Army Operations 1865-2

[From the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. 50, Parts 1 and 2]

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[OR I-50-2, pp. 1274-1275]

Headquarters Sub-District of Nevada,

Camp No. 10, July 1, 1865.

Lieut. E. D. Waite,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Sacramento, Cal.:

Lieutenant: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general commanding, that owing to the jaded condition of the cavalry horses, caused by several months of hard service, I have remained at this camp since the 18th of June for the purpose of recruiting the stock, gaining information of the course taken by the hostile Indians, which I have found, by frequent scouting parties sent in all directions, to be toward the mountains in the vicinity of the headwaters of the Owyhee and Humboldt Rivers. On the 25th of June I inspected the cavalry according to Special District Orders, No. 90. The pack train which is intended to carry my supplies on the inarch after the Indians arrived on the 28th of June. On the 30th ultimo I mustered all the troops for pay. I have ordered Company B, Second California Cavalry, Lieut. R. A. Osmer, commanding, to scour the country between the Humboldt and Reese Rivers, with orders to protect the settlers and punish any marauding bands of Indians. Company D, Captain Hill, Sixth California Infantry, I have ordered to Queen's River to protect the settlers and travelers of that vicinity. Both of the above-named companies have orders to move wherever they deem their presence most required. I shall move after the Indians by two routes tomorrow morning, taking fifteen days' rations and crossing the range of mountains lying between the Humboldt and Owyhee Rivers (at whose base Camp No. 10 is situated); thence I shall proceed east, directing my course for the head of the Humboldt River. I send Capt. J. C. Doughty, Company I, Second California Cavalry, with a command, directing him to leave this camp on the 3d instant and scour the country in vicinity of Gravelly Ford, joining me at a point about 110 miles from Gravelly Ford. My command will consist of forty-five men of Company E, under Lieut. J. Littlefield; fifty men of Company D, Capt. A. B. Wells, Nevada Cavalry; fifty men Company A, Capt. W. Wallace, Nevada Infantry; a 12-pounder mountain howitzer, dismounted and packed upon mules; Asst. Surg. A. F. Mechem, Lieut. C. C. Warner, H. Butterfield, guide and interpreter, with three Indians. Total, officers and men, 157; also a pack train of twenty mules. Capt. J. C. Doughty's command will consist of seventy men of his own company, twenty men Company B, Nevada Infantry, under Lieutenant Seamands (mounted), Lieut. Charles Tagge, Acting Assistant Surgeon Spaulding, six Indians, and a 12-pounder mountain howitzer; total, 100, with orders to find the hostile Indians, if possible. I have moved my field base of supplies from Camp No. 10 to Camp No. 14, twenty-five miles back, and placed Capt. E. C. Payne, Company E, in charge. I have stations through to Dun Glen for the protection of supply trains. I have ordered Maj. M. O'Brien, Sixth California Infantry, to report with one of his companies now at Fort Churchill at these headquarters, for the purpose of taking charge of the post to be established here, the site of which I shall select on this trip.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. McDERMIT,

Lieutenant- Colonel Second California Cavalry, Commanding.

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[OR I-50-1, pp. 419-421]

JULY 2-13, 1865.—Expedition from Camp Lyon, Idaho Ter., to the Malheur River, Oreg., with skirmish (9th).

REPORTS.

No. 1.—Lieut. Col. John M. Drake, First Oregon Infantry, commanding Sub-District of Boise.

No. 2.—Lieut. Charles Hobart, First Oregon Cavalry.

No. 1.

Report of Lieut. Col. John M. Drake, First Oregon Infantry, commanding Sub-District of Boise.

Headquarters Sub-District of Boise,

Fort Boise, Idaho Ter., July 18, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith, for the information of the colonel commanding the district, a copy of Lieutenant Hobart's report of an action with the Snake Indians near the headwaters of the Malheur River on the morning of the 9th instant. The Indians received a pretty severe punishment, and will not be apt to attack that command again. The wounded man, Private Phillips, of Company B, First Oregon Cavalry, has been brought to this post and is doing well. From the locality of this affair I judge the band of Indians to be the same that have been depredating on the Boise road, along Burnt River, and in the vicinity of Auburn. From inquiry made along Burnt River while en route to this post, I learned that the rumors current along the Columbia River a few days ago, to the effect that an extensive Indian raid had been made on Auburn and the adjacent settlements, was without any other foundation than the capture of a pack train near Shaw ranch on the night of the 7th instant. I believe the rumor to have been circulated designedly for some sinister purpose. A portion of Lieutenant Hobart's command, twenty-five men, under command of Lieutenant Gates, were dispatched by Lieutenant Hobart July 1 to Surprise Valley, or to such point on the California road where a detachment of troops from Fort Bidwell could be met, the object being to patrol the road in conjunction with the troops stationed at Fort Bidwell, as directed in General Orders, No, 36, current series, department headquarters. The number of troops at Camp Lyon is insufficient for the duties prescribed—the protection of the mining settlement and patrolling two California roads. The road to Paradise Valley will have to be left to the care of the troops stationed there, unless the garrison at Camp Lyon is increased.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. DRAKE,

Lieutenant- Colonel First Oregon Infantry, Commanding.

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,

Headquarters District of Oregon, Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter.

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No. 2.

Report of Lieut. Charles Hobart, First Oregon Cavalry.

Headquarters,

Camp Lyon, Idaho Ter., July 13, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to report that the expedition consisting of forty-four enlisted men of Companies A, B, and D, First Oregon Cavalry, under my command, left this post on the morning of July 2, 1865. About 11 a. m. we came upon the trail of the stock stolen from Jordan and Reynolds Creeks and followed it to the Malheur River, arriving there on the 7th. The trail was very hard to follow and we experienced great difficulty in following it. It went in a very circuitous direction and every method had been used by the Indians to blind it. On the day of arriving at the Malheur the scouts in advance incautiously exposed themselves and were seen by a party of three Indians who were gathering berries. They fled to the brush, leaving their horses. On the arrival of the command every effort was made to find them, so that they would be unable to transmit intelligence of our presence to the main body of the Indians, but they concealed themselves so effectually that it was impossible to do so. The train was camped and the command, with the exception of the camp guard, was pushed rapidly forward on the Indian trail, hoping to reach the camp of the Indians and surprise them. On our way up the river three mounted Indians were seen and chased by the advance and their horses captured, the Indians escaping to the brush. We kept on the trail till late in the afternoon, riding most of the time at a trot or a gallop, passing several recent camps, until the trail became blind, the stock appearing to have been scattered in all directions. The command was then divided into several parties and the country within a circuit of several miles thoroughly scouted, but without attaining our object. We returned to camp after dark. The next day small parties went out, but could find no traces of the Indian camp. Our camp was on a little flat situated where a small creek joins the Malheur, bounded by the Malheur on the front and left, the creek on the right, and a high precipitous mountain in the rear. On the opposite side the mountains rose in broken ridges directly from the river. This was the only camp in several miles, there being no water in the mountains and the bunch grass being high up on the divides. About an hour and a half before daylight the picket guard reported Indians near camp. The stock was driven in, the men called to arms, the horses ordered saddled, and the howitzer got into position. While this was being done the Indians, finding themselves detected, opened a heavy fire on the camp from all sides, but heaviest from a bench on the mountain in rear of the camp. A charge of canister was immediately thrown among them and they fell back. It was then reported that ten horses and a number of mules had broken from the men and ran in the direction of the mountain in the rear. A party under Sergeant Wallace and Corporal Walker, of Company B, were instantly sent to charge the hill and recover the stock, the Indians in the rear having fell back, shouting as they did so to the party opposite us. In front they commenced a rapid fire, by which Private Jones of Company D, First Oregon Cavalry, was wounded in the arm, and prepared to make an attack on the camp, but a few discharges of spherical case and canister caused them to retreat over the mountain. The stock having by this time returned to camp, re-enforcements were pushed forward to the party of Sergeant Wallace, which was still in pursuit of the Indians. The Indians were pursued five or six miles, a running fight being kept up all the time till they managed to escape down a steep, rocky cañon, leaving in our hands the body of one Indian whom they were unable to take off, his arms and ammunition, and nine horses. Three other dead Indians were carried off by them, together with their wounded; how many in number I could not say, the country being so cut up with cañons breaking off from the main ridge that an Indian could elude pursuit by going into them. The horses captured were covered with blood, and I think quite a number of Indians must have been wounded, as the fire of our men was quick and well directed. During the pursuit Corporal Walker and Private Phillips, of Company B, separated from the main body in chase and, the Indians coming out the cañon behind, turned and fought their way back through the Indians. Private Phillips was seriously wounded. Corporal Walker turned back and killed an Indian that was just going to knock Phillips off his horse. The Indians did not pursue them farther. By this time others had come up and continued the pursuit till the Indians separated and escaped into the cañons. The number of Indians cannot be correctly estimated. The mounted Indians numbered about seventy. The Indians on foot kept on the high points and in the heads of the rocky cañons and must have been in large numbers. I think white men must have been among them, for they told us in good English to "come on, you sons of bitches, we can whip you anywhere." They had considerable soldiers' clothing among them and appear to have plenty of arms and ammunition. I am of the opinion that some of the Boise Indians were with them, as the gun captured is one of those that were stored in the quartermaster's storehouse at Fort Boise. The place where we had the engagement is about twenty-five miles in a southeast line from Pilot Rock, a high mountain forty miles south of Canyon City, near which the roads from Canyon City to Boise and California separate. I think that there is a large body of Indians in that section of country and that they have made that part their base of operations. Returning from the Malheur River, we arrived at this post to-day. In conclusion, I would speak in the highest terms of the bravery and judgment shown by Sergeant Wallace and Corporal Walker, which aided greatly in the successful issue of the day. Our loss is 2 horses and 1 mule. The horses got away during the engagement and we were unable to find them afterward. The mule was severely wounded and unable to travel and was shot by my order.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES HOBART,

Second Lieut., Oregon Cavalry, Comdg, Camp Lyon, Idaho Ter.

Lieut. Col. J. M. Drake,

First Oregon Infantry, Commanding Sub-District of Boise.

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[OR I-50-2, pp. 1276-1277]

Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter., July 6, 1865.

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,

Headquarters District of Oregon :

Sir: I have the honor to submit to the consideration of the colonel commanding some observations on the existing state of affairs in the Boise and Snake River country and to offer some suggestions on the dispositions of troops in the Sub-District of Boise. The Owyhee mines and the routes of travel leading to them from California are more exposed to Indian raids than any other portion of the country, and will need military protection summer and winter for at least two years to come. During the past spring quite extensive depredations were committed on the Owyhee River and Jordan Creek, and on the roads leading to them, at a time when the only troops in that part of the country were a single company of infantry at Fort Boise, and a part of that was out on the Overland Stage line. The early spring and breaking up of winter is the time invariably selected by the Indians for their horse-stealing expeditions. To prevent these, troops will have to be wintered in the country where their services are required. I would recommend that the camp established in Jordan Creek Valley be made a winter camp, if a site can be found that will afford any facilities for constructing shelter for the troops and procuring forage for animals. Lieutenant Hobart's camp, on Jordan Creek, for the summer was located with regard only to the facilities necessary for a summer camp, but he has instructions to examine the country and report upon its natural resources, with a view of making a winter camp if it should be considered advisable. The Overland Stage Line will require protection from Salmon Falls to the Goose Creek Pass, a distance of 120 miles. For this duty forty or fifty men, half of them mounted, will be sufficient. They can be camped at Rock Creek, and can construct shelter for themselves and gather forage for their horses at that place. To enable the military authorities to afford any protection whatever to this line during the winter, a winter camp is absolutely essential. The large mining population collected in the Boise country has driven the hostile Indians entirely from the north side of Snake River, and this part of the country has escaped from Indian depredations the past year. The camp in Camas Prairie is not necessary to the protection of that part of the country. It might be abandoned and the troops composing it be posted at or near Fort Hall, on Snake River, until late in the fall, for the protection of the immigration. A band of Bannock Indians under Pocatello have been encamped on the Port Neuf River for several weeks. They have conducted themselves peaceably thus far, but are liable at any time to break out in open hostilities, and could, if so disposed, cut off' the immigration entirely, unless some military force be sent into the vicinity.

The day before leaving Fort Boise I learned by letter from the sheriff of Oneida County, addressed to Governer Smith, that a band of Bannocks, numbering about 200 men, women, and children, had collected at Soda Springs since the withdrawal of the troops from that place and were threatening and aggressive in their manner and deportment Trouble with them was apprehended. If Captain Palmer's command now in camp at Camas Prairie, was re-enforced to seventy or eighty men and posted on the Snake River bottom, below the Blackfoot Ferry and kept there until, say, the 15th of October, any outbreak on the immigration now in contemplation by these Indians might be checked, prevented entirely. The warlike attitude assumed by all the Indians of the Rocky Mountain region renders it highly improbably that these two parties of Bannocks have assembled at these places for any peaceful purpose. Their position will enable them to destroy the immigration, if they are so disposed, and no protection is afforded. The scarcity of cavalry renders it highly necessary that means be afforded of occasionally mounting a detachment of infantry. With the necessary supply of horse equipments men can be mounted on mules for temporary service, and be made equally available with a cavalry force. It will be necessary at all times to keep some pack mules at these outside camps, and with a small supply of saddles, bridles, &c., in the quartermaster's department, a detachment of infantry can be made to render efficient service in the pursuit of Indians.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. DRAKE,

Lieutenant- Colonel First Oregon Infantry.

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[OR I-50-2, pp. 1278-1280]

Headquarters Department of the Pacific,

San Francisco, July 10, 1865.

Lieut. E. D. Waite,

Acting Assistant Adjutant- General, Sacramento, Cal.:

Sir: I have received from Mr. MacCrellish, of the Alta, the following statement, which is respectfully submitted to General Wright, viz:

Letters dated June 27, from Owen's River Valley, state that Indians have burned the Union Mills, which cost $30,000; sacked Bend City and threatened San Carlos Mills and town. The inhabitants have gone to Kearsage district.

Mr. MacCrellish procured this information from Mr. Hanks, long a resident of San Carlos, who thinks a few soldiers sent from Camp Independence would protect and save much valuable property.

Very Respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. W. HILLYER,

Lieut. Col. Fourth California Infantry, Acting. Asst. Adjt. Gen.

[First indorsement. |

District of California, July 11, 1865.

Respectfully referred to commanding officer Camp Independence for his information.

By order :

E. D. WAITE,

Acting Assistant Adjutant- General.

[Second indorsement.]

Camp Independence, July 21, 1865.

Respectfully returned to district headquarters.

The Union Mills have been burnt, but whether by Indians or not has not yet been determined. Bend City has not been sacked nor San Carlos threatened. The citizens of those towns have all removed to Kearsage in consequence, of the superiority of the Kearsage mines and plenty of business at Kearsage. The general commanding department has been here, to whom the facts have been explained.

Respectfully,

JNO. G. KELLEY,

Captain, Nevada Infantry, Commanding Post.

[Third indorsement.]

Brigade Headquarters, District of California,

Sacramento, August 3, 1865.

Respectfully transmitted to department headquarters.

EDWD. McGARRY,

Colonel Second California Cavalry, Commanding District.

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Smoke Creek Station, Nev. Ter., July 10, 1865.

Lieut. E. D. Waite,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Sacramento, Cal.:

Lieutenant: I have the honor to report my arrival with my company at this station at 3 p. m. to-day. I have camped near the quarters formerly occupied by the troops when stationed here and owned by Kingsbury & Co. They arc only large enough to accommodate thirty-five men, and the stable will accommodate thirty horses. They will not accommodate more than half my command, but when I get my men distributed along the road between here and Pueblo the quarters will accommodate what will remain here, if it is intended that I shall hire the quarters. I have nothing but shelter-tents, and the winds blow so hard every afternoon that they are of but little use. There is not a tree or stick of timber fit for building purposes nearer than Susanville (that is fifty miles). Sage brush is all the wood used here, or to be gotten for cooking purposes, nearer than fifteen miles. There is some scrub cedar about fifteen miles from here on the head of Smoke Creek, but before it can be gotten at considerable work will have to be done, making roads. I have several men sick, and there is no medicine here and no doctor nearer than Susanville. The detachment of Nevada cavalry stationed at Deep Hole, thirty miles from here, is camped here to-night on its way back to Churchill. The man living at Deep Hole came with them, and thinks the Indians will make a raid on him as soon as they learn that the detachment has gone. The sergeant in charge of the detachment reported to me that he saw Indian signs near the station the day before he left. I will send a detachment through to Pueblo with the first stage, which will leave here on the 13th instant, and when the stage stations are established I will leave a detachment at Granite Creek, and another at one of the stations between Granite Creek and Pueblo. If I am to guard the route from here to Pueblo (the distance is 130 miles), and the detachment can be spared from Antelope Creek, I would like to have them here, as I think they would be of some use here, and of none where they are. This is a hard country for men, and they should be well provided for, and not be kept out in detachments without an officer too long at a time, if they are expected to be kept under discipline. I will keep them out two or three weeks, and then relieve them and bring them in here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. KNIGHT,

Captain, Second California Volunteer Cavalry, Comdg. Station.

[Indorsement.]

July 21, 1865.

Respectfully submitted to department headquarters. Another cavalry company from Camp Union has been ordered to Smoke Creek. Captain Knight has been instructed not to hire quarters.

G. WRIGHT,

Brigadier- General, Commanding.

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Ruby City, Silver City, and Boonville,

Owyhee Mines, Idaho Ter.,

July 12, 1865.

His Excellency Hon. C. D. Smith,

Governor of Idaho Territory, Boise City:

Dear Sir: We, the undersigned, citizens of Owyhee County, Idaho Ter., beg leave to call to your attention the condition of Indian affairs in this section of the Territory, and to state to you that the Indians have now almost complete control of the new road leading to this quarter from California and Idaho. We would desire to state to you that a stage line was established and put into successful operation under the most gratifying and favorable auspices by Mr. Hill Beechy, from Star City, in Nevada, to Ruby City in Idaho, but the Indians broke up the stations, ran off the stock, and compelled Mr. Beechy to abandon the road until the Government could give him ample protection. Up to this day nothing has been done by the Government or any one else. We would also call your attention to the recent dastardly, atrocious, and inhuman cruelties perpetrated upon the immigrants from California to Idaho in the Pueblo Valley. Several parties coming through have had their stock stolen and fearing to risk their lives were compelled to leave the country on foot. These parties were followed by two others in Pueblo Silver District, when they were attacked by the Indians and four killed. The Indians took one of the men, cut off his head, and driving a stick through it pinioned it to the ground. They then cut off his testicles and hung them on a tree; then cut off his legs and arms and cut his body into strips and hung the pieces on the bushes. One of the men was burned to a stake. One of the men escaping, Mr. Hendricks, is now here severely wounded. To the most of Pueblo the Indians are holding possession of the road, and the report is have defeated Captain Wells, of California cavalry. Within a few nights past they have run stock off from Reynolds Creek with perfect impunity. The travel from here to California and Nevada, which thus far has opened under favorable auspices, is about being cut off. Two days ago the travelers by Pierce and Francis Saddle Train, on their way with their horses to stock the stage line from Susanville, feared to start out without some protection. They visited Camp Lyon, commanded by Lieutenant Pepoon, of the Oregon cavalry, and asked for a small detachment of five men to accompany them through the Indian country, and it was refused them on the ground that they have no soldiers to spare for this purpose, and the men and horses had to return, and are now here waiting to get a sufficient force to protect themselves. We desire, therefore, to bring these facts to your official notice, and ask that early and active steps be taken to protect the country against further depredations of Indians, and would ask that a large force be established in the Pueblo District, with instructions to patrol the road from the Pueblo to the Owyhee and from the Pueblo to the settlements in California, and we shall ever remember the service done us and the country.

We are, sir, with respect, your obedient servants,

C. G. STAFFORD,

Probate Judge,

[And 162 others.]

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[OR I-50-1, pp. 424-428]

JULY 17, 1865.—Skirmish on the Owyhee River, Idaho Ter.

Report of Lieut. Charles Hobart, First Oregon Cavalry.

Headquarters Sub-District of Boise,

Fort Boise, August 11, 1865.

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,

Headquarters District of Oregon, Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter.:

Sir : I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of a report by Lieutenant Hobart of an affair with Indians on the Owyhee that occurred on the 17th of July. This report is dated July 18. It was not received until the 8th instant, having been delayed by being sent through some channel at Ruby City other than the one usually adopted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. DRAKE,

Lieutenant- Colonel First Oregon Infantry, Commanding.

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Headquarters,

Camp Lyon, Idaho Ter., July 18, 1865.

Sir : I have the honor to report that Sergeant Wallace with his command returned to day. They followed on the trail of the stock stolen from Jordan Creek, and yesterday found the Indians in a cañon of the Owyhee, about forty five miles south of this camp. The sides of' the cañon were about 800 feet high, and was only passable for stock by a narrow trail by which the Indians had driven the stolen stock down. The horses of the command were left under guard on the table-land, and the remainder of the command divided into two parties, one entering the cañon below and the other above the Indians. There were twelve or fifteen warriors in camp. The party led by Sergeant Phillips was enabled to get to their station before the party led by Sergeant Wallace (on account of having the longest and roughest road to follow) could get to theirs. The intention was for Sergeant Phillips not to commence firing until he heard the guns of the other party, but being discovered by two Indians who were washing in the river, he was obliged to commence the attack. The other party soon came up, and the results were 4 Indians left dead on the field, some others who managed to get across the river, but were seen to be severely wounded, 1 ox (the only one left alive of the band stolen), 2 horses, a number of bows and arrows, ammunition, several hundred pounds of dried meat, a large amount of dried berries, trinkets, &c., robes, furs, blankets, and all the stuff in their camp, 2 revolvers, parts of a Henry rifle, and empty shells for it, so that there is no doubt that this was the party who killed McCummins and McGregor last winter. I think that but very few of the party—not more than two or three—got away unhurt. The camp and everything it contained was burned, and the command returned to Jordan Creek last night, and arrived at Camp Lyon about 2 p. m. to-day.

Great credit is due Sergeant Wallace for the energy and bravery shown by him in surprising and destroying this band of thieves. The sergeant speaks in the highest terms of the conduct of the men.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES HOBART,

First Lieutenant, First Oregon Cavalry, Commanding Post.

Lieut. Col. J. M. Drake,

First Oregon Infantry, Commanding Sub-District of Boise.

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[OR I-50-2, pp. 1285-1286]

Hdqrs. Company B, Second Cav. California Vols.

Dun Glen, July 17, 1865.

Lieut. Col. Charles McDermit,

Second Cavalry California Volunteers,

Commanding Humboldt Expedition, Nev. Ter.:

Colonel: I have the honor to make a further report of the movements of Company B, Second Cavalry California Volunteers, since July 7, 1865, to the present date, in conformity with instructions from yourself. On the 8th day of July this command left Fairbanks Station and moved for the Golconda Mountains, escorting at the same time a party of unprotected emigrants en route for Reese River. I moved to Summit Spring some forty miles distant from said station, and on hearing that hostile Indians had camped in that vicinity, I concluded to use my utmost searches and endeavors to find them. I therefore camped at Summit Spring, and at the solicitation of the emigrants I dispatched a squad of my men (numbering twelve) to escort and see them safely to the Reese River settlements. I in the meantime and for the period of six days scouted the mountains in the section of the camp day and night, and left nothing undone in my power to capture and punish any hostile Indians that may have been around. I scouted the ravines and even the highest summits of the mountains in the adjoining country, and am sorry to say with little success. On the return of the squad of men who escorted the emigrants aforesaid I learned that traces of large bands of Indians were visible about twenty-five or thirty miles from Reese River, and that they had met with several stray inoffensive Indians, who informed them that a large number of bad Indians had gone to Reese River, and furthermore the non-commissioned officer who had command of the squad informed me that he had conversation with several settlers in the vicinity of Reese River, who expressed much fear for their safety, and expressed hopes that military protection may be given them in time, as daily they expected their houses burnt and property destroyed by the ruthless band that hovered around their section. I would therefore respectfully represent to the colonel that from information and belief I deem these settler's fears are not without foundation, and feel assured that after supplying the command with rations and other necessaries I could meet with that success in the Reese River district I have looked so earnestly for in the Golconda range of mountains. I left the Summit Spring on the 15th instant and camped at Evans Cañon, where I remained for one day, during which I took with me thirty men and thoroughly searched through the second east range going to the summit of the mountains. I also sent a squad through Clear Creek Cañon and scouted the other squad through Sonoma Cañon to Grass Valley and the adjoining ravines, and could see nothing to convince me that Indians dwelt around there. On account of the men of my command being partly out of rations I deemed it advisable to repair to Dun Glen to get the same replenished, and in conformity with your instructions, colonel, to await your inspection of the 20th instant.

I have the honor to be, colonel, your most obedient servant,

E. A. OSMER,

First Lieut., Comdg. Company B, Second Cav. California Vols.

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[OR I-50-2, p. 1287]

Headquarters Department of California,

San Francisco, August 11, 1865.

Lieut. Gen. U. S. Grant,

Commanding the Army of the United States, Washington, D. C.:

General: Owing to the interruption of the telegraph line between this and the East, and, further, to my absence from headquarters on a tour of inspection beyond the Sierra Nevada to Owens River Valley, your telegram of the 10th ultimo asking if I need troops for Arizona and if so what number and kind should be sent, was not received by me until the latter part of July, since when I have been waiting from day to day for the telegraph to work to send an answer. But as there seems now no prospect of the line being in order for an indefinite time to come I answer this by the next steamer, sending a duplicate to take its chances overland. In the last dispatches received from him, Brigadier-General Mason, commanding the District of Arizona, writes as follows :

I would respectfully request that, if possible, two additional regiments of infantry be sent to this Territory. In the end it will be more economical. A sharp, quite active campaign against the Indians during the coming fall and winter will be all that is needed, provided we have troops enough. The extent of country (Arizona) is so great and the number of Indians comparatively so small that they can evade the troops. Whilst we are scouting in one section they are depredating in another, but with troops enough to operate in all sections at the same time a short campaign will suffice.

I cannot agree with the general in his estimate of the short duration of hostilities in his district, though I do in the economy, in every point of view, of his having as large a force as can be used and supplied. I therefore wish two regiments of infantry for Arizona. I can spare from the troops at the Presidio some companies and a company from Southern California, and shall immediately order them to proceed to Arizona. Ultimately I will send four other companies from Southern California, making in all thirteen companies, all of which in a few months' time will not amount to more than a regiment. For the other regiment I beg to suggest as follows: There are in New Mexico parts of the First and Fifth California Volunteer Infantry and part of the First California Volunteer Cavalry, which it is desirable should be drawn into Arizona, where they will be nearer their homes by the time their terms of service expire. That this may be done, and at the same time the brigadier-general commanding in New Mexico may have sufficient force to co-operate efficiently with the commander in Arizona, two full regiments of infantry, or their equivalent, and two squadrons of cavalry should be sent to New Mexico, as it may be too late by the time this communication reaches you and can be acted upon for these troops to go from Kansas, either by the Cimarron or Eaton routes. It may be necessary to send them from or through Texas, if that State is in a condition to admit of it. I have as yet received no reports or returns from New Mexico, and cannot write with any precision as to the number, disposition, or kind of troops in that district, and the number I have named is therefore a matter of conjecture, but cannot, I think, be far out of the way. In connection with this subject, I beg to ask that authority be given to consolidate the regiments of volunteer infantry in California with each other as they fall below the minimum, instead of reducing the regiments into battalions, so that some of the colonels, who are very necessary for holding commands, may be retained.

I have the honor to remain, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Major- General, Commanding Department.

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[OR I-50-2, p. 1288]

General Orders, ) Hdqrs. Mil. Div. of the Pacific,

No. 1. ) San Francisco, Cal., August 30, 1865.

I. In compliance with the orders of the President of the United States, Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck hereby assumes command of the Military Division of the Pacific, comprising the Departments of California and the Columbia.

II. All communications and reports not otherwise directed by regulations and orders will be made through the commanding generals of departments.

III. Communications for division headquarters will be directed to Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott, assistant adjutant- general of the division.

IV. The following officers of division staff are announced, viz: Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott, assistant adjutant- general; Lieut. Col. D. C. Wager, assistant inspector-general; Maj. John McL. Taylor, chief commissary; First Lieut. Henry A. Huntington, Fourth Artillery, aide-de-camp; Bvt. Brig. Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U. S. Volunteers, on special inspecting duty.

By order of Major-General Halleck:

EGBERT N. SCOTT,

Assistant Adjutant- General.

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[OR I-50-1, pp. 425-428]

SEPTEMBER 23, 1865.—Skirmish in the Harney Lake Valley, Oreg.

Reports of Capt. Loren L. Williams, First Oregon Infantry.

Headquarters Selvie's River Expedition,

Camp Wright, Oreg., September 24, 1865.

Col. George B. Currey,

First Regiment Oregon Infantry,

Comdg. Dept. of the Columbia, Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter.:

Sir: Inclosed find official report of engagement of yesterday; also list of casualties in the engagement. The scouts consisted of ten men of Company H, and two men of Company P, First Regiment Oregon Infantry.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. L. WILLIAMS,

Captain, First Oregon Infty., Comdg. Selvie's River Expedition.

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Headquarters Selvie's River Expedition,

Camp Wright, Oreg., September 24, 1865.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of an engagement between twelve men under my command and 75 or 100 Indians of Harney Lake Valley, which action commenced at 12 m. on September 23, and ended at 7 p. m., same day.

On September 23, 1865, I set out with twelve men from camp on Selvie's River to scout a few miles down the valley to locate a permanent camp, and search for a place to cut hay. Proceeded down the valley seven miles, when we discovered the fresh trail of two Indians on foot going in the direction of Harney Lake. Following the trail a short distance, the Indians were discovered about one mile distant entering an extensive sage plain. We immediately gave chase, not expecting to overtake them, but soon discovered one of them to be a boy of about nine or ten years old, which impeded their progress, so that we soon found ourselves gaining upon them. After a pursuit of about seven miles, and when within long range of our guns, they were met by two mounted Indians from the opposite side of the sage plain, and were taken up and made good their escape. We had been marching at double quick over the sage plain for seven miles, and consequently the men were very tired. I therefore ordered a rest, placing two sentinels in a conspicuous place. We rested for an hour, and that hour's delay came near proving fatal to the scouting party. We were now sixteen miles from our camp. A solitary Indian mounted on a fine iron-gray horse now appeared in sight, and riding about at full speed circling around us, then rode off to a distance of half a mile and fired his gun, and sounded the war whoop. Directly we discovered thirteen mounted Indians approaching, and as that was just our number, we had no fears for our own safety. As they came up they encircled us on every side, and firing was at once opened by them and promptly returned. We now turned toward camp and steered straight for a high mountain point which lay direct between us and our camp, which would make the distance much nearer than to go round. The Indians kept up their firing and howling, and were very soon re-enforced by twenty or thirty horsemen and twenty-five or thirty footmen, who joined in the conflict. Their forces were placed on every side of us, horse and foot mixed up promiscuously, and now firing became very brisk from front, flank, and rear, but the Indians were kept at a distance of from 250 to 500 yards by our long-range guns. We were still moving direct for the mountain, believing that we would be perfectly safe if we could gain the mountain ; at least, if it gave us no other advantage, it would be the most direct route to our camp, where we could obtain relief. The firing was brisk on both sides. The bullets were whizzing among us. We were not sufficient in numbers to protect all sides at one time. When within half a mile of the mountain some twenty or twenty-five horsemen fell in ahead of us and ascended the mountain at the very place for which we were striving, and we had the mortification of seeing them take position in the rocks to cut us down if we advanced. At this time I could see but one alternative, and that was to turn direct to the right and travel parallel to the mountain, and make for Selvie's River, some five miles off. The men were tired, nearly exhausted, their lips parched with thirst, and the whole distance to the river was one level sandy sage plain. As we turned, nearly all the footmen and two-thirds the horsemen pursued along the foot of the mountain to our left. I now placed Corporal Johnson to guard the left flank and Private McPherson to guard the rear, the places from which the most danger came, and the men were then ordered in single file, fifteen paces apart and parallel to the mountain. In this manner we marched to Selvie's River with a constant shower of bullets falling among us or whistling over our heads. The sage-brush in many places, being of heavy growth, gave the Indians favorable opportunities, and many shots were fired at us from a distance of from 75 to 100 yards, the Indians generally dodging down and avoiding our shots. On approaching the river, Private Alexander Griffin, of Company H, First Oregon Infantry, was severely wounded in the left hip, but not disabled. As we reached the willows on the river the Indians struck the river above and below us. My men were so tired they could scarcely travel, and nearly choked with thirst. My mouth was so parched that I could scarcely give command. I at once ordered three men through the stream without a moment's pause to protect our front. Three others were faced about to guard the rear, while the remainder took a hasty drink of water and relieved them. Our delay at the stream was not over one and one-half minutes, and at the command "fall in on the east side," every man was instantly at his post, and we marched at double-quick for about 300 yards from the willows along stream to an open level plain. A few horsemen were in front but the bulk of the Indians had halted along the stream. We now turned up the valley northward in the direction of our camp, firing still kept up briskly by the Indians from the river on our left. Private Smith, of Company F, First Oregon Infantry, was at this time slightly wounded in the left foot. It was now about sundown, and our camp still four miles off—so far that we could not hope for them (the men in camp) to hear our guns. After sundown a mounted Indian with a blazing torch struck out from the river and fired the grass on a line for two miles in length, and crossing at right angles through the prairie before us, and betwixt us and our camp. We still pushed on (heavy firing all the time kept up on both sides), passing through the fire line, and aimed to strike the river three miles or two and a half below camp. The ground was level; no very high grass, and but little sage-brush. We were soon expecting a re-enforcement from camp. We thought we were safe unless some random shot from the willows should strike us, and there was much danger, for whole volleys were occasionally fired at one time, and would strike in the grass or whistle past us. At this time I was stunned by a volley of five or six rifles from a dry gully four or five feet deep directly ahead of us. I looked around expecting to see one-half of my men fall dead, hut none were injured. The men were at once ordered into a sink at our left of sufficient depth to hide them. from this position we had three or four good shots, not over sixty yards distant, at those who had fired the last volley. This was the last firing on either side. I rested the men a half-hour, and it now being dark (except light from fire which now extended up and down the river for some distance), so that it was impossible for us to move in the direction of camp without placing us directly between the Indians (in the willows along the river), and the blazing fires on the prairies. I could see no other avenue of escape than to double up on our track, which was accordingly done, and we double-quicked it out of our position and soon placed the fires betwixt us and the mass of Indians along the stream. We traveled four or five miles in a course directly opposite from camp and made a large circle to the northward and gained our camp at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, having traveled forty-five miles without food or rest, seven hours of which being under a heavy fire from the Indians, who outnumbered us at least six to one. From the place where the fight began to its termination was about fifteen miles, three-fourths of which was a sandy sage plain. The attack upon us was made at about 12 m., and was kept up without any cessation until about 7 p. m., during which time it is certain that fifteen Indians were killed and several horses crippled. Our two wounded men were safely brought in. The men all acquitted themselves creditably. Not an order or command was given but what was instantly obeyed. Corporal Johnson and Private McPherson are entitled to great credit for their valuable services, without which the whole detachment might have been cut off. Our long-range guns and superior marksmen gave us advantages that rendered their superior numbers far less formidable than if we had been armed with common rifles.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. L. WILLIAMS,

Captain, First Oregon Infantry, Comdg. Selvie's River Expedition.

Col. George B. Currey,

First Regiment Oregon Infantry,

Comdg. Dept. of the Columbia, Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter.

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Camp Wright,

On Selvie's River, Oreg., September 26, 1865.

Sir : On September 18, I arrived at Selvie's River with twenty-four men of my command, and on 23d, while scouting with twelve men, I scared up a hornet's nest of 75 or 100 Indians, who surrounded us, and for seven long and weary hours we fought in the center of a living circle, and finally dodged the Indians after dark and reached camp at 2 o'clock next morning, having traveled forty five miles without food or rest, fifteen miles of which was under as heavy a fire from Indians as men ever withstood and came out of alive. I had one man severely wounded in the hip and one slightly wounded in the foot. It is certain that fifteen Indians were killed and several horses crippled. I will give you the official report in detail soon. I have no blanks for post returns. Orders, No. 7, as far as I am concerned, I think will be carried out, the opposition of a large band of Indians to the contrary notwithstanding.

In great haste, your obedient servant,

L. L. WILLIAMS.

Col. G. B. Currey,

Fort Vancouver, Wash. Ter.

P. S.—I can get good hay and have named my camp after General Wright.

L. L. W.

[Inclosure]

Return of the casualties of the Selvie's River Expedition at an engagement with the Indians in Harney Lake Valley, Oreg., on the 23d day of September, 1865.

Griffin, Alex (ball lodged in left hip; small bullet), Company H, First Oregon Infantry, Rank: Private, severely wounded.

Smith, Thos F. (Ball passed through shoe, grazing left foot), Company F, First Oregon Infantry, Rank: Private, slightly wounded.

I certify that the above is a correct return of the casualties of the detachment of Companies H and F, of the First Oregon Infantry Regiment, at an engagement with the Indians in Harney Lake Valley, Oreg., on the 23d September, 1865.

L. L. WILLIAMS,

Captain, First Oregon Infantry, Comdg. Selvie's River Expedition.

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[OR I-50-2, pp. 1288-1293]

Headquarters Department of California,

San Francisco, Cal., December 6, 1865.

Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Mil. Div. of the Pacific, San Francisco, Cal.:

Sir: In answer to your letter of yesterday I have to report that, in compliance with General Orders, No. 10, from division headquarters, " to immediately muster out of service such volunteers as could be dispensed with from my command," the following corps were ordered to be mustered out, to wit: The Sixth California Volunteer Infantry, the Eighth California Infantry, six companies of the Fourth California Volunteer Infantry; the three companies of Nevada infantry, the two companies of Nevada cavalry, serving in the department; the battalion of four companies Native California Cavalry. Of these the field and staff and seven companies of the Sixth Regiment have been mustered out (October 25 and 31). Two of the companies of the Sixth were at Summit Lake, beyond the Sierra Nevada, on the road to Idaho. A small company of the Ninth U. S. Infantry (regulars) is on the march to relieve them, and when last heard from was beyond the Sierra. The lateness of the season and the heavy storms will, I fear, obstruct the road and retard the line of march of the companies of the Sixth, and make it impossible to give a date for their arrival and muster-out. Another of the companies of the Sixth Regiment was at Camp Lincoln, near the Indian reservation on Smith River; a company of the Ninth has gone up to relieve it, but the storms were so heavy that the steamer could not bring the volunteers back. They are expected by the next steamer. The field and staff and all the companies of the Eighth Regiment mustered out October 24, except four of the officers on a court-martial. These were mustered out November 7. Five of the companies of the Fourth Regiment mustered out November 30. The other company ordered to be mustered out was serving in Oregon, and has not yet arrived under the orders given at division headquarters.

The company of Nevada infantry serving at Fort Ruby, on the overland route, will be mustered out as soon as the company of the Ninth (regular) Infantry, now on the march, arrives to relieve it. When last heard from this company was one day's march beyond Fort Churchill. The company of Nevada infantry at Fort Churchill will be mustered out as soon as the company of cavalry ordered there from northern Nevada arrives. The company of Nevada infantry at Fort Independence, Owen's River Valley, will be mustered out of service as soon as relieved by the company of California volunteer cavalry, now en route. As in the case of companies at Summit Lake, this post lies beyond the Sierra Nevada, which is now covered with snow. The relieving company has been obliged to march to the south through Walker's Pass, instead of direct across the mountain. It has, however, arrived by this time, and the company of Nevada infantry will soon be on the march to Fort Churchill to be mustered out, which will be toward the end of the month. The battalion of Native California Cavalry was serving in southern Arizona and will not be able to reach its place of muster-out for sometime, as it has to make a march of over 500 miles, much of it over a desert.

In addition to these corps, a detachment at Fort Churchill belonging to the Nevada cavalry serving in Utah, and detachments at the Presidio belonging to the Second California Volunteer Infantry, and Native California Volunteer Cavalry in Arizona have been mustered out. As I do not consider that they can be " dispensed with " I have not given orders for the muster-out of the Second California Volunteer Cavalry, for there is no regular cavalry in the department that could be sent to relieve it, and it is stationed in California and Nevada at points that require protection, and some of it engaged in active hostilities against the Indians. Nor have I given orders for the muster out of the volunteer regiments and companies serving in Arizona; for the reason that they are now occupied in a vigorous campaign against the Apaches, for which large and expensive preparations have been made, and to carry on which the two battalions of the Fourteenth, even when they reach that far-off country, will be wholly inadequate. The First Battalion, recently arrived, will proceed there as soon as practicable; moving two companies at a time, which, on account of the scarcity of water on the desert, is the largest number that can march with comfort. There remains in the District of Humboldt, at Hoopa Valley and at the Indian reservation at Round Valley, two companies of the Second and one company of the Fourth California Volunteer Infantry. A long and expensive Indian war was waged in that section, which required from two to three regiments. A large number of the hostile Indians were made prisoners and sent to the Round Valley Reservation, and others have been located on the Hoopa Valley Reservation; I do not think it prudent at this time to withdraw the volunteer companies from those reservations.

I have nothing but two small skeleton companies of the Ninth, not over one-third of the force, and if they should be sent I should be without a single company of infantry for any service; the two small skeleton companies referred to being the infantry reserve for the whole department. The force in Nevada is represented by the district commander and by his subordinates as inadequate to the service required of it. In northern Nevada a very active campaign has been carried on all last summer, and the Indians have been driven off the main routes and overland-mail road. We have lost one of our best officers, Lieutenant-Colonel McDermit, the district commander, and several men. In a recent engagement on the route from Nevada to Idaho an entire band of the hostile Bannocks were almost totally annihilated, 120 having been killed. To withdraw troops from these distant posts this winter and to abandon the campaign in Arizona, concerning which so much expectation has been excited and on which so many interests and so many lives depend, would be very disastrous to the country, and I trust it may not be done. Next year I hope and believe it may be done if a regiment of cavalry should, in the meantime, be sent out.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Major- General, Commanding Department.

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Headquarters Military Division of the Pacific,

San Francisco, Cal., December 8, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant,

Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.:

General: In compliance with your directions, I inclose herewith maps of the Departments of California and the Columbia, on which are marked the several posts at present occupied by troops of this military division. The following remarks are submitted by way of explanation:

COAST DEFENSES.

I presume that it is the wish of the Government to have the fortifications on the seacoast occupied with some kind of garrisons, however small they may be. I shall therefore keep garrisons in the several forts in the Bay of San Francisco and at the mouth of the Columbia River. There is at the present time a company of artillery at San Diego for the purpose of enforcing our neutrality laws. When the Mexican difficulty shall be solved there will be no necessity for a garrison at that place; at least not until the harbor is fortified. At Wilmington, Los Angeles County, a very large and expensive depot and barracks have been established. I can perceive no good reason for the enormous expenses which have been incurred at that place; but as the establishment exists, it will probably be best to keep it up till some other base for supplying the troops in Arizona is determined on. This will be discussed in another place.

Until the boundary question in regard to San Juan Island is definitely settled it will be necessary to keep a garrison at that place. A company of artillery is now stationed there. There is also a small garrison at Fort Steilacoom. Forts Townsend and Bellingham are without garrisons. The territory bordering Puget Sound is now so thickly settled by the whites that no danger is apprehended from Indian depredations, except in canoes from the British Possessions on the north. These parties usually land at places distant from any military post, commit their robberies and murders, and are off in their canoes before their presence is known to the garrisons, which have no means of pursuing them by water. To prevent these depredations there should be a small naval steamer kept cruising in the straits and sound.

I respectfully request that the attention of the Navy Department be called to the necessity of this precaution. I see no use of military posts on these waters except at points where permanent fortifications are to be established. Probably the points to be so defended are Port Discovery, Point Defiance, Deception Passage, and perhaps Admiralty Head. Should a navy-yard be established in these waters, perhaps it may be necessary to fortify some other points for its defense. It is important that the proper localities for these purposes be selected and reserved or purchased without delay. The value of these lands and the difficulty of purchasing the sites are rapidly increasing, and in a few years they can be secured only at enormous cost. Moreover, all expenses incurred for military posts in that vicinity should be made on sites which are to be permanently occupied. Those at Steilacoom, Fort Bellingham, and probably Port Townsend, should be abandoned as a useless expense. I, however, shall order no changes there till General Steele arrives and has time to investigate the matter. I think a board of engineers should be ordered without delay to select the necessary sites for permanent fortifications.

INDIAN FRONTIER.

In regard to the protection of the Indian frontier on the east, the policy should be to keep the troops in advance, retain them in rear of the white settlements, and to make the posts as temporary and cheap as possible. These should be maintained as depots of supplies for expeditions against the Indians and the temporary camps which may be established in their country. As these camps will be continually changing, they should be of the most temporary character. Tents and huts constructed by the troops will usually be sufficient.

DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA.

The most northerly post on this frontier line is Fort Colville; next is Fort Lapwai, near Lewiston. Probably it will be necessary to establish an intermediate temporary post in the vicinity of Coeur d'Alene Lake or Mission, and perhaps another pretty well up the Salmon River and between the Lapwai Mountains and Fort Boise. The latter post will serve as a center of operations to Fort Hall on the east and to near the southern boundary of Idaho Territory. Camp Lyon serves as a temporary protection to the mining operations on the Owyhee River, but it will probably be necessary to establish a post near the headwaters of that river, say somewhere near the northern boundary of Nevada or near Pete's Butte, so as to connect with Fort Ruby and the settlements on Humboldt River. All Indians west of this line should be removed or placed in reservations, so as to prevent their marauding expeditions upon the white settlements. Much of this can be accomplished in the course of the coming year,

There is a belt of rather poor country extending from Fort Klamath to the Owyhee River, over which the Indians pass on their robbing expeditions into Southern Oregon and Northern California, and to receive and purchase horses stolen by the local tribes. In order to check these depredations Camps Polk, Watson, Currey, Wright, and Alvord were established in Oregon, and Fort Bidwell and Camps McDermit, Summit Lake, Snake Creek, and Dun Glen in California and Nevada. These are of a very temporary character, and when the more advanced line is completed most of them can be dispensed with. Fort Klamath must for the present, on account of the Indians in that vicinity, be retained. The expenses of its construction were entirely disproportionate to its importance. Forts Yamhill and Walla Walla can probably be dispensed with very soon, and Fort Dalles immediately. It is not possible to conceive any military necessity for the enormous expenditures at Fort Dalles. Fort Vancouver serves as the depot for the supply of the Department of the Columbia, and the military establishment at The Dalles seems more like a private speculation than a public necessity.

NEVADA.

Fort Ruby will serve as a center of operations for the protection of the overland mail and emigrant roads to Salt Lake and the settlements on Humboldt River beyond Dun Glen. An inspecting officer has been sent to examine its condition, and will probably report in a few days. Fort Churchill is simply a depot. Some of the temporary camps near the boundary (northern) of the State must depend on it for supplies.

CALIFORNIA.

Forts Crook, Wright, Humboldt, and Gaston and the adjacent camps in the northern part of California must be maintained for the present winter, but it is probable that some of these posts may be dispensed with next season. Several artillery garrisons, as already remarked, will be kept in the forts of the Bay of San Francisco simply as seacoast defenses. Monterey and Camp Union have been abandoned, and I can see no necessity for a garrison at Benicia. The construction of barracks, storehouses, and stables at that place was most ill-advised, and the enormous sums of money expended there were of little or no benefit to the Government, however advantageous they may have been to private speculations. San Francisco always has been and always will be the depot of supplies for California and Nevada. Visalia is the only military post maintained at present in the San Joaquin Valley, and General McDowell is of opinion that this camp may soon be dispensed with. The mining settlements at Owen's River and Lake, and in that vicinity, will require military protection for some years. A substantial post must therefore be established in that district of country, from which temporary camps may be thrown out as the population advances. Its maintenance will be very expensive, and its garrison should therefore be kept as low as may be consistent with safety and the proper protection of the district. Camp Independence is probably the best location. Camp Cady was established and is kept up for the protection of the road from Cajon Pass to Fort Mohave. The discovery and development of valuable minerals between the Sierra Nevada and the Colorado, and the numbers of Indians which inhabit or roam over that region of country, will render it necessary to keep up a considerable military force for its security and protection.

ARIZONA.

The map will show the present disposition of military posts in the Territory of Arizona. Probably the winter campaign against the Apaches will cause some considerable changes. The most important problem to be solved is that of supplying the posts in that Territory. At present there are four routes of supply: First, by sea, the Gulf of California, and the Colorado River; second, from Wilmington to Fort Yuma; third, from Wilmington to La Paz; and fourth, from Wilmington to Fort Mojave. There is no great difference in the expense of reaching Arizona by either route from San Francisco, which is the main source of supplies. But the great difficulty is in supplying the interior posts, which can be reached from the Colorado River only by crossing barren and sandy deserts, where there is great scarcity of water for men and animals. The natural line of supply for Las Calabasas and Tucson and their dependencies is from some port on the Gulf of California, and it is of the greatest importance for the future prosperity of Arizona that some good port should be obtained in the gulf. It is hoped that this matter will be kept constantly in view in all future negotiations with Mexico. The boundary line should at least be carried so far south as to include the port of La Libertad. From that point to Las Calabasas the route is short and easy for the transportation of supplies.

TROOPS.

I must again urge upon you the necessity of sending a cavalry force to this division. We have now no mounted troops in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Nevada, and in California and Arizona only the California volunteers, who regard their term of enlistment as having expired and wish to be mustered out. These troops are made up of most excellent material, but men who regard themselves as unjustly retained in service will not be very efficient in the field. You will bear in mind that when your orders for mustering out the volunteers are completely carried out, the only forces in this entire division will be the Second Artillery and Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry. The Ninth is only a small regiment. The artillery will be required to garrison the forts on the coast, and the Ninth Infantry in the interior of California and Nevada.

This leaves only one battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry for the Department of the Columbia and two battalions for Arizona. The hostile character of the Indians in the latter Territory requires more posts and larger garrisons than in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho; but circumstances may render it necessary to re-enforce the troops in the latter department. With the present forces in the division it would be difficult to do this without seriously exposing other districts to Indian depredations. A regiment of cavalry would do much to relieve this embarrassment. The accompanying report of Major-General McDowell will explain the necessity of retaining certain volunteer troops for the present. It also contains a list of those mustered out.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major- General, Commanding.

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