's authority over the party leaders. His margin of control was narrow and he was well aware of it ; he could afford no quarrels.

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 411

And the event has amply proved his sagacity; the policy of watchful waiting was too bare to be a bone of contention. It could be explained privately, where that was unavoidable, and to each man according to his special need; but for the most part it excused a mighty silence.

          From March 4, 1913, until the end of that year it was nearly impossible for any man who had interests in Mexico, and desired light upon the future, to get a single ray of it from the State Department in Washington. It was difficult to approach Mr. Bryan on that subject, and the President was wholly inaccessible. There was a channel of communication open between Washington and Hermosillo, after Carranza had established his headquarters there, and it may be said that from the outset the influence of the United States was exerted in favor of the Constitutionalists ; but the policy of giving them direct and undeniable support against Huerta developed slowly. All action in the Mexican matter was postponed, retarded or suppressed, by every possible means, while President Wilson struggled with his Congress for the enactment of those laws which he had set himself to procure.

          Business in the United States did not improve; the tariff and the income tax had yet to disclose their capacity for revenue. There was trouble with the banks, and with the railroads. The manufacturing interests were suffering serious depression. The tolls exemption repeal, with its veiled threats of international complications, and open assault on harmony in the Democratic party, presently intruded to make matters worse. The first year of President Wilson's administration was a hard one at home, giving excuse for doubt whether time could be spared for setting a neighbor's house in order.

          But the excuse lost its value through the disclosure that the United States had been meddling with its neighbor's

412 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

affairs for many months. There was war in Mexico, and the United States seriously hampered one of the contending parties while giving important support to the other. It would appear, at the date of this writing, that nothing more need be done to insure the triumph of the Constitutionalists; and that, when this shall have been achieved, the United States must interfere to deprive Carranza and Villa of the usual rewards of victory, or must permit a government to be set up by them and their adherents. Having gone so far with these men President Wilson can hardly turn his back upon them. The obligations incurred cannot be evaded by mediation. By supporting the Constitutionalists the United States has become responsible in part for their fortunes and their behavior. Despoiled Europeans are recognizing this; so are their home governments.

          It is a very grave responsibility. What pledges have been given by Carranza and Villa I do not know, but as to the value of those pledges I have a very definite opinion, which is that they are upon a par with those given to Ambassador Wilson in the matter of the lives of President Madero and Vice President Suarez. If Madero and Suarez had been efficiently protected by the United States they would not have suffered death ; and the same may he said prophetically of many a Spaniard and abhorred Huertista who will come into Villa's power during his military operations, and afterwards. Those whom the United States succeeds in protecting, whether by arms or threats or promises, will live, and those whose fate depends upon the inward reformation of Pancho Villa will be fortunate if they suffer nothing worse than death.

          The mediation at Niagara Falls may result in an excellent plan for the government of Mexico, but if this shall exclude Carranza and Villa from high office, it must involve a questionable bargain with them, or must leave them

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 413

cheated by the United States. For something must have been promised them in the course of these prolonged relations, otherwise the bare encouragement would have amounted to a promise that they should rule their country when their armies should have conquered it.

          If a Constitutionalist government shall be established, its chief claim to favor will reside in the projected reform of land tenure. This seems to be President Wilson's conviction. Samuel G. Blythe, in the Saturday Evening Post, May 23, 1914, gives a long account of a conversation with the President on April 27, and the following sentences occur in that article :

          " He (the President) sketched the conditions in Mexico under Diaz and came to the underlying cause for all the unrest in that country for many years. This, he said, was a fight for the land — just that and nothing more."

          A considerable assortment of other causes for unrest—causes which the land question can not be said to underlie, and which no reform in that matter alone can remove—were visible to me during my residence in Mexico ; but that is another story. The land question, as I have already said, depends for its equitable solution upon a proper method, not to mention the means of putting it honestly into practical operation. This reform was the chief plank in the platform of San Luis Potosi, and Francisco I. Madero believed in it very sincerely, to which fact I bear witness from personal knowledge. But under the circumstances and in the time allotted to him, he did not find an answer to the problems which it presented. No safer wager could he made than that Carranza, Villa and all their domestic counsellors will prove equally inadequate.

          If the United States is truly committed to that reform

414 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

in Mexico, it must provide the method, and will be extremely fortunate if not called upon to provide the power also. But, to speak of the plan alone, Madero would have been devoutly grateful for it ; and since land tenure is alleged to have been for many years the sole underlying cause of Mexico's unrest, it seems a pity that the United States did not work out a scheme for the removal of the landless peon's discontent, and give the use of it to the predecessor of General Huerta, thus solving the Mexican question which has cost so many lives, and so much money.

          For the inauguration of a Constitutionalist president will be the completion of a blood-red circle drawn on the map of Mexico. There may be — though I doubt it — a brief time of quiet afterwards in which to balance the books of the transaction. On the credit side will be the favorable difference, if any may be discovered, between the stability and merit of the new Mexican administration and that of President Madero. I put emphasis on stability, for in default of it no land tenure change can be of any value. The peon will not have much profit of his land, if it becomes a battlefield between seedtime and harvest, nor will he dwell upon it, even though the fighting may be miles away. He will have learned to prefer looting to the dull pursuit of agriculture.

          Let this instruction be the first item on the debit side of the account covering the last two years. There must be added many thousands of Mexican lives sacrificed in battles, massacres of prisoners, and incidental murders ; the wreck of cities and the devastation of rural districts ; the killing of Americans in numbers which it is too early to estimate ; the hardships suffered by a multitude of others, and their property loss, very large in the aggregate. Hatred of Americans will be bitter and enduring, and will tend to retard the business recovery of the country, even

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 415

under the best possible conditions. It is an item not to be overlooked.

          Many of these evils might have been prevented, I believe, by more judicious action on the part of the United States after the accession of Madero. He had come to the presidency after a revolution very mild and brief, yet violent impulses had been in some degree stimulated, and it was not easier to predict that night would follow day than that anarchy would follow another revolutionary overturn in Mexico. Peace, and some degree of permanency for the new government, were the first essentials, and this fact seems to have been recognized in Washington. Madero, though he came unwelcome, treading on de la Barra's heels, was recognized in due time, with kindly expressions.

          I have no doubt that it would be possible to trace the diplomatic relations of the two governments, and find evidence on which to base a very plausible contention that President Taft was the great and good friend of President Madero. It seems to me that he was hasty and ill advised in his action relative to the disorders which presently appeared in Mexico, of which the most conspicuous was the wholly mercenary revolt of Orozco. I have asserted for example, that the threat of military interference did great mischief and no good; that it tended vastly to increase the evils which were supposed to have been its justification; that it hurt Mexico's credit, embarrassed Madero in many serious ways, and needlessly excited enmity toward the United States in Mexican bosoms.

          Yet it may be shown that President Taft's attitude was friendly throughout, that his language was temperate and courteous even when it conveyed threats, and that he never ceased to express a hope that the sister republic would emerge triumphant from her troubles. Along this line I

416 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

will concede all that reason will allow; but afterwards there will remain one matter in which the United States was persistently and fatally unfriendly to Mexico from the beginning of Madero's rule until its tragic end. In regard to this particular matter I assert that there can be no difference of opinion, but only of information; that two or a thousand right-minded men will inevitably agree, if they know the facts.

          President Taft maintained in the capital of Mexico an ambassador who should not have been there; who was lamentably misplaced, unsympathetic, injudicious, and disastrously harmful. Knowing as I do how narrowly Madero missed a triumph over the extraordinary difficulties and deadly enemies that beset him, I am constrained to believe that the least value which can be assigned to the unfortunate influence of the American ambassador is still sufficient to have turned the scale. The right man in the place, tactful, well disposed, keenly discerning, a man who earnestly desired the established government to continue because he had the foresight to perceive what must follow its violent overthrow — such a man as dean of the diplomatic corps and representative of the most influential nation, could have lent enough support to Madero to keep him up until the wave of violence had subsided and the revival of prosperity had turned the minds of the masses toward peaceful means of living. And he could have done it without offensive interference, without going beyond the bounds of diplomatic propriety.

          If the reader doubts this let him think upon a single phase —upon the situation when Calero was in Washington and Henry Lane Wilson in Mexico City. How was President Madero then placed with regard to diplomatic relations? If there was any help that might have been given, what chance had Madero of getting it? Much help

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 417

was possible, at that time and before and afterwards, but I know that it was not forthcoming.

          The brevity of Madero's term in office, the manner of his fall, and the murders that followed were in the highest degree deplorable. They were evidences of inherent instability and incitements to all who saw personal profit in such conditions. It was inevitable that there should be a season of violence more serious than any that had gone before. I believe that the conditions in Mexico City and in many parts of the country amply justified intervention by the United States, and that the day on which it should have been declared was February 18, 1913, when Huerta seized control of the government. It seemed to me then that, sooner or later, it must come, and I have never changed my opinion. The situation has not improved but has become worse, and intervention as the ultimate answer to the Mexican question has never been more probable than it is today. It might come before this book is off the press, and not surprise me in the least; but should it be delayed a long time I shall still believe that nothing has been gained. It would have cost less time, less money, and fewer lives if it had followed as speedily as possible the events of the day I have just named. The resistance would have been inconsiderable compared to that which will be encountered when the thing is done.

          Though Ambassador Wilson worked for the immediate recognition of Huerta, such action would have been manifestly improper. President Taft did nothing of importance in the matter, and the Mexican problem was passed on to his successor as it stood, a scandal to the world.

          President Wilson let it be known immediately that his attitude toward Huerta was unfriendly, yet he retained Ambassador Wilson in Mexico City, and thus gave his administration the appearance of facing both ways, for

418 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

all the world was aware of the Ambassador's efforts in Huerta's interest. It is probable that Huerta's position was strengthened by this dubious procedure, and that he received more aid from interested persons abroad than would have come to him if the Ambassador had been recalled immediately.

          There was no serious pressure exerted by European nations, either then or afterwards, to influence the Mexican policy of the United States. There was a certain amount of bluffing, but that was all, despite persistent reports to the contrary. It was believed in Europe, if not in America, that the United States would be compelled to intervene; that its credit would be engaged to ensure payment of Mexico's obligations, including all damage claims. Nothing better was desired; no suasion was necessary to bring on the fortunate result. Jealousy of one another, and the hazard of their own trade interests were sufficient to deter European Powers from action.

          Except for the fateful nature of the situation which had come to exist during the administration of his predecessor, President Wilson was free to answer the Mexican question in various ways. Real non-interference, however, was not within the scope of his choice. There were too many Americans in Mexico, and too many interests interlocking the two countries. It was strictly impossible to contemplate indefinite continuance of disorder in Mexico as endurable by the United States. I believe that the proper course would have been the restoration of peace by the speediest practicable use of the armed forces of the United States; but this action was not favored by the President, for reasons which I have attempted to deduce and set forth. After some months of apparent hesitation he began to accept with gradually increasing definiteness a policy of depending upon the Mexican revolutionists to

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 419

accomplish the pacification of the country through a series of military triumphs.

          He might have taken sides with Huerta instead. There are those who still believe that if this had been done the rebellion would have been put down promptly ; but this is an error. The circumstances under which Huerta had come to power were such that the greater his resources, the longer would be the war in Mexico. It would have been brought to an end only by the intervention of the United States, never in any other way while Huerta lived, and held his seat.

          There was, however, another procedure possible to President Wilson. To my mind it was the only acceptable alternative to immediate intervention. He might have attempted to solve the Mexican problem peaceably with the help of men who were deeply, vitally interested in the welfare of the country, and who could exert a powerful influence toward satisfactory readjustment even in a situation so difficult. Beyond question the man to be consulted first was Limantour. It would not have been easy to gain his confidence, but it would not have been impossible. If his advice had been sought, accepted, and followed, and his efforts toward the establishment of a stable government in Mexico had been tactfully and strongly supported, a creditable success might have been achieved. My criticism of Limantour's course in the spring of 1911 will be recalled, but no contradiction will be seen by those who have read with comprehension.

          I think that so far as the President neglected any opportunity to secure information and advice on the Mexican problem, it was a grave error ; and that a continuance in this course would be unfortunate. With the deepest respect I wish to say that the President's published utterances on the Mexican question do not reveal a full understanding

420 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

of it. The Mexican people are not fitted for self-government, in the sense in which he seems to use the expression. To stand by willingly while some millions of uneducated Indians, vastly outnumbering the cultivated inhabitants of the country in which they live, try to evolve a working democracy from a state of demoralization only to be relieved by the exercise of the most highly developed judgment, would be as cruel and absurd as to wait for a sick child to grow up and evolve the theory and practice of medicine. What the Mexicans really require is a business government much better, much more modern than that of the United States, a business government equipped with every device of science, and above all with the method.

          There is no doubt as to the duty of the United States; it is the same as that of every organization and every individual in relation to the general welfare, and consists in unremitting effort to extend the gains of scientific research and the use of the scientific method into all the details of human life, governmental, industrial and personal. That is what the United States ought to do for Mexico, so far as may be practicable.

          The idea that ignorance plus liberty plus providence is the formula for a commonwealth is no more respectable today than Rousseau's theories of a return to nature and the golden age. And it will be well for the United States to consider in all the long future of the Mexican question that what is really desired is the welfare of the Mexican people, not their mere momentary gratification. The aspiration for liberty has often seemed to come from below, though its real source has usually been in a few elevated minds. The scientific principles upon which, at some future time, the first truly free state will be organized and conducted are just now beginning to come down from above, from the brains of men trained for methodical research. The more

THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO 421

diligently this fact is remembered in connection with the rehabilitation of Mexico, the better it will be for all concerned, including the humblest peons who will never be able to understand the source from which will come their help.

          These remarks seem to me pertinent because I believe that the United States will be compelled to take control of Mexico. At the date of this writing it seems certain that President Wilson will find it necessary to thwart Villa and Carranza, and that war will result. Although the Constitutionalists have been permitted to become a formidable host, their power will be registered only in the number of the invaders who will be slain, not in substantial military successes. In the end they will be dispersed and driven to the mountains, and the United States, for a space, will rule Mexico. It is then that I shall wish to see politics and all antiquated methods forgotten, and the public affairs of that country administered with real enlightenment.

          Whoever doubts the eventual restitution of Mexico to its own people, questions the honor of the United States. The obligation will be explicit ; the American public will indorse it, and will make it good. If that public will condemn, while the occupation lasts, every worn-out device of politics and every foolish tendency towards sentimentalism, the incident will be brief and the results beneficial. The Mexicans do not need another dictator, domestic or imported. The era of Diaz is closed. What they need would be better described as a good board of directors to manage the corporation of which they are the stockholders, and a reformed policeman strictly under the orders of the board. If they have an experience of this rule, they may like it so well that they will gladly undertake its perpetuation. That will be self-government.

          Whatever may be done in Mexico, there will be the same

422 THE POLITICAL SHAME OF MEXICO

need as heretofore that the United States should have a definite and continuous policy toward Latin American countries, not one that varies with political changes, or mere shifts of sentiment, in the great northern republic. The questions to which that policy will be directed will be business questions, and should be handled by business men. To permit the development of trade with Latin America to be further retarded through neglect of this plain fact is manifestly unwise. A self perpetuating commission of representative business men should be established to deal with all Latin American relations. Their recommendations would not be final, but radical departures from them would be very infrequent.

          If such a board had been in existence in 1912 there would probably have been no Mexican revolution in February of the following year, because the men composing the board would have known what was being hatched, and what was to be looked for in Mexico if the mischief should be left unchecked. It is hardly possible that the President and the Secretary of State would have been deaf to the representations sure to have been made by watchful men of sound business training and adequate foresight, serving the government at that time in the capacity suggested.

THE END 

Edward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (1914) Part 1; Part 2; Part 3; Part 4; Part 5; Part 6; Part 7