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U.S.. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation

Statement of

James F. Ahearn

SAC Boston Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Before the

Committee on Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations United States Senate

April 15, 1988

Re: Organized Crime - 25 Years After Valachi

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            Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

            It is a privilege to appear here today representing the Boston Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Boston Division encompasses the states of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine.

            By way of background I have been a Special Agent of the FBI for twenty-five years and. have been assigned to organized crime investigations as an Agent, and as a Supervisor in both the field and FBI Headquarters. As an Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Special Agent in Charge I have, through subordinates, supervised organized crime, investigations in San Francisco, Omaha and Boston. Through these experiences and my interaction with a former member of the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) turned Government witness, I am familiar with the internal workings of the LCN both from an historical and present-day view.

            I would now like to present some information on the organized crime picture as it relates to the LCN in the Boston Division of the FBI.

            Today in New England we find two LCN groups represented - the PATRIARCA Family in Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts as well as Providence, Rhode Island, and the New York GENOVESE Family in Springfield, Mass. RAYMOND L.S.

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PATRIARCA took over leadership of his family in 1954 and retained that role until his death in 1984, when family leadership passed peacefully to his son, RAYMOND J. C. PATRIARCA.

            Like other LCN families in major U. S. metropolitan areas, this group had its United States origins in the immigration patterns of the early 20th Century when organized crime members from Sicily and Italy joined thousands of immigrants seeking a better life in the United States. Initially these criminals stayed within the immigrant community but Prohibition enabled them to increase their contacts and criminal reputations outside the immigrant community. By the end of Prohibition, having pushed aside other ethnic criminal groups, the LCN was well on its way to becoming the dominant criminal group in New England. Gambling, extortion, loansharking and dealing in stolen property became the mainstay of their illegal enterprises and murder was routinely used to enforce their will. Where necessary, the LCN was adept at forming alliances with other ethnic groups to minimize the disruption of profits due to conflict. Other ethnic crime groups in New England, while locally powerful, did not have the national scope and resources of the LCN. This factor alone separated the LCN from these other groups.

            By the late 1940s and early 1950s, one PHIL BUCCOLA of Boston had been identified as the head of this group. Public congressional hearings during the early 1950s determined that

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Mr. BUCCOLA was taking frequent and extended vacations to Sicily where he eventually sought early retirement setting the stage for RAYMOND L.S. PATRIARCA.

            The history of the FBI's efforts to identify the nature and extent of this criminal conspiracy began in the early 1960s at a point in time when the LCN was not understood as the national criminal conspiracy it is today. The LCN had a forty-year head start and was well ingrained into the fabric of the community. The code of silence or "OMERTA" did not make the information-gathering process easy but steady progress was made. Successful prosecutions were developed against many prominent LCN members including RAYMOND L.S.PATRIARCA, but the enterprise continued to operate.

            By studying and evaluating the past, it became obvious that a new investigative strategy was needed. This was not just an idea of the Boston Division but of the FBI seeking to develop a national investigative strategy based on information about the LCN developed over a period of years from many parts of the country.

            In New England resources were concentrated on the family and its leaders as a functional criminal entity, using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute in such a way that the evidence obtained would show the totality of their criminal enterprises. And thus, when convicted, sentences could be imposed that would stop the revolving door process that had gone on in the past.

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            In 1981, a court-authorized microphone was placed in the office of the family Underboss and another in a club frequented by a powerful family Caporegime and his soldiers. Evidence from these two microphones presents a rare picture of the day-to-day operation of an LCN family wherein the very nature of this secret organization was frequently discussed as were the wide variety of their criminal ventures. Murder, extortion, gambling, loansharking, and bribery were all found to be primary areas of criminal effort.

            Largely as a result of the evidence obtained from the microphone, 22 convictions were recorded. The length of sentences ranged from 45 years to 18 months and included convictions of the Underboss, 3 Caporegimes, 7 members and 11 associates. An indictment was also returned on the Consigliere of the Family but trial was postponed due to medical reasons. The Consigliere died prior to trial on RICO charges.

            It is noted that convictions were also recorded in state court against the Underboss of the New England Family and one additional LCN member on the charge of accessory before the fact of murder utilizing evidence from the federal wiretap mentioned above. Conviction on this charge resulted in a life sentence for the Underboss and a 15/20 year sentence for the soldier.

            Our efforts against the Springfield, Mass. faction of the GENOVESE Family have been equally successful utilizing electronic microphone surveillance and the RICO theory of the LCN as the criminal enterprise. Within the last several months, a

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long-time Caporegime for that area and 5 of his soldiers and two associates entered guilty pleas and were sentenced.

            An unusual by-product of these microphones in Boston was the substantial amount of "structure" conversation in which the history of their criminal group was discussed by the subjects themselves leaving little need for speculation. While this evidence led to substantial convictions noted above, we had to realize that an honest assessment would tell us that total success could not be claimed and that the effort, more than ever, had to be increased if we were ever going to be able to remove the LCN from their position of criminal dominance.

            An investigative strategy was developed and employed at a time when substantial Agent resources were committed to ongoing prosecutions. In essence, those individuals seeking to fill the leadership vacuum being created by Federal convictions were already targeted for intensified investigation. Electronic surveillance, undercover projects, and cooperating witnesses were used to gather evidence. Since many of these matters are presently before Federal Grand Juries, I must keep my comments general but I do wish to point out to you today that while convictions of individuals are essential, it is not necessarily the only goal. The Boston investigative strategy is only one part of a national investigative strategy similar in design. Our goal will only be met when the LCN no longer functions as a national criminal enterprise.

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            I think that I can safely represent to you today that in New England this process has started. The newly created LCN leadership has, within two years, found itself subject to intense investigation and expecting extensive RICO indictments. Fear of electronic surveillance and cooperating witnesses have greatly reduced their ability to communicate with each other and without communication no group can function effectively. New LCN members are not being recruited and those sought are not as interested in membership as in the past. Conviction of experienced leaders has forced less capable people into leadership roles for which they are not prepared. The LCN in New England is in a state of regression for the first time in seventy years; however, the history of the Mafia in Sicily tells us that this is not enough to claim victory. Our success should only serve to convince us how much more there is to be done. There is much about the LCN that we do not know, particularly in the areas of finance, legitimate business and corruption, and how they replenish their ranks from a community of more educated people who may chose a different way of life.

            The Boston Division of the FBI continues to find innovative ways to investigate a now well-educated LCN. One of our greatest assets is the competence and dedication of Justice Department prosecutors who have formed excellent working bonds with FBI Agents. We have had the full support of various U. S. Attorneys and this has been essential in presenting a solid Federal front against the LCN.

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            A necessary ingredient in our effort against the LCN is a community belief that we can do the job and that citizens will do their part in fighting organized crime.

            Where the LCN has been deeply entrenched in a community for many years, this sense of community rejection of the LCN is often difficult to achieve. However, in many parts of New England I am convinced that our successful efforts to date have turned the tide and citizens do believe that something can be done about the LCN and its criminal influence. This does not come overnight and is a continuous problem but I can assure you it is taking place.

            Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to answer questions of this Committee.