RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE NEW YORK DIVISION

            Question. Have all the successful prosecutions in New York City had any real impact on the LCN?

            Answer. The numerous successful prosecutions in all five New York LCN families have had a measurable impact on the LCN, particularly with respect to the top leadership.

            The "Commission Case" virtually removed the existing hierarchy of three of the families; Colombo, Luchese, and Genovese, and separate prosecutions eliminated the leadership of the Bonanno Family.

            With regard to the Gambino Family, the indictment and subsequent trial of Boss Paul Castellano brought to light embarrassing conversations between Castellano and other LCN members from FBI Title III interceptions. As a result, Castellano neglected important family matters by becoming preoccupied with the trial. This led to his demise and that of Thomas Bilotti at the hands of the current Gambino Family leadership. In retaliation, Frank De Cicco, Gotti's right hand man and heir apparent to the Consigliere position, was blown up by a bomb planted in his car. Further, the indictment of long-time Gambino Consigliere Joe N. Gallo, caused Gallo to retire from that position.

            In the other four families and, to some degree, in the Gambino family, young, inexperienced street guys have been brought in as members, and the top leadership and many capo positions are held by "acting" members, who have little of the expertise or wisdom in "family matters" to handle the illegal activities of these groups.

            This resulted in a breakdown in discipline, internecine warfare, and a return to the more familiar forms of activity such as gambling, loansharking, and extortion. This has led to the development of more sources, and in many ways, less complex prosecution, since the new hierarchy has not yet developed an expertise in the conduct of illegal activity and the evasion of detection.

            Question. Will Civil RICO lawsuits, targeted against the LCN, result in a diminution of the LCN's influence?

            Answer. The purpose of civil litigation under the provisions of the RICO Statute in an organized crime investigation is to seek injunctive relief prohibiting the recurring crime problem. The civil RICO actions filed against the LCN to date are structured to remove the LCN influence from specific labor entities thus removing the LCN's lucrative control of certain industries. The LCN control or influence over Teamster Locals 560 and 814, as well as Laborers Local 6a and the District Council of Cement and Concrete Workers in New York, has continued unabated in spite of successful Federal prosecution against LCN members for labor racketeering. This new strategy of seeking injunctive relief will allow law enforcement through civil and criminal contempt of court provisions to ensure that the LCN does not continue to manipulate these labor entities.

            Question. How are the LCN families reacting to the recent convictions of their hierarchies? Are they in disarray, and if so, how have these convictions affected the way they do business?

Answer. The convictions of various LCN hierarchies have caused disarray within the affected LCN families. Acting bosses have been named to replace the incarcerated bosses, but tend to be younger and without lines of communication to other LCN families. This necessary familiarity is usually gained through years of experience. Meetings and discussions to further family businesses have generally excluded non-LCN members for the security of LCN members.

            New meeting places are being sought and a general atmosphere of caution appears to be prevalent.

            Question. What are the principal sources of income to the LCN families operating in New York City?

            Answer. The LCN families in New York gain income from a myriad of criminal activities and are principally involved in gambling, loansharking, and labor racketeering. Organizationally, gambling is the principal source of income. Loansharking and labor racketeering are important and provide income for individual members

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who are involved in these activities. As the Federal Government continues to remove LCN influence from the labor movement and its related industries, certain LCN members are engaging in narcotics trafficking to replace lost income.

            Question. As to LCN influence in unions, how is organized crime able to establish such a firm grip on some unions? What, if anything, can be done to prevent this?

            Answer. The LCN utilizes many techniques to gain a firm grip on unions to include murder, extortion, loansharking, degenerate gambling and property destruction. Investigations have also revealed many corrupt union officers willing to work with the LCN for their personal enrichment.

            We believe that freeing the unions of LCN control, dominance and influence is a realistic goal. A review of the FBI's investigative efforts and successes over the past decade relative to the LCN reflects a positive evolvement of investigative techniques and effectiveness. As a result, today the FBI's current Organized Crime National Strategy has as its mission the elimination of the LCN and other organized crime groups as significant threats to American society through sustained coordinated investigations that support successful prosecutive action. Central to the accomplishment of this mission are well-developed, well-coordinated RICO investigations utilizing the Enterprise Theory of Investigation. We believe that our strategy provides for an imaginative, responsive and effective investigative approach directed against the LCN, and that with enhanced legislation, sufficient coordinated resources and sustained efforts to expand our national intelligence base, it is possible to remove the influence the LCN has with unions.

            Question. If so, how are we going to accomplish that?

            Answer. We believe that we can free the unions from the influence of the LCN and we believe we can accomplish that through the effective implementation of our Organized Crime National Strategy. Our Organized Crime National Strategy calls for coordinated investigations against LCN families utilizing the Enterprise Theory of Investigation. These investigations will be prosecuted under the RICO Statute and followed up when appropriate by the civil provisions of the RICO Statute.

            Question. In the 1970s, the FBI conducted a massive investigation, called UNIRAC, of organized crime's influence in the waterfront industries and in the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). Has organized crime influence declined in that area as a result? What follow-up has been done on that investigation in the New York area?

            Answer. At the conclusion of the UNIRAC investigation, the FBI believed that it had dealt a crippling blow [to] the LCN influence and control over the ILA and the shipping industry. In retrospect we now realize that although we had prosecuted and jailed large numbers of labor racketeers, we have not destroyed their criminal infrastructure. We had not taken advantage of the criminal provisions of the RICO Statute which allow for prosecution of the criminal enterprise and the seizure of the assets of that enterprise, nor did we employ the resources of the civil provisions of the RICO statute. Therefore, the LCN has remained a dominant force in the ILA and the shipping industry.

            Labor racketeering is the highest priority in the FBI's organized crime investigative program. The FBI has identified four major unions that are substantially corrupted by the LCN. The ILA is one of those unions and as such receives continuous and requisite investigative attention to labor racketeering violations identified.

            Question. At the institution of a criminal investigation, does the FBI conduct a civil investigation concomitant to the criminal investigation. If so, how do the civil aspects hinder or bolster the criminal investigation?

            Answer. Until recently, the civil provisions of the RICO Statute have been underutilized by the FBI. However, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, RICO's pre-trial restraint provisions were amended enabling the Government to obtain a restraining order from the court to prevent the dissipation, sale or transfer of property which the Government believes will become forfeitable upon conviction of the defendants. Presently at the institution of a RICO investigation, the FBI initiates the process of identifying property used to facilitate racketeering activity as well as the proceeds of racketeering activity. At the indictment stage this evidence is presented to the court in an effort to obtain a restraining order preventing the dissipation, sale or transfer of the property. This is all done in anticipation of the eventual forfeiture of the property to the Government upon conviction of the defendant.

            At the institution of a criminal investigation the FBI does not conduct a concomitant civil investigation. This is primarily due to the fact that some criminal investigative tools and techniques, such as the Federal grand jury, are not available to the investigator in furtherance of a civil investigation. Also, some civil investigative techniques, such as depositions, are not available to the investigator in furtherance

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of a criminal investigation. In civil investigations that have been successfully litigated by the Government, such as United States versus Local 6a, Et Al, United States versus Local 560 Et Al, and United States versus Local 814 Et Al, the decision to proceed with the civil case was made at the conclusion of the criminal investigation.

            Question. Upon the successful conclusion of a civil RICO lawsuit aimed at the LCN what agency is empowered to enforce the court order and how can the court order be enforced?

            Answer. The authority to conduct an investigation for the purpose of monitoring compliance with a court order entered in a civil RICO proceeding is derived from the RICO Statute itself (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 1961-1968). Specifically, Section 1961(8) defines "racketeering investigation" as ". . . any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any final order, judgment or decree of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter."

            Based upon this definition, a racketeering investigation is authorized in two instances. First, it may be conducted to determine whether a violation of RICO's substantive provisions, Section 1962(a-d), has occurred. Once a Section 1962 violation has been established the Government may elect to seek criminal penalties pursuant to Section 1963, pursue civil remedies under Section 1964, or both.

            Second, a racketeering investigation may be conducted to determine whether any person has violated any final order, judgment or decree entered by a court in any RICO proceeding. Within the context of civil RICO, Section 1964 confers upon the District Courts of the United States broad equitable powers to prevent and restrain violations of Section 1962. This statutory grant of equitable jurisdiction authorizes the District Courts to issue orders which include, but are not limited to, ordering divestiture of a person's interest in an enterprise, imposing restrictions on future activities of any person and ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise [Section 1964(a)]. These are clearly the types of orders contemplated by the definition of racketeering investigation, i.e. "final order[s], judgment[s], or decree[s] duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under" RICO.

            Based on the foregoing, it should be noted that although the U.S. Marshals Service has primary responsibility for the enforcement of all court orders, the FBI has statutory authority to investigate for the purpose of determining compliance with civil RICO court orders. The authority to conduct such investigations, however, is not limited to the FBI, but may be exercised by any "racketeering investigator" so designated by the Attorney General. See Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1961(7). The statutory authority to conduct racketeering investigations, as defined in Section 1961(8), provides a complete and independent jurisdictional basis for the FBI to investigate compliance with civil RICO court orders. This grant of investigative authority is not dependent upon a prior request for investigation by a court or a court-appointed trustee. When conducting such investigations any evidence of noncompliance with the court order will be brought before the court for a determination of any remedial action necessary to effect compliance with the court order.

            Question. What was the "human" cost of the New York Division's successful organized crime cases?

            Answer. For the past several years, Joint Task Forces of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) have been engaged in a struggle with the forces of Organized Crime in the New York metropolitan area. This conflict is the equivalent of investigative warfare.

            During the course of this investigation, Agents and detectives encountered displaced families, victimized by Organized Crime, who were on the brink of despair. Many were convinced to cooperate with the New York Division and became Government witnesses. In Government parlance, we offered them "relocation" which translates into the Witness Security Program (WSP). Relocation means a man can no longer see his son. It means what he held most dear, he can no longer have. Some people do not wish to be "relocated;" some people live with daily threats against their lives posed by organized crime. For these people, their problems become our own.

            The human cost is not one sided. Threats are not exclusively directed at witnesses. Investigators have been assaulted and killed. Additionally, Agents are also under extreme stress because of extended work hours, personal financial worries and concerns with their general living conditions. Many of our Agents commute three (3) to four (4) hours a day just to arrive at work.

            Question. In The "Star Struck" and "StarQuest" investigations the New York Division convicted the hierarchy of the Colombo LCN Family. What was the cost of this investigation in both money and human resources? After factoring in all costs,

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including court costs and incarceration fees, how does the total cost of this investigation equal to the cost of the illegal activities to the general public?

            Answer. The Colombo LCN Family RICO enterprise investigation conducted by the New York Division resulted in the expenditure of approximately 2.1 million dollars over a five-year period. This investigation and the successful prosecution resulted in the dismantling of the hierarchy of the Colombo LCN Family. This investigation exposed to public scrutiny the inner workings of an LCN family and its infrastructure which had permeated and successfully infiltrated the concrete and cement industries as well as the hotel and restaurant industry in New York City. In one instance, a concrete company paid two percent of their contract price in all high-rise construction in New York City to the Colombo LCN Family. An additional two percent of the contract price of jobs over two million dollars was paid to four additional New York LCN families, with $10,000 per job being paid to the Colombo Family soldier and former President of the Cement and Concrete Workers Union, Ralph Scopo. An additional cost of twenty percent of the above payoff per job was incurred to pay the cost of raising the cash payoffs. All of these costs were passed along to the general contractor or developer. The FBI investigation in this phase alone resulted in a potential economic loss prevented of $3,927,200 solely based on one concrete company with contracts amounting to $75,625,000 between October, 1984 and December, 1986. This was the amount that company would have had to pay in kickbacks, and that amount would have been generated by overcharges to the contractor.

            In another instance, a concrete company paid two-percent of the contract price on all high-rise construction work to the LCN. To raise the two-percent payoff, the contract price was raised by four percent which was then charged to either the general contractor or the developer. FBI investigation in this instance resulted in a potential economic loss prevented in the amount of $788,400 based on high-rise construction from October, 1984 through October, 1986 amounting to $19,710,000.

            It is estimated that the citizens of New York pay more for what they eat and where they live and work because of organized crime's grip on legitimate businesses. The precise figure is difficult to quantify in monetary terms but a conservative estimate by knowledgeable economists in the New York City area determines that the LCN's penetration of the construction, delivery, food, and private garbage collection unions and industries, among others, costs consumers hundreds of million of dollars each year in New York City alone. It is estimated that concrete companies doing business in New York City with links to organized crime were overcharging builders in New York City by 40 to 50 million dollars a year or about ten percent more than they would otherwise have to pay.

            Ultimately, such construction costs are borne by consumers in the form of higher rents for apartments, higher cost for the goods or services sold by companies, and higher government taxes to pay for public works projects.

            During the Colombo LCN Family trial conducted in the Southern District of New York (SDNY), the president of Technical Concrete Construction Corporation testified that he paid the Colombo LCN Family more than $800,000 for labor peace and the right to big money building contracts. These payoffs were added to the cost and passed along to the developers. Testimony disclosed that all developers in New York City were losers because there was no competition. The builder felt that he and his partners had no choice about making the payments to Ralph Scopo, former President of the Cement and Concrete Workers Union and a soldier in the Colombo LCN Family. Testimony further disclosed that there was always the threat of physical violence to the contractor because of Scopo's union position and his membership in the LCN.

            The President's Commission on Organized Crime has determined that illegal payoffs on $175,000,000 worth of concrete poured at Manhattan building sites alone ranged up to 3.5 million dollars. The President's Commission on Organized Crime further estimates that the LCN's possible total gross profit from all forms of construction throughout the New York City area "must have been at least several times this amount."

            Additional testimony at the Colombo LCN trial provided evidence against the Colombo LCN Family and John De Ross, President of Local 6A, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union and a caporegime in the Colombo LCN Family. Witness testimony determined that De Ross was involved in accepting payoffs ranging from $7,500 to $25,000 a year in return for labor peace. In one instance, testimony revealed that nine $200-a-week dining room captains at Sardi's Restaurant in New York City were allowed to be replaced with two $120-a-week waiters. The workers were given a week's pay upon dismissal. The payoffs to De Ross were made for the purpose of

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allowing the former general manager of Sardi's Restaurant to violate the union contract.

            FBI investigation of the Colombo LCN Family resulted in the conviction of eleven LCN members including the boss, underboss and five caporegimes. These individuals received lengthy prison terms ranging from 12 years to 198 years. Additionally, the jury finding provided for a judicial determination of the existence of an LCN family. This is the first instance in which the existence of an LCN family, as an enterprise as defined by the RICO Statute, has been actually proven in Federal court.

            Question. Did the New York Division's successful LCN prosecutions leave a void in the underworld? If so, are other LCN families or nontraditional organized crime groups filling that void?

            Answer. The convictions and incarceration of the hierarchy of the five New York LCN families has caused disarray within the families for strong leadership. Less-experienced LCN members are attempting to return stability to the families but have not received the old regime's tutoring; especially in the area of labor racketeering and union control. For this reason, the FBI is continuing to focus on LCN union control as a priority.

            Question. What is the relationship, if any, between the LCN and nontraditional organized crime groups?

            Answer. The LCN maintains a working relationship with certain other organized crime groups in order to fulfill their racketeering objectives. For example, the Gambino and Genovese Families are known to use a violent group in New York called the "Westies" who function as a "private army" for these families. The "Westies" may be called upon to carry out contract murders or provide "muscle" when necessary. The Gambino Family has reportedly utilized a group of professional burglars and armed robbers who reside and operate in New Jersey to perform armed robberies for the family. The Gambino, Bufalino and Bonanno Families have strong ties to Colombian and Cuban drug cartels in the greater Miami, Florida, area, which provide these families with drugs for distribution in the United States. Also, there are other incidents of identified relationships between the LCN and nontraditional organized crime groups, such as outlaw motorcycle gangs and ethnic street gangs, wherein these groups are utilized in furtherance of the LCN's criminal activities. Nontraditional organized crime groups have benefited from their relationship with the LCN by having LCN members collect bad debts from reluctant clients. Other Hispanic and Asian groups in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and Miami have also been known to collaborate with the LCN on occasion for their mutual benefit.

            Question. What are the significant nontraditional organized crime groups in New York City? What action has the New York Division undertaken to meet this threat?

            Answer. The other significant criminal groups identified to date include Hispanic, Asian, Greek, Russian, and Korean organizations. The Hispanic groups include "The Company" and "The Corporation" which are generally involved in operating policy operations throughout the city. Asian organized criminal groups have infiltrated the Tung-On, the On-Leong Tong and the Hip Sing Tong in New York. These groups are assisted by various youth gangs who carry out criminal acts for members of the Tongs.

            In order to address these known traditional organized crime groups, the FBI New York has established a squad under the Joint Organized Crime Task Force concept with the New York City Police Department (NYCPD) to deal with emerging groups. This task force approaches the investigation of nontraditional organized crime utilizing the Enterprise Theory of Investigation.

            Question. What exactly was The Commission's role in the LCN? Is an LCN Commission still in existence or did the "Five Star" investigation eradicate it?

            Answer. The Commission's role in the LCN was generally to regulate and facilitate relationships between and among LCN families throughout the United States. Specific purposes of the Commission included the following:

            1. Promoting and carrying out joint ventures between and among LCN families and to obtain money through illegal activities.

            2. Resolving actual and potential disputes and regulating the several LCN families regarding the operation, conduct, and control of illegal activities.

            3. Extending formal recognition to newly-elected bosses of LCN families, and, from time to time, resolving leadership disputes within a family.

            4. Taking such steps as were necessary to preserve order in, between, and among the LCN families including authorization of acts of murder of certain LCN members.

            5. Approving the initiation of new members.

            6. Establishing certain rules governing the families, officers and members of the LCN.

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            7. Using threats, violence, and murder within the LCN to maintain The Commission's position of power and authority.

            The LCN Commission is having extreme difficulty maintaining a semblance of control by virtue of the fact that its members and/or leadership are incarcerated and generally out of touch with their respective families.

            The only bosses not currently in jail are Gambino boss John Gotti, and Vincent "Chin" Gigante who has been recognized as the boss of the Genovese Family. The remaining three families are being run by "acting bosses" who do not have the weight of a permanent boss, and to date have not been able to sit down and resolve many of the pressing issues, particularly that of new membership.

            It is not likely that The Commission will operate as it has in the past until permanent bosses are selected for each of the New York LCN families.

            Question. The Genus-Cattails or Pizza Connection case established a relationship between the Sicilian Mafia and the LCN. What is the extent of this relationship or was it isolated to the "Pizza Connection" case?

            Answer. The relationship between the Sicilian Mafia and the LCN is not isolated to the "Pizza Connection" case.

            The Genus-Cattails case, commonly referred to in the media as the "Pizza Connection" case, focused on Salvatore Catalano, a ranking member of the Bonanno LCN Family. The investigation determined that Catalano and his associates were members of Sicilian families but had developed a relationship with the Bonanno Family and/or the Gambino Family.

            Information obtained from Tommaso Buscetta determined that the Sicilians are allowed to operate within the area controlled by American LCN families. In return, the Sicilian Mafia pays tribute to the LCN.

            Question. How significant is the Sicilian Mafia's role in drug trafficking in this country?

            Answer. The Sicilian Mafia is comprised of organized criminal groups predominantly located in the Palermo, Agrigento, and Trapani provinces of Sicily. Two other major enclaves suspected of operating in the Untied States are the 'Ndrangheta originating from Reggio di Calabria, and the Camorra from the Naples area of Italy. Members and associates of the Sicilian Mafia have been responsible for a significant portion of the organized importation and distribution of multi-kilograms of heroin. To a lesser extent, they have been known to distribute cocaine.

            Recent investigations into Sicilian/Italian drug trafficking groups were highlighted in the well-publicized "Pizza Connection" case conducted by the FBI between 1980-1985. Extensive coordination of investigation with Italian authorities resulted in significant intelligence discoveries, more than 35 arrests in the United States, and laid the groundwork for the Italian Government to prosecute 350 Mafia members and associates in Palermo in the first "Maxi Trial." The most recent investigation into the Sicilian/Italian Mafia drug activities culminated on March 31, 1988, with the arrest of over 100 subjects in the United States and Italy. The Sicilian Mafia, 'Ndrangheta, and Camorra continue to be a strong force in the heroin trade in the United States, however, other ethnic groups are now becoming significant. Southeast and Southwest Asian drug trafficking organizations are emerging as dominant forces in the importation and distribution of heroin into the United States. Mexican organizations, however, collectively still predominate as the single largest suppliers of heroin, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States. The FBI has elevated these groups to a top investigative priority, committing manpower and resources to attack these groups.

            Question. Is the Sicilian Mafia independently active in the United States? Is their criminal activity confined to drug trafficking or are they active in the rackets?

            Answer. The Sicilian Mafia is independently active in the United States and is primarily involved in drug trafficking. They have minimal involvement in other traditional criminal activity in this country. The existence of the Sicilian Mafia, although already established and criminally active in the United States, was discovered as a result of the "Pizza Connection  investigation. Beyond this initial discovery in New York, it was learned that enclaves of Sicilian Mafia members, associated in some fashion with the LCN in several locales, were established in Buffalo, Boston, New Jersey, Chicago, and Detroit—to name a few. These Sicilian Mafia drug traffickers maintain their principal lines of communication and authority with their sponsoring families in Sicily.

            Question. In "The Commission" case, the FBI revealed that the LCN controlled concrete industry in New York City. What was the price of that LCN control in terms of the cost of concrete to the consumer? Has the cost of concrete in New York City gone down since the recent convictions? Can the cost expended by the FBI in the investigation and convictions in this case be justified?

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            Answer. The proof at trial during The Commission case demonstrated that, in the first half of the 1980s, the LCN Commission directed a massive extortion and bribery scheme involving the concrete construction industry in New York City. The power of the four families, Genovese, Gambino, Luchese and Colombo, whose bosses sat as full voting members of The Commission in this period was combined and coordinated by The Commission in order to operate the "club" schemes. Ralph Scopo, by virtue of his position as President of the Laborers Union which represents the city's concrete workers, was one of the lower level La Cosa Nostra members designated by The Commission to carry out the day-to-day extortion operation.

            The scheme was known as the "club" and through it, The Commission dominated the major concrete construction contractors in New York City. In return for "labor peace,' these contractors were forced to pay two percent of the contract price for all jobs over two million dollars. In addition, each organized crime family established an interest in one or more concrete superstructure contractors and, through a coordinated bid-rigging scheme, sought to expand the number of jobs performed by that contractor. In that way, each family earned money, over and above the two percent, through the profits earned by the companies. The bosses of each of the four La Cosa Nostra families involved in the scheme designated a family member to be responsible for managing the scheme. These four subordinates, one of whom was Ralph Scopo, met regularly to discuss which contractor would do upcoming jobs, resolved disputes, collected the two percent extortion payments, and passed the proceeds of the "club" scheme back up to The Commission.

            Information indicates that there has been no reduction in the cost of concrete in the New York area since the successful RICO prosecutions of the LCN. The reasons are complex ones involving inflation, increased transportation costs and other factors unique to the New York area. The FBI is not in a position to determine if the cost of the investigation is justified by savings incurred by the average citizen. However, the highest ranking members of organized crime are presently incarcerated for the rest of their lives. These men generated millions of dollars yearly from a myriad of illegal activities over which they no longer control. Their incarceration has disrupted this steady flow of revenue. Therefore, an actual dollar amount cannot be placed on the savings to the average citizen.

            Question. Based on the evidence, the RICO Statute appears to be an extremely powerful tool for law enforcement. Can Congress "fine tune" RICO to make it an even more effective statute? What suggestions could you make to bolster the RICO Statute?

            Answer. The addition of a civil forfeiture provision under RICO would permit law enforcement to more effectively and efficiently penalize those engaged in, or otherwise involved in, racketeering activities. One of the most potent and effective criminal penalties under RICO is the forfeiture of the convicted individual's property used to violate the law, or which was derived from the violations of the law. However, the civil remedies under RICO do not permit the forfeiture of any such property. In contrast, the Controlled Substances Acts, as well as the Child Protection and Money Laundering Control Acts, provide for both criminal and civil forfeiture penalties; these Acts permit law enforcement to seize and forfeit a larger percentage of property which has been used to violate the law or which was derived from violations of the law and to decide how the seizure and forfeiture of such property can best be accomplished.

            In order for property to be criminally forfeited, law enforcement must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the owner of the property has violated the law and that the property is subject to forfeiture. For civil forfeiture purposes, law enforcement need only establish probable cause to believe the property is subject to forfeiture. Therefore, if the ownership of property cannot be conclusively established by the Government; if the owner of the property was aware of, or facilitated, but did not commit, a violation of the law; or, if it can only be established by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner of the property violated the law and the property is subject to forfeiture, the property could not be criminally forfeited but could be civilly forfeited pursuant to a civil forfeiture statute.

            Furthermore, it is difficult to seize or restrain property which is being criminally forfeited prior to the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. On the other hand, property subject to civil forfeiture can be and usually is seized at the commencement of the civil forfeiture proceeding. This greatly reduces the risk that property subject to forfeiture will be destroyed, placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, transferred to a third party, commingled with other property or diminished in value.

            Question. What can Congress do to aid law enforcement's efforts against organized crime?

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            Answer. The emergence of organized crime groups, some still based on foreign soil, such as the Chinese Triads, the Japanese Yakuza or the various narcotics cartels may require some innovative legislative action. There is mounting evidence that many of these criminal enterprises are generating large amounts of capital from criminal activities in their homeland and are transporting these proceeds to the United States for investment in otherwise legitimate entities. The provisions of Title 18, Section 1952, prohibit travel in foreign commerce or the use of any facility in foreign commerce to distribute the proceeds of enumerated unlawful activity, however this unlawful activity pertains to violations under existing U.S. jurisdiction. Since this is a new area of concern, extensive research by the Department of Justice may be necessary to determine whether legislation can be recommended for criminal prosecution or asset seizure under these circumstances.

            Question. What industries does the mob influence or control in the New York City metropolitan area?

            Answer. The labor movement in the New York City metropolitan area has been, in general, heavily infiltrated by the LCN for decades. Such pervasive infiltration continues to date. Particular labor organizations and industries so infiltrated include, but are not limited to, the following:

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)

            Joint Council 16 of the IBT in New York City and many of its member locals have been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by LCN members and associates from each of the five New York City LCN families. The organized crime families with greatest influence in the IBT locals in New York City include the Colombo, Genovese, Gambino, and Luchese LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN presence include, but are not limited to, long-haul trucking short-haul trucking, building materials hauling, garment center trucking, IBT electrical workers, IBT entertainment industry workers, garbage hauling, airport workers, movers and warehousing related to the previously named trades.

Hotel Employee and Restaurant Employees International Union (HEREIU)

            HEREIU locals in the New York City metropolitan area have traditionally been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by the Gambino and Colombo LCN Families. Members of these LCN families interface with members of other LCN families who have interests in restaurants, bars, and places of entertainment in the New York City metropolitan area. The industries influenced by the LCN presence in HEREIU locals would include the hotel, restaurant, and entertainment industries.

International Longshoreman's Association (ILA), AFL-CIO

            ILA locals in New York City metropolitan area have been traditionally and pervasively influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members and associates of all five New York City LCN families and the New Jersey Decavalcante LCN Family. LCN families with the greatest influence in the ILA included the Genovese, Gambino, Colombo, and Decavalcante LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN presence include the shipping industry, warehousing on the docks, and trucking from the docks.

Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA), AFL-CIO

            LIUNA locals in the New York City metropolitan area have been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by LCN members and associates from each of the five New York City LCN families and the Decavalcante LCN Family. LCN families with greatest influence in LIUNA locals in New York City include the Gambino, Luchese, and Genovese LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN presence include the various building construction trades, demolition and excavation work, road construction, and construction materials yard work.

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (UBCARP) AFL-CIO

            The New York City District Council of Carpenters and many of its member local unions have been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members and associates of the five New York City LCN families and the Decavalcante LCN Family to various degrees over the past several decades. LCN families with particular influence in UBCARP in the New York City metropolitan area include the Genovese, Gambino, and Luchese LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN influence include the drywall construction industry, the general construction industry, the floor construction industry, and the cement and concrete industry.

International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (IBPAT), AFL-CIO

            District Council No. 9 of IBPAT and individual IBPAT local unions in the New York City metropolitan area have traditionally been influenced, infiltrated, and con-

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trolled by members and associates of the Luchese and Gambino LCN Families. Members of these LCN families interface with members and associates of the other three LCN families in the New York City metropolitan area. Industries affected by the LCN influence in IBPAT include the bridge painting industry, the general painting industry, the nuclear power plant painting industry, and the paper hanging industry.

Roofers Union, AFL-CIO

            The Roofers Union in the New York City metropolitan area has been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members or associates of the Genovese, Luchese, and Gambino LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN presence include the roof construction industry and the roof maintenance industry.

Operating Engineers Union, AFL-CIO

            The Operating Engineers Union in the New York City metropolitan area has been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members and associates of the Genovese and Colombo LCN Families. Industries affected by such LCN presence include the construction industry as well as the air conditioning and refrigeration industry.

Bricklayers Union, AFL-CIO

            The Bricklayers Union of the New York City metropolitan area has been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members and associates of the Gambino, Luchese, and Genovese LCN Families. The industries affected by such LCN presence have been the brick, stone, and tile construction industries.

Plasterers Union, AFL-CIO

            Local unions of the Plasterers Union in the New York City metropolitan area have been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by members and associates of the Genovese, Gambino and Luchese LCN Families. Members of those LCN families have interfaced with members and associates of the other two LCN families in the New York City metropolitan area. Industries affected by such LCN presence include the plastering industry and the drywall installation and taping industry.

Other Labor Organizations

            Other labor organizations and affiliated local unions in the New York City metropolitan area which have been influenced, infiltrated, and controlled by one or more LCN families include the Boilermakers Union, AFL-CIO; the Stage Employees Union, AFL-CIO; the Transit Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) AFL-CIO; Distillery Workers Local Union No. 2, AFL-CIO; the Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the Iron Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Local 2 of the Laundry and Dry Cleaning Union, AFL-CIO; the Leather Goods Workers, AFL-CIO, the Novelty Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the Plumbers Union, AFL-CIO; the Retail Wholesale Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the Service Employees Union, AFL-CIO; the Stage Employees Union, AFL-CIO; the Transit Workers Union, AFL-CIO; the Journeymen's and Production Allied Services of America and Canada International Union Local 157; the Allied International Union of Security Guards and Special Police; and other independent and AFL-CIO-affiliated labor organizations. Industries affected by such LCN presence include, but are not limited to, the construction industry, the garment industry, service and maintenance industries, the security guard industry, the entertainment industry, the toy and novelty item industry, the liquor sales industry and the busing industry.

            Question. Do those industries share certain characteristics which make them especially vulnerable to LCN influence? If so, what are they?

            Answer. The industries that are characteristically vulnerable to LCN influence are those which are labor intensive. They usually require that goods be moved or services be completed on a timely basis. The LCN has secured control over them through illicit manipulation of the labor unions that are affiliated with these industries.

            Question. Have you found legitimate businesses within those industries to be cooperative or noncooperative in criminal investigations for the most part?

            Answer. For the most part, the businesses that are infiltrated or influenced by the LCN have an economic advantage in the market place and face the threat that the LCN will use its illicit control of the labor movement to adversely affect them. The New York Office has identified "clubs" of businessmen who band together under the auspices of the La Cosa Nostra to fix prices and thereby control such industries as construction, trucking, shipping and refuse collection. These "clubs" and their re-

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lation to the LCN threaten the free enterprise system and drive prices up. They also deny workers the rights they have obtained through collective bargaining.

            The "legitimate" businesses that are in collusion with the LCN are normally not cooperative as it is to their benefit economically to cooperate with the LCN. It is usually necessary to uncover the criminality on the part of the businessman in order to obtain his cooperation. This usually requires prosecution of the businessman.

            Question. What is the most important milestone in the Bureau's efforts against the LCN?

            Answer. The most important milestone in the FBI's efforts against the LCN is the development and utilization of the "enterprise theory of investigation." Based on the RICO Statute, this approach facilitates the accomplishment of a number of interrelated objectives. These objectives include the identification and elimination of corrupt influence, domination and control of labor unions and industry by LCN members and associates and ultimately, the incarceration of the hierarchy of the LCN. This "theory" has provided for the successful prosecution of the bosses of the five New York LCN families as well as numerous capos and soldiers, civil injunctions against the Bonanno and Colombo LCN Families, and civil injunctions against labor unions dominated by the LCN. The effect of these successes has shown that an LCN boss, allegedly insulated, is not immune from prosecution. For example, civil court orders can also prohibit LCN members and corrupted officers from holding union offices and can designate trustees to conduct union affairs and supervise the election of new officers. These actions remove the offenders from union offices which they have misused for the benefit of the criminal organization and restore these offices to persons interested in the welfare of the union's rank and file.

            Question. What differences separate nontraditional organized crime groups and La Cosa Nostra?

            Answer. Nontraditional organized crime (OC) groups are oftentimes violently oriented groups which engage in criminal activities for profit, such as gambling, drug trafficking, extortion, and murder. These groups are distinguished from traditional OC groups in that they have not used their criminal activities, or their illegal income derived therefrom, to penetrate the economic fabric of society. Through such activities as labor racketeering, public corruption, and infiltration of legitimate business, traditional OC groups have become entrenched in American society.

            Question. Both the FBI and the Labor Department's Organized Crime Racketeering Section have jurisdiction over criminal investigations in the labor racketeering area. How many joint FBI/Labor Department investigations have been handled by your office in the last three years? Are you satisfied with the cooperation between your office and Department of Labor agents in criminal investigations?

            Answer. The cooperation between the FBI and the New York Office of Labor Racketeering (OLR) has been exceptional. New York has worked jointly on at least six investigations with the OLR over the past three years.

            Question. In your view, what should be the role of the Labor Department Inspector General's office in the investigation of labor racketeering cases?

            Answer. The role of the OLR, Department of Labor should be focused on misuse of union funds by officers in the labor movement. There is a great deal of discrepancy between the FBI's definition of labor racketeering and that of the Department of Labor. The Labor Department's focus should be narrowed while the FBI is attacking the labor racketeering problem utilizing the Enterprise Theory of Investigation. There are instances where cooperation enhances investigations. It is a matter of complementing each other's efforts rather than one of competition.

            Question. Currently, unlike other Federal law enforcement agents, agents of the Labor Department's Organized Crime Section do not have statutory law enforcement authority, i.e., the authority to make arrests and to carry a gun. They receive this authority only on a case-by-case, deputization basis, from the Justice Department. Do you know of instances where this lack of authority has delayed or impeded their ability to effectively investigate organized crime cases?

            Answer. The New York FBI Office is not aware of any instances where lack of statutory law enforcement authority has impeded law enforcement efforts by the OLR.

            Question. Do you believe that agents of the Labor Department Inspector General's organized crime section should have statutory law enforcement authority? Why or why not?

            Answer. All documented justification for expanding the law enforcement powers of the Office of Inspectors General appear to be based on the assertion that in the performance of the variety of law enforcement functions by the offices of Inspectors General, personnel of the Inspectors General encounter serious Federal crimes and

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confront dangerous criminals; therefore necessitating the authority to carry firearms, make arrests and serve warrants. We agree that law enforcement entities statutorily tasked with board-based investigative jurisdiction should be empowered with full law enforcement powers. However, an agency mandated to investigate interagency and intragovernmental crimes and frauds should rarely encounter dangerous criminals. In these rare instances where government employees become dangerous criminals, the currently available assistance to the Inspectors General from the FBI is adequate.

            It is my view that Public Law 95-452, also know as the "Inspector General Act of 1978," established 12 Inspectors General for the purpose of providing leadership, increasing coordination, and recommending policies designed (1) to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the administration for the department's programs and operations; (2) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in the department's programs and operations; and (3) to provide a means for keeping the heads of the departments and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of the department's programs. The Inspectors General were empowered to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to programs and operations of their various departments.

            In conclusion, I am opposed to empowering the various Offices of Inspectors General with authority to make arrests, carry firearms and serve warrants. Although additional resources to law enforcement to combat crime would be a much needed and welcomed augmentation to the law enforcement effort, it is incumbent that such additional resources be structured and marshalled in a coordinated and well-defined manner to avoid inefficient, ineffective, and duplicative activity. To empower numerous agencies and departments with full law enforcement powers under the direction of 12 individual semiautonomous departments, without clear lines of jurisdiction and clearinghouse entity to avoid duplication of effort, would most assuredly be drafting a blueprint for inefficiency and conflict in future investigations. It is also apparent that captioned legislation would divert Inspectors General from their current statutory responsibility to detect waste, fraud, and abuse within their own agencies.

            Question. What problems do you anticipate in conducting other investigations of this type?

            Answer. For future investigations utilizing the enterprise theory of investigation, it is incumbent upon the FBI to demonstrate to all Special Agents assigned organized crime matters the meaning of the theory, how it can be applied and what can be attained. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 authorizes support employees to monitor TitleIII installations. If this can be accomplished it can alleviate the manpower limitations by freeing Special Agents to conduct investigations. Investigators and prosecutors must consider how predicate criminal acts on the part of the individuals can be developed to demonstrate criminality of the enterprise. We must continue to improve and refine FBI training and awareness along these lines in the field divisions. As Special Agents continue to learn how to use this theory and prosecutors gain more experience litigating these matters, the utilization of the enterprise theory will become the norm.

            Question. How does modern technology affect the methods used by the FBI in the conduct of its investigations? Has law enforcement been able to keep pace with recent advances in technology and communications?

            Answer. The FBI's Organized Crime Section (OCS) and the Technical Services Division (TSD) regularly assist one another in the development and refinement of computer systems. This effort maximizes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of Organized crime information and the management of the Organized Crime Program in order to avoid unnecessary expenditure of resources and provide analysis to the field for investigative focus. These systems include the Organized Crime Information System (OCIS), Artificial Intelligence (AI), the Resource Management Information System (RMIS) and the Field Office Information Management System (FOIMS).

            Cellular telephones and telephones pagers (beepers) provide investigators and managers with an important and continuous communication link which has significantly increased the effectiveness and efficiency of FBI operations. The FBI has increased the procurement and installation of voice privacy radio equipment and secure telephone facilities in an accelerated manner due to the prolific use of radio scanners and other sophisticated equipment by criminals and foreign agents to intercept FBI communications. The TSD examines new commercially developed and marketed technical equipment that may adversely affect the FBI's ability to conduct its investigations.

            Organized Crime cartels also closely monitor developments in communications technologies not only as a means of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of

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their illicit operations, as evidenced by their widespread use of cellular telephones, telephone pagers, and call forwarding, but also in a continuing attempt to neutralize the technology utilized by law enforcement. It is therefore necessary for us to remain cognizant of technological advances in equipment capable of impeding law enforcement efforts, and conduct the research necessary to protect the integrity of our investigative operations.

            Question. Can the Enterprise Theory of Investigation be effectively utilized against nontraditional organized crime groups?

            Answer. The Enterprise Theory of Investigation is an investigative strategy which seeks criminal prosecution of the hierarchy of a structured entity for all the criminal activity in which they are engaged. It also seeks forfeiture of the proceeds of illegal activity, as well as seeking civil injunctive relief to remove the mechanisms, albeit legal or illegal, which allowed the criminal enterprise to operate. This strategy can be used effectively against any criminal enterprise, be that enterprise involved in political corruption, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or traditional criminal violations.

            Question. The FBI has done fine work against La Cosa Nostra. The obvious question now is what is next? That is, who is filling the LCN void, and what are we doing about it?

            Answer. The attack against the LCN is far from a point whereby other groups would be able to fill the void. FBI New York estimates that there are over 682 LCN members in New York and each member has at least 10 associates.

            The number of unions that are dominated and controlled by the LCN is still very high and much effort must be placed to rid the unions of this undue influence.

            It is important to point out that the LCN control of certain parts of the labor movement and related business marks the most serious difference between the LCN and emerging organized criminals. Until such time as the labor movement and related business are freed from this illicit domination and control, the LCN must continue to be the focus of our investigative attention.

            Question. In our 1984 Subcommittee Report on the Status of Organized Crime in the Mid-Atlantic Region, we concluded on page 67 of the Report that: "* * * emerging crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs should be investigated fully by law enforcement and immobilized before they become entrenched." Do you agree with that assessment of the Subcommittee's? If so, what is your office doing about them? Specifically, how many cases have you brought, and what resources have you allocated to them? Where do you take such investigations for prosecution? U.S. Attorney? Strike Force?

            Answer. In 1986, the New York Office of the FBI undertook a major investigation of the Hells Angels Motorcyle Club, Chapter Headquarters in Manhattan, New York City. This investigation showed that the Hells Angels were a disciplined, well-structured organization whose primary criminal activity involved narcotics trafficking. The investigation led to the conviction of approximately 20 members of the Hells Angels in Manhattan including its entire leadership. This investigation made us aware of the scope of the Hells Angels' activities, and it has been determined no further investigation is warranted. Besides narcotics trafficking, the most serious threat the Hells Angels pose is their criminal conduct focused against each other. This investigation was prosecuted in the Southern District of New York and is presently in a closed status.

            Question. In the same Report, our Subcommittee criticized the Department of Justice and the Organized Crime Strike Forces for focusing their attention almost exclusively on the LCN. We stated on page 67 of the Report: "For too long, the Strike Forces have addressed the subject of organized crime as if the problem were one limited almost exclusively to the LCN. The LCN is an important factor in organized crime, but is not all there is to the problem." Do you agree with this 1984 assessment of the Subcommittee's? Has it changed, based upon your own experience with your local Strike Forces and U.S. Attorney offices?

            Answer. The Subcommittee's criticism that "The LCN is an important factor in organized crime but is not all there is to the problem" is obviously true. However, to turn away from the LCN as the major organized criminal problem in this country would be a major mistake. While other so-called, ignored, organized crime groups function in this country none of them has the history, the organizational skills or the ability to control the free enterprise system and the free labor movement as does the LCN.

            It can not be overstated that until the LCN is removed from the control of major unions in this country, organized crime will have the upper hand in many, many areas of the free enterprise system. When the Federal Government and law enforcement in general reaches a point where it can say that the labor movement in this

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country is in the hands of those to whom it rightfully belongs and the related industries no longer pay tribute and/or are controlled in various degrees by members of the LCN then it will be time to turn toward other organizations. I believe this view is shared by the U.S. Attorneys of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, who continue to prosecute FBI investigations of the LCN involvement affecting the citizens of New York.

            Question. In our 1984 hearings on the status of organized crime in the Great Lakes region, the Subcommittee conducted a confidential survey of 30 past and present strike force attorneys and investigators. Twenty-six of the 30 respondents said they had firsthand, direct knowledge of instances in which they had gathered sufficient evidence to demonstrate a major organized criminal activity that was not part of or associated with La Cosa Nostra family. But in each instance, their requests for Strike Force assistance were denied because there was no LCN involvement. (Page 13 of the Hearings, and page 3 of the Report.)

            Answer. The New York Office (NYO) of the FBI operates its OC program through specific strategic plans. These plans focus on the LCN, its hierarchy, and their involvement in the labor movement. There are minimal resources available to investigate anything other than the LCN. It is for this reason that this question does not apply to the NYO.

            Question. In our Report on the Status of Organized Crime in the Great Lakes Region, we noted that there appeared to be no agreement within the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice Department, which supervises the strike forces, as to what constituted organized crime. Do you agree with this assessment? How does your office define organized crime for prioritizing, investigations? Do your priorities agree with the Strike Force's? U.S. Attorneys'? If not, where do they differ? What do you do when they differ?

            Answer. In our opinion there is no confusion at all concerning the definition of organized crime or the priorities within the organized crime program among the various components of the Department of Justice (DOJ).

            The La Cosa Nostra is presently and will continue to be, for the foreseeable future, the number one priority of the New York Office organized crime program. This is with the full knowledge and concurrence of the United States Attorney's and Strike Force Office. Our priorities also fall within the FBI's organized crime National Strategy which is fully supported by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division of the DOJ.

            It is imperative that the priorities of the FBI in the area of organized crime be in full agreement with those of the United States Attorney's Office, and Strike Force Office. We ensure that our priorities and our strategy for reaching our program goals are coordinated by communication between the top management of the New York Office and our OC program manager and their respective United States Attorneys and Strike Force Chiefs.

            Question. On the first day of the hearings, the General Accounting Office recommended to the Subcommittee that our organized crime efforts need to be based upon "careful strategic planning" that established clear objectives, assigns responsibilities, and allocates our finite law enforcement efforts. Do you agree with such an analysis, and if you do, who do you recommend should establish such a well-thought-out plan for all Federal law enforcement agencies involved in the fight against organized crime?

            Answer. The General Accounting Office recommendation has been the backbone of the New York Office (NYO) OC program since 1980. In 1980, strategic plans were prepared to focus on the hierarchy and criminal activities of each of the five LCN families in NY with emphasis on their involvement in labor racketeering. These plans were important because they caused the FBI to describe the problem of organized crime, what it intended to do about the problem, and specific steps on how the goals were to be accomplished. It prompted the FBI to assess the resources needed and to determine who should carry out the assigned responsibilities.

            All OC investigations should begin with a planning process, and this plan must continue throughout the course of the investigation and prosecution. It is our belief that the OC problem will not be solved solely through incarceration of OC members. We must go further to try to achieve change in behavior and prevent the conditions that exist and allow OC to flourish.

            As to who should establish such a well-thought-out plan, it is apparent from the experiences of the NYO that planning OC investigations requires 'a strong intelligence base before plans can be implemented. The New York experience has shown that the FBI can plan significant investigations, with the concurrence of the U.S. Attorneys office and other agencies as well, to solve significant criminal problems. I

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would recommend that the FBI continue to be the lead agency and the planner of such endeavors.

            Question. As you know, on January 2, 1988, Attorney General Meese signed an "Order Directing New and Expanded Initiatives in the Federal Organized Crime Effort" As I read the order, it really addresses only the division of authority between the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Forces. As I understand it, prior to this order, the Strike Forces, under the direction of the Strike Force Chief in Washington, exercised control of their investigations, while keeping the U.S. Attorney advised of their activities in order to avoid possible conflicts: By contrast, this new order apparently gives the U.S. Attorney principal control of Strike Force investigations and prosecutions. The order even names the U.S. Attorney, as opposed to Strike Force superiors in Washington, as the "rating official" for the performance rating of the local Strike Force Chief. Now, the FBI has obviously worked organized crime cases with both the Strike Forces and the US. Attorney's Offices. Do you feel this order was necessary and, if so, why? What is its impact in your city?                    

            Answer. The Organized Crime Section in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) has historically been a unit of the United States Attorney's (USA's) Office and answerable to the USA, SDNY. In the Eastern District of New York (EDNY), the Strike Force has functioned as a separate prosecutive entity. The FBI in New York has had an excellent relationship resulting in substantial prosecutive successes in the area of organized crime in both the. SDNY and the EDNY. The change in the rating official in EDNY has not had any impact on FBI investigations being handled by the Strike Force.           

            Question. What is the current procedure for coordinating labor cases with the Strike Force and Labor Department? How can we be assured those problems won't occur again?

            Answer. The important aspect of mutual relationships and effective prosecution of organized crime requires that those individuals charged with the responsibility of managing the related programs be willing to communicate with their counterparts. From time to time there are very good reasons why this communication can not be effected. This must be understood by those involved in this type of investigative activity. In New York, the communication between the Office of Labor Racketeering and the FBI is exceptional. There are no secrets unduly kept, and for the most part there is a very open, sharing atmosphere. We can be assured that those problems won't occur again if there is an investigative agency, not prosecutive, that is charged with designing a planned attack on organized crime with the input of all other investigative agencies so that communications will be formalized and clearly understood.