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RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE BOSTON DIVISION

            Question. The FBI has submitted for the record field office summaries from across the country recounting the status of organized crime activity in those areas. The Boston Office summary says and I quote: "The New England LCN Family historically has opted to remain in illegal ventures and apparently has not sought or not gained major influence in legitimate industry." Why, unlike many other LCN families, has the New England Family decided against infiltrating legitimate business?

            Answer. It is difficult to say whether or not the New England LCN made a positive or negative decision against infiltrating legitimate business or whether their lack of action in the area was just an outgrowth of their style of operation. The New England LCN had the same Family Boss from 1954 to 1984 which was a period of general stability for this criminal group where they took in few new members and experienced little growth in their numbers of criminal ventures. In the more traditional areas of criminal activity, they had no competition and each of its members was able to obtain reasonable wealth through traditional crimes. While the exact answer to this question is not known it does appear quite possible that this family was in a period of stagnation while other families were growing either in numbers or complexity of criminal activity.

            Question. That same summary notes that "suspected Camorra members from the Naples, Italy area" have been found in Springfield, Massachusetts. As I understand it, those individuals and their organization are distinct from the Sicilian Mafia families about which Mr. Buscetta testified here last Monday. Could you describe in greater detail these individuals, their organization, and the extent of their criminal activities in New England?

            Answer. The Camorra is a centuries-old Italian criminal organization with its roots in Naples, Italy and the surrounding countryside. At times in its history, which purportedly predates the Sicilian Mafia, this group has often been referred to as a second government. It now appears, like the Sicilian Mafia, that members of this group have emigrated from Italy to various European and Western countries to ply their criminal trade.

            Antonio Orlando Manzi was born July 14, 1952, at Quindici, Avellino, Italy. As a result of an arrest on September 13, 1984, at Chicopee, Massachusetts, by the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) for the sale of six ounces of cocaine, he was charged with drug trafficking, and is currently serving a seven- to ten-year sentence in the Massachusetts penal system. An extradition warrant was lodged against Manzi for extradition to Italy for offenses including two counts of homicide, armed robbery and Camorra association. Manzi has since been ordered extradited by a U.S. Magistrate and has appealed this order. Upon affirmation of the order, Manzi will be released by Massachusetts authorities to be returned to Italy to serve a thirty-two-year sentence which he received on the above homocides and other charges in absentia.

            Manzi alleged that he met a Genovese LCN member who resides in Springfield, Massachusetts, originally in Italy. Upon arrival, Manzi sought out this LCN member and was given employment in gambling operations controlled by him in the Springfield area. He later became involved in cocaine trafficking in the Springfield, Massachusetts, and Albany, New York, area with his brother, Carmine Manzi, a naturalized U.S. citizen who was a codefendant in the cocaine trafficking case. Italian authorities described Manzi's criminal activities in Italy as including acts as a leader of the Nuova Camorra Organization in warfare with the rival Nuova Famiglia faction of the Camorra. Biagio Cava, born October 16, 1955, at Quindici, Avellino, Italy, was arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at 51 Johnson Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, on June 5, 1985, on charges on Illegal Entry to the United States and Possession of False Documents. Cava was subsequently indicted on three counts of violation of immigration statutes. He pled guilty to these charges on June 26, 1987, received a five-year suspended sentence and signed a Waiver of Extradition to Italy. Cava was turned over to Italian authorities to serve a previously imposed sentence of five and one-half years for conviction on charges of extortion, weapons possession, telephone threats and Camorra association. He was also reportedly under investigation for conspiracy to murder an Italian judicial official.

            Cava is alleged to be a member of the Nuova Famiglia (NF) faction of the Camorra. He survived an ambush murder attempt in April 1983, in which his companion was killed. Antonio Orlando Manzi has been convicted of this attack. Information received by INS prior to Cava's arrest was that he was in Springfield to kill Antonio Manzi although Manzi was in state custody at the time.

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            Cava had entered the United States on the altered Italian passport of an Agostino Libepale, born November 18, 1958, in Avellino Province, Italy. Cava had entered the United States on five occasions between May 31, 1986, and June 1, 1987, on this passport.

            Cava, although a member of the rival Camorra faction from Manzi, was also aligned with the Genovese LCN Family and their associates in Springfield. In January 1987, Cava was observed traveling from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Springfield, Massachusetts, with two Genovese LCN associates.

            Question. Both the FBI and the Labor Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section have jurisdiction over criminal investigations in the labor racketeering area. How many joint FBI/Labor Department investigations have been handled by your office in the last three years? Are you satisfied with the cooperation between your office and Department Agents in criminal investigations?

            Answer. During the past three years, four investigations have been conducted jointly by the Boston FBI Field Division and the Regional Office of Labor Racketeering (OLR). Cooperation between the two agencies has been excellent in each of the investigations.

            Question. In your view, what should the role of the Labor Department Inspector General's Office be in the investigation of labor racketeering cases? Is the labor racketeering problem big enough to accommodate both the FBI and the Labor Department?

            Answer: In labor racketeering matters, the role of the Labor Department of Inspector General's Office should be to investigate waste, fraud and abuse within the Department of Labor (DOL); and to investigate violations of Section 805 (b) of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Section 504 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and Section 601 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), statutes which DOL is statutorily empowered to investigate. All other labor racketeering violations identified by DOL's Inspector General's Office should be referred to the appropriate criminal investigative agency. The DOL should continue to provide to investigations their expertise developed over years of administering various DOL programs where appropriate and applicable.

            The labor racketeering problem is substantial. However, the number of important organized crime influenced labor racketeers in a city is finite and usually readily identifiable by law enforcement. Past experience has demonstrated extraordinarily dysfunctional results caused by uncoordinated multiagency pursuit of the same subjects. In fact, some of the best organized crime sources of the FBI have been lost unnecessarily due to uncoordinated investigations.

            The FBI's "Organized Crime National Strategy," which has proven so successful against the La Cosa Nostra (LCN), mandates use of the RICO statute in concert with Title III and undercover techniques. Indeed, the experience of the FBI is that all three techniques are essential to success against the LCN. Furthermore, the LCN is the major force in labor racketeering. Although additional resources to law enforcement to combat crime would be a much needed and welcomed augmentation to the law enforcement effort, it is incumbent that such additional resources be structured and marshaled in a coordinated and well-defined manner to avoid inefficient, ineffective and duplicative activity. To empower numerous agencies and departments with full law enforcement powers under the direction of individual semiautonomous departments, without clear lines of jurisdiction most assuredly ensure inefficiency and conflict in future investigations.

            Coordinating resource usage from independent agencies having concurrent jurisdiction was attempted under the strike force concept with less than favorable results. Statistical accomplishment considerations, as well as differing investigative strategies necessitated by resources availability, intelligence base, and the technical capabilities of each agency prevented coordinated efforts toward a common goal. No agency will unilaterally subjugate their personnel or responsibility to another agency leaving the alternative of management by committee for a particular investigative project. This has proven to be inefficient and ineffective in addressing crime problems in a thorough and timely fashion.

            Question. Currently, unlike other Federal law enforcement Agents, Agents of the Labor Department Organized Crime Section do not have statutory law enforcement authority, i.e., the authority to make arrests and to carry a gun. They receive this authority only on a case-by-case deputization basis from the Justice Department. Do you know of instances where this authority has delayed or impeded their ability to effectively investigate organized crime cases?

            Answer: The Boston Division of the FBI is aware of no instances where the lack of statutory law enforcement authority has delayed or impeded the ability of Labor Department organized crime Agents to conduct effective investigation in the area of

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organized crime. The case-by-case deputization by the Justice Department appears to have effectively resolved the need when it has arisen.

            Question. Do you believe that Agents of the Labor Department Inspector General's organized crime section should have statutory law enforcement authority? Why or why not?

            Answer. Based upon the experience of this office, no need has been demonstrated for the OLR to have statutory law enforcement authority. Moreover, if such authority were granted, it could easily lead to a diffusion of investigative effort.

            Question. Did your Division use any state or local law enforcement agencies in its LCN investigations? If so, what agencies co-operated in these investigations, and what was the level of that co-operation? If not, why not?

            Answer. No. Utilization of local law enforcement was considered impractical due to ongoing FBI investigations predicated on allegations of local police corruption during the time of the Angiulo investigation. On the state level, there were no investigations assigned, on a full-time basis, to organized crime in 1981.

            Question. Does the Boston Division utilize the task force concept in any of its organized crime investigations, and if so, what are the parameters of the task force?

            Answer. The Boston Division utilizes informal task force arrangements depending on the nature of the organized crime investigation. The Boston Division has conducted a joint electronic surveillance with the Boston Police Department, and two of its last electronic surveillances have been done with a recently formed Massachusetts State Police Organized Crime Unit. In each case, the state and local investigators were deputized as U.S. Marshals in order to assist in electronic surveillance. Since the Massachusetts State Police Organized Crime Unit is of fairly recent origin, this concept has been mutually agreed upon and subsequently used.

            Question. What is your Division's LCN family's involvement in drug-trafficking, if any, and to what degree are they involved in the distribution of narcotics in your area?

            Answer. A recent survey of LCN-related intelligence within the Boston FBI files indicates that approximately 50 percent of New England LCN members have had some form of involvement in illegal drug trafficking or personal drug abuse. The New England LCN is not the most significant drug-trafficking group in the region and there is a "family rule" prohibiting an LCN member from involvement in drug activities. This rule is a myth as it is not enforced by the Family hierarchy and individual members and capos cannot resist the lucrative drug profits. Illegal drugs activity represents just another criminal leg of the LCN enterprise in New England.

            Question. What are the industries that the LCN controls or influences in your Division, and how does that control or influence affect the citizenry?

            Answer. The primary illegal activities of the New England LCN family are gambling, extortion, loansharking and fencing. During the past 10 years, the New England LCN's involvement in fencing has decreased while its involvement in extortion has increased. Loansharking activities by the New England LCN appear to be stable. The New England LCN has decreased their gambling operations in the last ten years.

            The New England LCN Family historically has opted to remain in illegal ventures and apparently has not sought or not gained major influence in legitimate industry.

            Question. What investigative techniques were used in your Division's investigations into the LCN, and which of those techniques proved most successful?

            Answer. During the course of the Boston Division's investigation of the LCN a number of investigative techniques were employed. Among these were electronic and physical surveillance, witness interviews, use of informants and others. Informants and cooperating witnesses are the most useful techniques in connection with LCN investigations. Without informants and cooperating witnesses it would be very difficult to obtain probable cause for our next most useful technique, court-authorized electronic surveillance.

            Question. Is your Division fully committed to the Enterprise Theory of Investigation and the use of the RICO Statute?

            Answer. Yes. The Enterprise Theory of Investigation is used whenever an organization meets the Attorney General's Guidelines for such an investigation. Today, the RICO Statute is the most widely used statute in organized crime investigations.

            Question. Does this commitment to the enterprise theory of investigation include the use of the civil components of the RICO Statute?

            Answer. Yes. The civil provisions of the RICO Statute permit the Government to remove organized criminal influence from enterprises which have been corrupted and exploited by organized crime. Under certain circumstances a civil RICO case may present a more effective means of addressing the prohibited conduct than a

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criminal RICO prosecution. The flexible injunctive remedies under the civil RICO Statute also provide a formidable weapon against organized crime. The imposition of court-supervised trusteeship on a labor union or business entity influenced or controlled by organized crime and the ability to enjoin these criminals from business dealings with the union or business entity eradicates a crime problem which may go unaddressed in criminal prosecutions. In addition, the standard of proof in a civil RICO action is less than in a criminal RICO action thus allowing the Government to expeditiously remove the crime problem while continuing to pursue criminal penalties.

            Question. Does the LCN family in your Division use any nontraditional or emerging organized crime groups in the conduct of its illegal criminal enterprises or activities?

            Answer. During the course of the Angiulo court-authorized electronic surveillance, both Gennaro Angiulo and Larry Zannino commented at different times about their bookmaking in the Chinatown area of Boston. Zannino and his associates independently had some contacts with Chinese Ping-On gang members that appeared to have been generated by contact with the Genovese LCN regime in Springfield, Massachusetts, over gambling junket matters. Gerry Angiulo, in prior years, had been observed at the restaurant of a Chinese organized crime person of influence, during the early morning hours. However, Asian organized crime groups are not known to have direct, regular, illegal business ties with the Boston LCN, but apparently have the access.

            For many years, an Irish organized crime group, known as the "Winter Hill Gang," has been closely associated with the LCN. While separate criminal enterprises, they often joined forces with the LCN on matters of mutual interest and Gerry Angiulo claimed "they are with us."

            Additionally, in 1985, Angiulo used members of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Gang to collect loanshark debts. The LCN, when necessary will engage in a symbiotic relationship with other groups. However, this appears to be sporadic, unusual and not a common practice.

            Question. What influence does the LCN have in the labor unions in your area? Has your Division's organized crime successes had any effect on the LCN's influence on those labor unions?

            Answer. Electronic surveillances conducted in New England between 1981-1987 failed to reveal the direct ties between the LCN and labor unions that have been found in other parts of the country. No LCN member is known to hold a union position. This is not to say that they are without their own degree of influence. Further investigation concerning this area is warranted in the Boston area.

            Specifically, during the Angiulo interception Nicolo Angiulo talked with his brother Gennaro about having gone to New York and having met with other LCN consiglieres wherein he learned the New York families were heavily involved in labor unions. Nicolo Angiulo reported he was totally against this form of activity and advised his brothers against it.

            Question. What other investigative tools or Federal statutes are needed to aid law enforcement in its investigation of organized crime in New England?

            Answer. The LCN in New England is extremely conscious of electronic surveillance and, having learned from the past, now meets in places or under conditions which are exceedingly difficult to surveil electronically. As a result, law enforcement requires the ability to electronically intercept the conversations of subjects wherever they are located rather than conducting electronic surveillance on a specific location. The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1986, with provisions for "roving taps," has enabled law enforcement to overcome this obstacle. The institution of this type of electronic surveillance, however, generates the need for additional personnel, for monitoring and physical surveillance purposes and requires innovative technical equipment designed to provide the capability of moving rapidly from one means of communication to another.

            Question. Can you identify any emerging or nontraditional organized crime groups that will be able to challenge—or fill a void left by—the LCN family in your Division?

            Answer. No. Previous prosecutions of a faction of Irish organized crime—The Winter Hill Gang—have left that group decimated and they themselves are not in a position to fill the void. The Chinese Ping-On Society, an Asian organized crime group, in general, is still not a threat outside of the Chinese community as is the LCN.

            Question. In what New England states does the Patriarca LCN family conduct its criminal activities, and what is the extent of these criminal activities?

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            Answer. Providence, Rhode Island, is a stronghold for the Patriarca LCN family and the family boss, and at least two regimes are active in that area. Since 1985, the underboss for the Patriarca family has been located in the New Haven-Hartford, Connecticut area, where the Patriarca LCN family seems to have coexisted with other LCN groups for years. The influence of the Patriarca LCN family is considerable in both Connecticut and Rhode Island.

            The LCN impact is New Hampshire and Maine is almost negligible.

            Question. In view of the Boston Field Division's successful investigation into the Boston faction of the Patriarca family, has the LCN threat in Boston been eliminated?

            Answer. No. These recent successes have merely created vacancies for others less qualified to fill. The Boston Division is presently conducting investigations that will result in indictments of a substantial portion of the emerging leadership but even this will not ensure that the LCN's control is broken.

            Question. What was the Patriarca family's influence in the Boston social and civic community? What was the extent of that influence, and how did that influence affect the way the Boston Division conducted its investigation?

            Answer. The Patriarca influence in the Boston social and civic community was considered extensive. This group operated without any legal opposition for many years, and it made little difference whether it was incompetence or corruption that allowed them to operate. The Boston Division, in attempting to locate lease lines in the area, utilized the New England Telephone Company only to find that this information had been leaked to the Angiulos. This required the electronic surveillance to be done without any aid from the telephone company. It would have to be said that the investigative plans for this case were very carefully protected, and the case was conducted with as much secrecy as possible.

            One by-product of the recent conviction is that certain law enforcement agencies and prosecutors seem to be more willing to investigate or prosecute the LCN. Whether this results in positive action remains to be seen.

            Question. It is this Subcommittee's understanding that the citizens of the Prince Street area of Boston's North End participated in a "lookout" system for the Angiulos, in which they would report any "suspicious" activity in the neighborhood to the Angiulos. How did this community support of the Angiulos affect the investigative techniques utilized by the Boston Division? Is this community family involved in narcotics trafficking, and if so, to what degree is it involved?

            Answer. It is true that Agents in this investigation not only had to avoid discovery by LCN figures or associates but also had to avoid the curiosity of citizens in that immediate area. A number of LCN murders have been committed in the North End section of Boston over the years, and authorities had failed to show these citizens that they had the capacity to break the LCN control. Since the prosecutions in 1985 and 1986, it appears that the North End community would offer less support to the LCN than in the past.

            A recent survey of LCN-related intelligence within the Boston FBI files indicates that approximately 50 percent of New England LCN members have had some form of involvement in illegal drug trafficking or personal drug abuse. The New England LCN is not the most significant drug-trafficking group in the region, and there is a "family rule" prohibiting an LCN member from involvement in drug activities. This rule is a myth as it is not enforced by the Family hierarchy, and individual members and capos cannot resist the lucrative drug profits. Illegal drug activity represents just another criminal leg of the LCN enterprise in New England.

            Question. Has the Boston Division had any successful organized crime investigations outside of the Boston area?

            Answer. As a result of Federal prosecutions over a number of years, the Patriarca LCN faction in Worcester, Massachusetts has almost been neutralized as a criminal threat to the community.

            All pertinent members of the Genovese faction in Springfield, Massachusetts are presently under Federal RICO indictment awaiting trial. The Genovese LCN family has been charged as an illegal enterprise.

            The Boston Division was responsible for both the Worcester and Springfield, Massachusetts investigations.

            Question. What is the Patriarca family's role in the LCN's nationwide criminal activity? Do they stay in their own territory, or conduct illegal activities with other LCN families?

            Answer. In general, the Patriarca LCN family operates within New England. There are examples where they have operated outside New England, but these are relatively limited.

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            Based upon Title III intercepts between January and May of 1981, it is obvious that the Patriarca family does in fact have a relationship with other families throughout the United States. This was particularly emphasized as Ilario Zannino talked to three of his soldiers about the death of Philadelphia boss Phil Testa and the fact that the LCN family in New England should, when called upon by the commission, go to Philadelphia and help kill those responsible for the murder of Testa. There were also numerous conversations, particularly between Nick Angiulo and Gennaro Angiulo, concerning the New York family and the number of times Nick Angiulo traveled to visit the New York family to obtain more information, particularly as it related to the running of the LCN.

            During the Gallo-Profaci war in the late 1960's in New York, Patriarca did loan one of his trusted aids to New York in an attempt to settle the dispute. In 1976, former Government witness Joseph Barboza was murdered in San Francisco by four members of the Boston LCN who were believed to have set up the hit through the West Coast LCN. In summary, however, it would have to be said that this illegal enterprise confines the majority of its activities to the New England area.

            Question. Why were the civil components of the RICO Statute not utilized in this investigation?

            Answer. The initial phase of the Angiulo investigation was planned around the full use of RICO predicates; however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in September of 1980 that the RICO Statute did not apply to purely criminal enterprises. During the actual period of court-authorized electronic interception, the investigative and prosecutive theories were switched to substantive crimes of gambling, loansharking, etc., and thus greater minimization was required and conversations were lost because the RICO Statute was not cited in the court order. Shortly after termination of the electronic interception in the Angiulo case, the United States Supreme Court ruled in June of 1981 that the RICO Statute did apply to purely criminal organizations and thus the prosecutive and investigative direction reverted back to the utilization of the RICO theory.

            Since then, our Boston Office has used, is now using, and will continue to use the civil components of RICO, especially in the forfeiture area, to remove the profit motive from organized criminal activity.

            Question. Did the Patriarca Family use money-laundering techniques to "wash" the monies obtained from its illegal operations? Is money laundering a common practice engaged in by the LCN, or is it unique to the Patriarca Family?

            Answer. Investigation revealed that over a 18-month period, the Angiulo group laundered approximately $7 million between two Boston banks. The banks were later prosecuted, but the issue regarding the Patriarca Family's use of money-laundering techniques is still being investigated.

            Money laundering is not a practice restricted to the Patriarca LCN Family. It is a common practice among many organized crime groups.

            Question. Are there LCN families, other than the Patriarca family, conducting illegal activities in New England. And what activities are they engaged in?

            Answer. The New York Genovese LCN family has a regime in Springfield, Massachusetts, and two members of this regime are located in Worcester, Massachusetts. This family is active in gambling, loansharking and stolen property and has a heavy interest in gambling junkets. Certain of these individual members may also be involved in labor racketeering and narcotics.

            Question. How important are illegal gambling businesses to the Patriarca family? Can you estimate the approximate size and extent of their gambling business?

            Answer. In Boston, Gerry Angiulo often commented that he feared Federal gambling investigations, knowing that they could be used as RICO predicates. The Boston LCN faction controlled all the numbers, were heavy into sports bookmaking layoff, and conducted fraudulent charity sponsored Las Vegas nights where the charities were victimized by this group.

            It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that the illegal gambling business was the principal source of revenue for the Angiulo and Patriarca family as a whole. It was the single most important illegal activity that the New England family engaged in and has been for a period in excess of thirty years. This was primarily due to the business sense of the Angiulos and the way that they ran their gambling activity, particularly the numbers operation. Conservatively, based upon the records and testimony at trial, it is estimated that the approximate size and extent of the gambling business was $30,000 a day, strictly limited to the numbers operation run by the Angiulos in Boston. It is impossible to estimate the amount of money that was generated by their sports bookmaking.

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            Question. The FBI has done fine work against the LCN. The obvious question now is what is next? That is, who is filling the LCN void, and what are we doing about it?

            Answer. In the New England area, despite the successes achieved against the LCN, no void presently exists that would permit an emerging organized crime group to seize power. The LCN is still the dominant organized crime group in this area and will be for the foreseeable future.

            Question. In our 1984 Subcommittee Report on the Status of Organized Crime in the Mid-Atlantic Region, we concluded on page 67 of the Report that: ". . . emerging crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs should be investigated fully by law enforcement and immobilized before they become entrenched." Do you agree with that assessment of the Subcommittee's? If so, what is your office doing about them? Specifically, how many cases have you brought, and what resources have you allocated to them? Where do you take such investigations for prosecutions? U.S. Attorney?

            Answer. Yes, we agree with the 1984 Subcommittee report. However, the LCN continues to be the most significant organized crime group and therefore, receives the highest investigative priority. Investigations regarding emerging organized crime groups are allocated resources accordingly.

            The Organized Crime National Strategy calls for the LCN to receive the highest investigative priority, while addressing other organized crime groups and expanding existing intelligence on emerging organized crime groups to ensure that priorities are set properly and allocation of limited resources are utilized effectively and efficiently.

            One successful prosecution of several outlaw gang members was achieved in this Division partially as a result of a coordinated National effort against these groups. The outlaw motorcycle gangs in New England are not considered as serious a crime problem and, therefore, not demanding of the same investigative attention as is necessary in other parts of the United States. Investigations concerning outlaw motorcycle gangs in New England are normally prosecuted by the Organized Crime Strike Force.

            Question. In the same Report, our Subcommittee criticized the Department of Justice and the Organized Crime Strike Force for focusing their attention almost exclusively on the LCN. We stated on page 67 of the Report: "For too long, the Strike Forces have addressed the subject of organized crime as if the problem were one limited almost exclusively to La Cosa Nostra. The LCN is an important factor in organized crime, but it is not all there is to the problem." Do you agree with this 1984 assessment of the Subcommittee? Has it changed based upon your own experiences with your local Strikes Forces and U.S. Attorney offices?

            Answer. While we agree that the LCN is certainly not the only organized crime group present in New England, we feel it is by far the most dominant and accordingly, should continue to receive the most attention both from the FBI and the Strike Force. The LCN continues to be the most significant organized crime group. The prosecutive successes realized by the US. Department of Justice of LCN members in recent years may have served to curtail LCN organized crime activity but have not significantly diminished the threat the LCN poses to American society. The Organized Crime National Strategy calls for the LCN to receive the highest investigative priority, while addressing other organized crime groups to ensure that priorities and allocation of limited resources are utilized in the most efficient and effective manner. Investigative resources are committed to other organized crime groups to a limited degree, and these investigations are coordinated with the local Strike Force.

            Question. In our 1984 hearings on the status of organized crime in the Great Lakes region, the Subcommittee conducted a confidential survey of 30 past and present strike force attorneys and investigators. Twenty-six of the 30 respondents said they had firsthand, direct knowledge of instances in which they had gathered sufficient evidence to demonstrate a major organized criminal activity that was not part of or associated with an LCN family. But in each instance their requests for Strike Force assistance were denied because there was no LCN involvement. (page 13 of the Hearings and page 3 of the Report.)

            Are such observations accurate based upon your office's experience? In such a case, what does your office do with the investigation? Do you have problems taking it to a U.S. Attorney's office if it was rejected by the Strike Force? What should be done about this?

            Answer. We are not aware of any instances wherein any significant organized crime activity was not investigated because there is no LCN influence or involvement in the New England region. It is noted that in consultation with the Chief of

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the Strike Force on a periodic basis, all organized crime-related problems are examined, priorities set, and resources allocated; however, due to the continued strength of the LCN in this area, there has been no question as to the proper allocation of these resources. No serious criminal act in any organized crime group has gone unaddressed from this region.

            During the 1970's, the Boston Division aggressively investigated the racketeering activities of an organized crime group known as the "Winter Hill Gang." The "Winter Hill Gang" was comprised of members who were of Irish descent. As a result of these investigations, the hierarchy of this gang was arrested, convicted and incarcerated.

            Based upon the above statements, it should be concluded that the priorities of the Strike Force and the FBI are consistent in the New England Region. If a situation did arise where, due to lack of resources, the Strike Force was unable to handle a case, it would, of course, be referred to the U.S. Attorney's office.

            Question. In our report on the Status of Organized Crime in the Great Lakes Region, we noted that there appeared to be no agreement within the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice Department, which supervises the strike forces, as to what constituted organized crime. Do you agree with this assessment? How does your office define organized crime for prioritizing investigations? Do your priorities agree with the Strike Force's? US. Attorneys'? If not, where do they differ? What do you do when they differ?

            Answer. As previously stated, priorities of the field division agree with the local Strike Force Chiefs as well as the various U.S. Attorneys. In addition, this office is in complete agreement with established FBI national strategy concerning organized crime. The formulation of the FBI National Organized Crime Strategy is the result of many successes and some failures, designed by Agents who have actively engaged in the organized crime fight in the last several years. When applied at the field level, it is most effective in helping to assign priorities not only regionally but also in assisting to insure that not only is the regional program effective, but that it blends in and becomes a component of a national investigative strategy. This national strategy assists each field division in assessing and defining its own individual organized crime problem and in insuring that there are coherent national goals and objectives.

            Effective communication between this office, the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Strike Force Chief leaves no room for confusion or differences regarding the nature, scope and impact of organized crime; its investigative priority; and the strategy to be followed in addressing it.

            Question. On the first day of the hearings, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended to the Subcommittee that our organized crime efforts need to be based upon "careful strategic planning" that established clear objectives, assigns responsibilities and allocated our finite law enforcement efforts. Do you agree with such an analysis, and if you do, who do you recommend should establish such a well thought out plan for all Federal law enforcement agencies involved in the fight against organized crime?

            Answer. As previously discussed, the FBI has a carefully planned national strategy against organized crime, which has proven extremely effective. The FBI strategy is conveyed to other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through established liaison. The goal of all Federal law enforcement combating organized crime should be uniform; however, the strategies setting forth priorities, objectives, and techniques must be tailored by each agency depending upon their jurisdiction, intelligence base and resource availability.

            Question. GAO recommended that the current strike force planning vehicle, the National Organized Crime Planning Council (NOCPC), be expanded and intensified to accomplish this goal. NOCPC was established in response to prior criticism by this Subcommittee that the Justice Department's Organized Crime Program lacked "formal standards to measure effectiveness, lacked a national strategy and definition of organized crime." Although NOCPC is supposed to annually visit every strike force and discuss local problems with the various law enforcement agencies, it is our understanding, they rarely do so. Do you get any guidance from NOCPC? When was the last NOCPC meeting in your town? I understand, for example, that there hasn't been a NOCPC in Cleveland for three to four years? What is the system in existence in your city to discuss and lay out local strategies and allocate resources between agencies? When was the last time you met? Who attended? Who chaired the meeting?

            Answer. The last NOCPC meeting in New England was approximately four years ago and more recent scheduled meetings were canceled because of lengthy LCN trials in progress or budgeting problems on the part of the Justice Department.

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            Insofar as organized crime strategies in New England are concerned, I would again point to the FBI national investigative strategy against organized crime and the prioritization of criminal investigation within this strategy. Using this strategy, an FBI investigative strategy for the four New England states is written on a yearly basis in consultation with the Organized Crime Strike Force Chief. This strategy is directed at the LCN as a criminal enterprise and is reviewed periodically during the year by the Special Agent in Charge, Boston, his Organized Crime Program manager, and any changes necessary are made during the course of the year as warranted by case development or additions to the intelligence base.

            Joint organized crime intelligence meetings are periodically held during the year between the Boston and New Haven FBI Divisions to insure continuity of purpose and direction concerning the investigation of the LCN in New England.

            The Organized Crime Strike Force Chief in New England is either a personal attendee or has personal input into the meetings. Both the FBI and the Organized Crime Strike Force Chief coordinate intelligence and ongoing investigations through the Strike Force with other Federal agencies.

            In summary, the FBI national investigative strategy is used as a framework for the New England strategy, which is developed in conjunction with the Organized Crime Strike Force. This strategy is then coordinated between two FBI offices covering all of New England and with other Federal agencies through the Strike Force. FBI Program Management in Washington reviews the progress of these plans through various administrative controls.

            Question. As you know, on January 2, 1988, Attorney General Edwin Meese signed an "Order Directing New and Expanded Initiatives in the Federal Organized Crime Effort." As I read the order, it really addresses only the division of authority between the United States Attorney and the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Forces. As I understand it, prior to this order, the Strike Forces, under the direction of the Strike Force Chief in Washington, exercised control of their investigations, while keeping the U.S. Attorney advised of their activities in order to avoid possible conflicts. By contrast, this new order apparently gives the United States Attorney principal control of Strike Force investigations and prosecutions. The order even names the U.S. Attorney, as opposed to Strike Force superiors in Washington, as the "rating official" for the performance rating of the local Strike Force Chief. Now, the FBI has obviously worked organized crime cases with both the Strike Forces and the U.S. Attorney's Offices. Do you feel this order was necessary and, if so, why?

            Answer. The Boston Division of the FBI has enjoyed a commonality of purpose and prosecution with the Organized Crime Strike Force and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, as well as the U.S. Attorneys for the other New England districts. At the present time, the above order has not disturbed our working relationships in any fashion with any prosecutor. This harmonious relationship has certainly been a positive ingredient in recent successes in long-term, complex cases. The above-cited order to date has not demonstrated any positive or negative effect on our investigative efforts.

            Question: What is the current procedure for coordinating labor cases with the Strike Force and Labor Department? How can we be assured those problems won't occur again?

            Answer. At the first level, Boston FBI Agents are encouraged to routinely converse with their counterparts at the OLR and to exchange intelligence regarding labor racketeering at this level. Secondly, management of both these groups periodically meet to discuss cases of mutual interest and methods of procedure. Lastly, both the FBI and the Labor Department utilize the New England Organized Crime Strike Force as prosecutors and, therefore, there is a third level of communication to ensure that no investigation is at cross purposes with another.

            Question: Judge Sessions explained how the FBI effectively uses the "Task Force" concept in Organized Crime investigations to maximize the resources of Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. However, isn't it true that your office's investigation of a powerful LCN underboss was conducted solely by the Bureau because of the LCN's network of contacts throughout state and local government? Is it true that several members of the Boston Police Department were on the LCN family's payroll? Did the LCN's family influence extend to any Federal law enforcement personnel?

            Answer. In order to maintain the integrity of all its investigations whether inside or outside the FBI, the FBI operates on the need-to-know principle. Therefore, investigations concerning the LCN are not shared with FBI employees within the Boston Division or any other FBI office or FBI Headquarters entity that does not have a need to know.

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            In 1980 and 1981 the Task Force technique was not as widely used as it is today. In 1980 and 1981, while preparing for the court-authorized electronic surveillance at 98 Prince Street, the headquarters of the LCN in Boston, no consideration was given at that time to employ a Task Force concept relative to the electronic surveillance itself. Basically, the reasons are set forth as follows: All of law enforcement, to include local, state, and Federal agencies, were aware of the location of the LCN headquarters and the fact that this had been the same location for a period in excess of 20 years. The decision to utilize only FBI resources to include personnel, was based mainly upon the desire to maintain secrecy relative to all phases of this investigation. It was generally conceded that if in fact other law enforcement agencies were aware of the fact that the FBI had electronic surveillance at the headquarters of the LCN in Boston, this would have been a matter of conversation and would have quickly spread throughout all departments. This fact coupled with information received by the Boston Office that individuals of the Boston Police Department were known to have talked to members of the LCN and associates, firmly dictated that the FBI and the FBI alone would conduct all aspects of this investigation. As a result of the 3-month electronic surveillance at 98 Prince Street, it was determined that various members of the Boston Police Department had in fact been furnishing information to the LCN on a regular basis. The names of these individuals were made known during many of the conversations, and this information was relayed to the hierarchy of the Boston Police Department through the administrative staff of the FBI in Boston. Since all of the information was of a third party nature, no official charges were introduced during Federal court proceedings relative to these police officers. It is also noted that all of the police officers mentioned on the tape recordings retired shortly after the electronic surveillance became known to the general public and to all law enforcement.

            Some corruption in the Boston Police Department has been uncovered, and that problem is being addressed jointly by the Boston Police Department and the FBI.

            There has been no evidence gathered to indicate the LCN's influence extended to Federal law enforcement.

            Question. One of the purposes of these hearings is to strip away the myths surrounding the LCN and reveal to the public the true nature of these thugs and hoodlums. We must deglamorize organized crime to make it less appealing to those people who support it. Could you explain the problems which the FBI encountered from neighborhood supporters of the LCN during the Bureau's attempts to maintain surveillance of the LCN's Boston headquarters?

            How did you eventually overcome the problems presented by these sympathizers' efforts?

            Answer. The neighborhood support furnished the LCN in Boston relative to their headquarters located at 98 Prince Street was based upon the long-time association of the Angiulo brothers at that specific location (in excess of 30 years) and the personal friendships the Angiulos had made with many of the long-time residents of that area. This association, coupled with the fear and in some cases respect afforded the Angiulos lent itself to a neighborhood security network which made it virtually impossible for any law enforcement agency to enter the area without notification being made to the Angiulos by one or more of the local residents. Normally, these residents had no association with criminal activity but rather attempted to ingratiate themselves with the Angiulos by advising one or more of the Angiulos of the presence of law enforcement. This was verified on numerous occasions throughout the course of the court-authorized electronic surveillance. When any strange vehicle or individual appeared in the neighborhood, this information complete with all descriptive data, would be immediately referred to one or more of the Angiulos.

            An extensive plan was devised and instituted by the FBI for court-authorized entry into 98 Prince Street for the purpose of installing two surveillance microphones. The same plan was put into effect on five different occasions regarding each entry into the location in order to maintain and/or replace the equipment.

            Only when the results of the conversations were made public through court proceedings and subsequently reprinted in all major media newspapers within the Boston area did the sympathy for the Angiulos and their associates dissipate in the North End section of Boston. The same individuals who had been held in high esteem by many of the local residents were now displayed as murderers, extortionists, and as individuals whose primary interest was to conduct criminal activity. Much of the support which had been in evidence for the Angiulos was eradicated.

            These obstacles were overcome by thorough planning, total dedication on the part of Agent personnel willing to undergo physical rigor for long hours, and knowledge that any error in execution would jeopardize the investigation. The investigation

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could not and did not make any damaging mistakes, and when Agents were active in the area they managed to blend into the locale.

            Question. Did your electronic surveillance operation reveal the Boston LCN planning any murders and, if so, was the FBI able to avert any of the planned killings? If so, how was this accomplished?

            Is it true your electronic surveillance operation disclosed that the Los Angeles LCN family used a member of the Boston family to commit a murder in San Francisco? Do LCN families usually use members of other families to do their hits for them?

            Answer. During the course of the 103-day electronic surveillance, members of the LCN discussed the murder of three individuals and discussed the details concerning six murders which had previously been committed by themselves or other members of the LCN. With relation to the three ongoing murders that were discussed, the following facts are set forth: On March 31, 1981, the murder of Angelo Patrizzi was discussed between the Underboss, Gennaro Angiulo, the Capo Regime Sammy Granito and an LCN soldier, Freddy Simone. Granito and Simone discussed with Angiulo the previous attempts to kill Angelo Patrizzi, who expressed his desire for revenge relative to the murder of his brother by the LCN three years previously. The decision to kill Patrizzi was also made and sanctioned by the Underboss in order to avoid Patrizzi killing any member of the LCN. On March 21, 1981, Angiulo again discussed this murder with Capo Regime Ilario Zannino and explained to Zannino in detail the reasons why this murder had to occur. Efforts were made by the FBI upon identifying the victim of this proposed murder to locate and warn Patrizzi. However, Patrizzi was in fugitive status at this time having escaped from a halfway house and could not be located by the FBI. It is noted that in June of 1981, the badly decomposed body of Angelo Patrizzi was found in the trunck of a car in the vicinity of Lynn, Massachusetts. Because of the decomposed nature of the body, the exact time of death could not be verified. However, based upon investigation which disclosed his last known whereabouts prior to his death, it appears evident that Patrizzi was killed shortly after or on March 15, 1981, which was the last date he was seen by friends. Patrizzi was wearing the exact same clothes on that date that were found on him in June of 1981.

            On March 19, 1981, Gennaro Angiulo, Underboss, ordered the execution of an individual known as Walter Lafrenier and ordered that the execution be carried out by two LCN members, Richard Gambale and Peter Limone. Immediately upon receiving this information at the monitoring site, FBI Agents instituted efforts to locate and warn Lafrenier. This was accomplished a few hours after the actual converstion and prior to the LCN reaching Lafrenier. Lafrenier was advised that he was to be killed, that a contract had been placed on his life, and appropriate security precautions would be afforded him by the FBI if he so desired. Lafrenier did not request any protection from the FBI and when the LCN attempted to reach him and ask him to come for a ride, he responded, "Why, so you can kill me?" Lafrenier then proceeded to tell the LCN of the FBI's warning which was immediately given back to Gennaro Angiulo. LCN efforts to kill Lafrenier were placed in abeyance and were never carried out.

            On April 23, 1981, Ilario Zannino gave an order to three LCN members to execute an individual by the name of Harvey Cohen. Zannino advised his soldiers that the execution was to take place "for the family in New York." Zannino then proceeded to tell his soldiers how he wanted the murder accomplished and, based upon this conversation, it appeared that the murder would not take place for approximately three to four days. The next morning, following this conversation, the FBI located and advised Cohen that a murder contract had been placed on him. Cohen left the area and remained out of the Boston area for approximately a five-year period, long after the convictions against Angiulo and all high-ranking members of the LCN.

            In short, of the three planned killings by the LCN during the course of the electronic surveillance, two were averted by the FBI and one could not be averted due to the fugitive status of the victim himself and the inability to locate him prior to his murder.

            During the course of the electronic surveillance, Gennaro Angiulo, Underboss, and Ilario Zannino, Capo Regime, openly discussed the murder of Joe Baron Barboza and the fact that a Boston soldier by the name of Joe Russo had accomplished the hit in the San Francisco area in 1976. Zannino discussed his part in setting up this murder and the fact the murder had been helped by members of the Los Angeles family. Based upon this discussion and the previously mentioned planned murder of Harvey Cohen, which was to have been committed for the family in New York, it appears certain that LCN families do in fact use members of other families to do their "hits" for them.

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            While not having the factual information to refer to specific murders, Boston FBI intelligence has indicated that New England LCN members have assisted New York LCN families with their problems. One of the organizational strengths of the LCN has been the ability of one family to call upon the resources of another, where specific situations warranted. This would still be considered a valid investigative assumption. However, in New England, the usual case would appear to be that the New England LCN did their own murders and that a prospective member had to commit or participate in one murder before he could become a "made" member of the LCN.

            Question. Did the Boston LCN family have any close ties to any of the New York families? Did any of the New York families represent the Boston families in matters involving the Commission?

            Answer. Based upon conversations intercepted at 98 Prince Street, it appears evident that Boston members, particularly the Underboss Gennaro Angiulo, former Boss Raymond L.S. Patriarca, and Consigliere Nicolo Angiulo did in fact have close connections to the New York families. Angiulo commented at length regarding a meeting he had with former LCN boss Vito Genovese while in New York with Raymond Patriarca. Nicolo Angiulo also discussed the number of times he traveled to New York to meet with other consiglieres of the LCN relative to policies of the LCN nationwide.

            Intelligence subsequent to this investigation has indicated that the New England LCN was and still is represented on the "Commission" by the New York Genovese family.

            Question. Traditionally, we have been told that LCN members do not operate outside of their home country. However, there is evidence of suspected LCN figures from Naples operating in Springfield, Massachusetts, aligned with one of the New York families. Is this true? If so, what kind of operations are they engaged in?

            Is there evidence of similar relationships between LCN figures from Italy and other American families?

            What does this suggest for the future?

            Answer. This specific situation refers to two individuals that have been arrested in the Springfield, Massachusetts area and were found to be members of the Camorra, a centuries-old criminal group operating out of the Naples, Italy and surrounding area. While a separate criminal organization, in recent years it appears that members of the Camorra have become closely aligned with the Sicilian Mafia and like the Sicilian Mafia have had members emigrate to various European and other western countries including the United States. On September 13, 1984, one Antonio Orlando Manzi was arrested by Massachusetts State Police for the sale of 6 ounces of cocaine. He was subsequently convicted and is currently serving a 7-to-10 year sentence in the Massachusetts penal system. During the investigation, it was determined that Manzi was wanted in Italy for offenses including two counts of homicide, armed robbery and Camorra association. Manzi has subsequently been ordered extradited and has appealed the order.

            Manzi is a member of the Nuova Camorra Organization (NCO) and while in the United States was associated with a member of the New York Genovese family operating out of the Springfield, Massachusetts area. Upon arrival from Italy, Manzi was allegedly given employment by this Genovese LCN member in his gambling operations and later became involved in cocaine trafficking in Springfield, Massachusetts and Albany, New York, with his brother, Carmine Manzi, a naturalized U.S. citizen.

            On June 5, 1987, one Biagio Cava was arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for illegal entry into the United States and possession of false documents. He subsequently pled guilty to the Federal charges and signed a waiver of extradition to Italy wherein he was turned over to Italian authorities to serve a previously imposed sentence of 5 1/2 years for conviction of charges of extortion, weapons possession, telephone threats and Camorra association. Cava is also reportedly under investigation for conspiracy to murder an Italian judicial official.

Cava is alleged to be a member of the Nuova Famiglia (NF) faction of the Camorra, the opposing faction to the NCO Family. He survived an ambush-murder attempt in 1983 in which a companion was killed. Antonio Orlando Manzi (supra) has been convicted of this attack. INS provided information that Cava was in the Springfield, Massachusetts area to kill Antonio Manzi, a member of a rival Camorra faction.

            Cava was also aligned with the Genovese LCN Family and their associates in the Springfield, Massachusetts area.

            Concerning relationships between the New England LCN and the Sicilian Mafia, the following is set forth:

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            FBI, Boston, intelligence indicates that members of the Sicilian Mafia have come to this area, but are put under the control of, the local LCN. After a, period of time; they may be made members of the Patriarca family, or be told to go back to  Sicily; What type of relationship ,these people maintain with the Mafia in Sicily, is not clearly, known at this point, nor is it really known if they maintain a sort of dual membership.

            One thing appears certain is that an the New England area, there is contact between the Patriarca LCN family and the Sicilian Mafia and that what is convenient, efficient and profitable for both of these groups will dictate the future. The Sicilians have demonstrated that they are international citizens and often have more contacts across the country than the traditional LCN in large most part because many of their associates from Italy have also immigrated to the United States and aligned themselves in some manner with other traditional LCN families.

            Question. There is also evidence of cooperation between the LCN and Chinese organized crime groups in Massachusetts, primarily in connection with gambling junkets. How was this relationship developed and what is the nature of the cooperation between these two organized crime groups?         

            Is there evidence to suggest that this kind of cooperation between traditional and emerging criminal groups is increasing?                               

            How would you characterize relationships between these groups in New England?

            Answer. At the present time there is no evidence to indicate substantial illegal or legal business dealings between Chinese organized crime in Massachusetts and the LCN. However, there is certainly contact between these groups. The Genovese LCN family in Springfield, Massachusetts, and their associates, have been active in gambling junkets to Las Vegas and Atlantic City for years. Through these junkets, Genovese LCN members reportedly became acquainted with a Chinese OC leader from Boston.             

            Another Chinese OC leader in Boston and an elder associate had a preexisting acquaintance with underboss Gennaro Angiulo who would reportedly have late night meetings in Boston's Chinatown.

            To date, no significant criminal activity between these groups has been observed or reported. It would appear that, at, present, these two groups appear desirous of having the ability to communicate with each other while going their separate ways: There has been no known increase or change in the nature of contact between these two groups in recent times and the Chinese OC influence still appears to be limited to the ethnic community.'"               

            Question. The FBI has reported that, during the past 10 years, the New England LCN's various illegal activities have generally decreased or remained stable, with the exception of its involvement in extortion, which has increased significantly. To what do you attribute this rise in extortion cases?

            Answer. Historically the LCN in Boston actively participated in conducting illegal gambling in numbers, sports, horse and dog races. The LCN leaders knew how to manage and operate these forms of enterprises as they had substantial experience while working their way up through the ranks. These leaders were eventually convicted and the replacement leaders had two problems: first, they literally did not know how to manage large bookmaking enterprises and second, they were reluctant to participate in day-to-day management as this left them exposed to Federal RICO prosecution utilizing gambling predicate acts. The newer leadership was unable to just take over the operation of incarcerated members so they began to extort all identifiable bookmakers into paying weekly or monthly "rent' to the LCN in order to be allowed to operate. Anyone not wanting to pay was told to get out of the bookmaking business or be killed and that all bookmakers "had to be with someone," i.e., an LCN member. This tactic allowed the newer LCN leaders access to a quick source of income from a group that would not complain legally nor were they in a position to resist and still remain in the business.

            Reportedly, the LCN periodically applies this same tactic to drug dealers but this information is less detailed than the above.

            Question. Historically, the New England LCN family has generally confined itself to illegal ventures, choosing not to attempt to infiltrate legitimate businesses. Has this remained true during the recent boom in high-technology businesses which has occurred in New England?

            Answer. Yes.

            For years the New England LCN has dominated without any serious competition in the traditional crimes of gambling, loansharking, extortion and to some extent involved themselves directly in aspects of the drug trade. At the same time they remained a relatively small family led by the same person for 30 years. This left a

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group where everybody was making money and the family was controlled by an older mentality.

Gennaro Angiulo did not want to get involved in labor racketeering fearing this would bring too much attention from law enforcement. Younger members were brought up in the old school and do not appear to have ever been schooled in the sophisticated white-collar/business crimes demonstrated by other LCN familiar in the country. During the boom in high technology business in Massachusetts, which is ongoing, the situation has remained the same to date.